Empires, Colonies, Indigenous Peoples

Introduction: Sociologists and the Colonial Past and the Imperial Present

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Sociologists based in the US have been involved in the historical and comparative study of empires, colonies, and indigenous peoples since the 1870s, with a relative hiatus only between the 1970s and the 1990s (Steinmetz 2009, 2018; Go 2013). This was the same period in which sociologists in the metropoles of the former European empires such as Britain and France withdrew to their homelands and contracted a case of severe disciplinary amnesia about the fact that a large proportion of their members had been working in and on the colonies for almost a century beforehand. In the United States, and in other countries founded on colonial slavery and the displacement and
genocide of indigenous peoples (Belmessous 1998; Fenelon 1998), the present remains inescapably colonial (Gregory 2004). The CHS section panel at the 2017 ASA meetings on “Empires, Colonies, Indigenous Peoples,” sought to showcase some of the recent efforts by sociologists to deal with the colonial past and present by bringing together specialists in the British and American empires and postcolonies and imperial frontiers with indigenous societies.

References


Indigenous and European laws of nations in North America to 1763

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Over the last few years, I have been engaged in a research project that focuses on European and indigenous legal interactions. This research has shown that European expansion was a legal process in which native peoples participated. The legal world in which Europeans and indigenous peoples negotiated their relations was not a European world. It was shaped, from the beginning of that expansion, by both indigenous and European peoples. Each group used concepts to engage in a continuing political conversation grounded on a variety of European and native legal traditions. They also used violence, not as an alternative to legal discussion, but to back up legal claims whenever diplomacy had failed. This paper focuses on two sites of legal engagement to illustrate the level of interactions between European and Native American peoples: legal dealings concerning territorial control, and discourses regarding the protection of political subjects.

Indigenous peoples participated in the legal process of European expansion mainly through treaty-making, in order to negotiate European presence on their territory, and through the expression of territorial claims.

Historians tend to be dismissive of these treaties, because of the amount of fraud and treachery involved in the history of treaty-making. However, they are valuable tools to uncover indigenous understandings of this form of legal exchange, as well as indigenous strategies in negotiating with European powers.

Europeans promoted treaty-making as a more legitimate means of acquiring land than conquest or occupation. In this way, they could reconcile expansion with moral and juridical legitimacy. Native peoples engaged in treaty-making as a way of furthering their interests, even though from such agreements they would gain far less
overall than the Europeans, and often even less than what they had bargained for.

Colonial treaties varied greatly. They could be about war and peace, and trade, as well as about property and sovereignty. Some treaties were formal and written, others were informal and verbal agreements. Some treaties were public agreements between sovereigns, others were private agreements between individuals. On the indigenous side, those who engaged in treaty-making were sovereigns, tribal leaders, and communities. North-eastern American communities could send several delegates when the interests of their people conflicted internally. There are also instances where individuals acted on their own behalf. Their signature was then only binding upon them. European authorities, however, refused to accept this important point, as it was inconsistent with their law of nations, in which individuals either represented a sovereign or had no standing. Yet, in Algonquian politics, treaties had to be negotiated by entrusted leaders and then confirmed by the nation to be valid.

Europeans did not engage in treaty-making with all indigenous peoples, and historians have wondered about whether cultural stereotypes could have influenced this policy-making. Scholars have argued that Europeans concluded treaties with local groups they saw as militarily powerful, and did not engage in treaty-making with weaker groups. Studies have indicated that Europeans concluded treaties with non-European societies they characterized as fairly advanced culturally, while rejecting the possibility of negotiating with peoples they believed to be uncivilized—suggesting therefore that some degree of cultural equality was needed. The argument that Europeans used anthropology to promote or dismiss treaty-protocol has been recently challenged by Alain Beaulieu. He argues that, in America, from the 17th to the 19th century, the British did not simply measure native entitlements according to their use of agriculture and the complexity of their political structures. They made treaties with nomadic Upper Canadian groups with flexible political structures, but not with sedentary and farming communities such as the Iroquois of the Saint Lawrence River Valley and the Hurons (Wendats) who had more complex political structures. Clearly, opportunism and self-interest mattered more than cultural perception. Europeans engaged in treaty-making when the balance of power was favourable to indigenous peoples, and they ignored native claims when they got the upper hand. Anthropology was a discourse the Europeans used subsequently to justify their acknowledgement or denial of indigenous claims.

Indigenous peoples used treaty-making to further their own interests. For example, Colonists reported that Mi'kmaq initiatives to conclude treaties aimed to settle land disputes. In instances where there was great anxiety about the security of settlers’ individual rights of property, some British settlers sought to conclude treaties of purchase to get an unquestionable title on the land. The weakness of the Crown’s title to the land in the early decades of settlement in those colonies, made mere claims that native peoples had no title, problematic for settlers. In such context, they could not be certain that the land was theirs and that nobody else would challenge their property. This uncertainty contributed to recognition of a number of indigenous land owners in North America.

Native peoples also concluded treaties with Europeans to gain support in their rivalries with other native groups. Native Americans exploited European rivalries the same way that Europeans exploited indigenous rivalries. The history of North American native nations up to 1763, that is of the way indigenous peoples used imperial competition to further their own interests, perfectly illustrates what has been characterized as ‘balance-of-power politics’.

There is plenty of evidence contesting the idea that the legal argumentation concerning dispossession was a product of European culture which indigenous peoples appropriated in the
twentieth century. Contrary to common perception, European justifications of colonisation should be understood in various contexts as a form of counterclaim.

European and indigenous peoples were able to cross cultural boundaries and enter into political and legal negotiations, even if they did not always respect the terms of their agreements. Both parties included each other in processes that resonated within their own cultures.

Protection was one of the most important legal discourses and practices which European and indigenous peoples shared. European discourses of protection originated in the ancient Near Eastern and Greco-Roman worlds, and emphasised the patriarchal responsibility of rulers in relation to their subjects. From the Renaissance, social-contract theorists redefined protection as a duty sovereigns owed to their subjects for their obedience, rather than a privilege they extended as paternal rulers.

Though the duty to protect was mainly exercised within the limits of sovereignty, Europeans started extending their claim to protect outside those limits in the early modern period, especially in the context of their overseas expansion. They justified their expansion through their Christian duty to protect other peoples. The promise to protect the colonised (to guarantee their security, their property, their rights) was challenged, however, by the pursuit of domination and exploitation. To deal with this impossible contradiction, Spanish and then British colonisers invented new categories of people in need of extra protection—the natives—and institutions were created to make their defence official.

Protection was not simply a European principle that European powers imposed upon native societies. The native peoples who they colonised, employed comparable principles in their societies. Even though their principles had different meanings, the framework of the language of protection facilitated the conduct of relations. Native American peoples understood what protection involved, and had translatable equivalents in their own political arrangements, that, however approximate, they used to further their interests. The practice of so-called ‘adoption’, whereby one community would come under the wing of a more powerful one for diplomatic and military matters, resembled protection as the Europeans understood it. The Iroquois Confederacy had traditionally stimulated their demographic and military forces through the adoption of neighbouring groups such as the Erie and Neutral refugees who were seeking protection as their nations collapsed in the 17th century. In the following century, the Iroquois chose to bring entire nations under their protection, apparently to preserve the social structure of their own society. They established a tributary network based more on their sociability towards other communities than on belligerence. Within that alliance, the Iroquois used kinship to convey the unequal relationships between themselves and their allies. While the allies were referred to as nephews and children, the Iroquois carried the title of uncles: as such they held authority over the nephews for whom they were responsible. In the early 18th century, both the Delaware and the Tuscaroras of North Carolina sought Iroquois protection after they had lost most of their men in war. Protection entailed the transfer of their territorial rights to the Iroquois Confederacy, who also became responsible for their diplomatic affairs.

The existence of these legal interactions raises at least two significant questions for our understanding of colonial encounters. The first question concerns the translation of indigenous concepts and their characterisation as legal. Until recently, the emphasis of the linguistic turn upon showing subjects in their historical contexts has prevented historians from addressing indigenous law, as native peoples were not employing similar legal notions. I have argued elsewhere that there is ample evidence, both in the primary and secondary literature, showing that Europeans generally conceded that native peoples had laws. Native peoples themselves represented their societies in terms of law, when their claims were
translated on first contact with Europeans. When France ceded claims to large territories in North America with the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, the Wabanaki Confederacy objected to the new English claims of title. The Wabanaki made a series of representations culminating in a letter they delivered to Georgetown in July 1721. This letter was written in Algonquian and translated by Jesuit missionaries into Latin, French and English, and it was read aloud in all four languages to the English. The English version declared “my land dont belong to the, neither by right of Conquest, nor by Donation, nor by purchase.” (1) These are three of the main bases for dominium employed in the European law of nations. The Wabanaki were possibly conscious of the claims in the European law of nations, but they were clearly also using those terms as approximations for terms in their own culture. A similar process was evident in the recent successful claim by New Zealand Māori’s for recognition of the legal personality of the Wanganui River in New Zealand law.

A second matter raised by the existence of these legal negotiations, concerns the space in which they were formulated. It appears that native peoples recognised a system of conventions outside civil society and between peoples which contemporary Europeans described as the law of nations and later as international law. Lawyers and historians are now debating whether defining these indigenous legal systems as international law is or is not anachronistic. We could move beyond that discussion by appropriating the pre-modern notions used to describe law outside of civil society, for example, the Roman ius gentium or the French droit des gens which we might translate as the ‘law of peoples’. Whether such conventions exist as laws given that they lack the sanction of sovereign authority is debatable. What matters, however, is that various peoples have felt the need to employ the concept of laws that apply between peoples and in so doing recognised a common humanity.

Endnotes

Legacies of Suspicion: From British Colonial Emergency Regulations to the ‘War on Terror’ in Israel and India
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For over a half century, Israel has relied on the Defense (Emergency) Regulations to thwart domestic threats, primarily targeting Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Though this set of colonial regulations began during the British Mandate of Palestine, a politically controversial Anti-Terrorism Bill the Israeli Parliament passed in November 2016, transforms the draconian provisions of the emergency regulations into "regular" law. Ironically, the democratic process of formalizing and legitimizing anti-terrorism legislation may in fact sanction the sweeping curtailment of rights for all Israeli citizens, not just Palestinian Israelis.

The institutionalization of counterinsurgency legislation is an important historical juncture, whereby a state's perception of security threats demarcates the scope of executive power as well as the fault lines between the boundaries of citizenship and what the regime considers national loyalty.

In this paper, I conduct a critical comparison of the trajectory of colonial emergency regulations in India and in Israel, in order to highlight the role of institutionalization in legitimating civil rights violations by the state. In India, the emergency regulations became part of primary legislation (Singh 2007) shortly after independence. In Israel, the bill that formalized and incorporated powers of counterinsurgency into primary legislation only passed in 2016.
How did this formalization influence the boundaries of bureaucratic activity that infringes upon civil rights for political and security needs?

Political scientists and legal scholars have examined the history of emergency laws in cases when democratic principles have clashed with security needs in specific local conditions (Hofnung 2001), or when there is an assumed "delicate balance" between human rights and state perceptions of "self-preservation" (Gross 2001). Brooks (2004) looked at how emergency laws were developed in the context of transnational partnerships in the global war on terror, focusing on the practices and technologies of "homeland security." Some will argue that the legislative activities in both Israel and India are part of a global counter-terrorism phenomenon led by the United States.

I present an alternative analysis that shows how the anti-terrorism bill encapsulates the emergency legacy of British colonialism (Hussain 2003) and produces a bureaucratic triple bind between security, loyalty and identity. By comparing India and Israel—two former British Empire territories where emergency regulations were used extensively—we can trace how contemporary anti-terrorism bills in both countries have strong similarities to their colonial predecessors. The historical development of the British toolkit of emergency regulations for managing population is inscribed into contemporary practices. Both the existing Indian laws and the new Israeli law harbor a similar organizational logic and the same spatial-legal tools they inherited from colonial rule. These laws involve practices of identifying and classifying populations according to their level of hostility or the security risk they pose to the central regime, on an "axis of suspicion" (Berra, 2015). Today, these tools, initially developed by the interwar British Empire, are clearly distinct from the counterterrorism legislation in other states, including Britain (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).

Following the Defense of the Realm Act of 1914, the use of emergency regulations and decrees expanded into a repertoire of spatial-legal practices that proliferated across the British colonies and possessions. These practices became the colonial governments' main instrument of population management. Rather than being directed universally at the entire population, emergency laws targeted certain problematic or "dangerous" segments of the subject population. Although classifying populations was a central theme of British colonial governance (Singha 2000), the pace of classification accelerated when it came time to determine who would inhabit the territory in the future. The partition plans in India and in Palestine were intended to resolve inter-communal conflicts. However, as is evident by the flurry of activity in the home ministry regarding documentation of domicile and residency, they also demanded swift bureaucratic classification of populations along clear categories of race, nationality and religion. One of my findings was that in addition to the preoccupation with population taxonomies, classification was also according to the degree of loyalty to the regime, or the suspicion of posing a security risk, which I call "the axis of suspicion".

The classification and monitoring systems were critical because they enabled the colonial bureaucracy to use emergency laws as a practical tool of government. India and Israel inherited the classification systems after independence, and thus the partition turned minorities in India and Palestinians in Israel into foreign and dangerous populations (Kemp 1999). The minority populations were perceived as hostile because they were on the "wrong" side of the border—they were supposed to be in the territory allocated by the partition plan, in a different state (Dvi, 2013). As foreigners belonging to a separate political entity, minorities became suspects a priori and enemies de facto. The inheritance of British colonial emergency laws by the independent states included the institutional logic of managing dangerous
populations and preventing insurgency by bureaucratic means, using the emergency defense regulations.

In comparison to the partition of India, no Palestinian state was ever established in Israel. The attitude of the Israeli state apparatus towards the remainder of the Palestinian population blurred the boundaries between a security threat and a political threat, specifically regarding their status as an enemy population whose very citizenship was questioned until as late as 1952, when the Citizenship Law was passed. The practicable rights of the Palestinian minority went into effect de facto only when the military regime was dismantled in 1966 (Boymel 2002).

Despite the similarity in the legacies of emergency regulations in both India and Israel, the relationship between citizenship and security in the two countries evolved differently. In India, the inherited laws were used against all citizens, including members of the Hindu majority. In Israel, conversely, the laws targeted the subjects of the military regime who became Palestinian citizens of Israel. Emergency regulations were used against Jewish citizens only in a handful of cases.

Looking at these cases as connected histories allows us to investigate the impact of institutional change on the legitimacy of state’s tools of counterinsurgency. As we shall see, institutional structures and trajectories of law affect legitimacy to use state violence, and shape the scope and depth of measures the state can use against its citizens.

Studies on institutional legacies in former colonies, despite their rigor and theoretical innovations (for example Mahoney 2003; Lange 2009), have treated bureaucratic and legislative procedures as almost neutral variables, overlooking how bureaucratic practices and routines are not only outcomes of policies, but also actually produce political outcomes (Bourdieu 1994; Hull, 2012).

In this article, the institutional perspective to the continuity of emergency laws that I introduce, reveals the links between security legislation, the "routinization of emergency" (Borda 2017), and citizenship in "aspiring" democracies.

Relying on my observations of bureaucratic officials and their correspondence, I argue that the organizational mechanism utilized by the new states to create juridical and administrative continuity affected the legitimacy of using emergency legislation against civilians. A comparative study of emergency regulations in Israel and in India illuminates the inherent tension of the liberal principle of “the rule of law”. This binary principle (legal/illegal) attributes great importance to the manner in which laws are passed in democratic institutions. It gives procedural formalization the political legitimacy to infringe on civil rights, so long as the infringement abides by institutional standards (Lavi 2006). Yet the principle of the rule of law largely ignores the content of the laws, even when laws preserving security include potential infringements of civil and political rights to such a degree that democratic structure becomes hollow. The comparison evokes the dialectic relationship between the ostensibly democratic formalization of colonial defense regulations, and its contents. The formalization in India led to broader infringement of the rights of citizens across the board. In Israel, a patchwork of defense regulations led to the targeted and severe infringement of the rights of the Palestinian minority during the military regime of 1949 to 1967, and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories from 1967 onwards.

The findings in this article are based on archival material from the Interior and Justice ministries in Israel and in India, following the first five years after independence (State Archives in Jerusalem, National Archives in New Delhi, and National Archives UK), and consisting primarily of organizational correspondence between officials.

In the first part of the paper, I trace how the British Empire established the practices of
policing and managing populations through emergency laws in the colonial era. Classification of populations transformed emergency regulations into a toolbox for preventing resistance to the regime. Legal analysis sees the declaration of emergency as a foundational moment of sovereignty—whether or not one accepts Carl Schmitt’s notorious definition of a sovereign as the one who charts the boundary between friend and a foe (1985). However, I demonstrate that labeling a population as friend or foe in the British colonies was not a moment, but a process (Shenhav 2012). Labeling the population as dangerous or hostile was the product of a set of bureaucratic practices that evolved over time. At the outset, such labeling was intended to control “security threats” during times of crisis, but emergency powers spawned an ever-expanding list of administrative categories that created a fluid interchangeability between those who were considered a security threat and those considered a political threat, through the routinization of emergency.

I focus on the process of labeling populations through the creation of “blacklists” and the sorting of prisoners into “security” and “political” prisoners. The colonial regime, which fought against national liberation movements, saw some political activity as a security risk that endangered the existence of the regime. Used primarily during crisis, classification reinforced the institutional logic that blurred the official distinctions between political and paramilitary activities. Among its tools are administrative detention and spatial-legal limitations on movement. Classifying populations as suspicious was one of the counterinsurgency methods used in Ireland, India, Palestine, and other colonies (Khalili 2010). After independence, the newly independent states inherited this institutional logic—but each state took a different approach to formalizing these emergency powers. In the case of India, I focus on legal tools for coping with potential opposition to the regime. Such legal tools were incorporated quickly into primary legislation, including administrative detention, limitations on movement and the granting of special powers to security forces. In the Israeli case, I discuss the direct deployment of the defense emergency regulation in the permit system operated by the Israeli military government on the Palestinian citizens of Israel from 1949 to 1966.

The final part of the paper discussed the last two decades of security legislation. Since the 1990s, emergency legislation, originally devised to govern subject populations threatening colonial regimes, has transformed into anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency legislation both in India and in Israel. The political partnership between the two states has intensified with the “global war on terror”. The scaffolding of anti-terrorism legislation in both countries has three key principles, inherited from colonial legislation: broad discretion to security bureaucrats; limitations on movement; and spatial definition of entire geographical areas as "dangerous" areas or areas of “terrorist infrastructures.” In the Israeli bill (2016), the classification of populations as hostile is broadly construed to include kinship or geographic links sufficient to define a person as a terrorism supporter. In India, powers are enacted based on places defined as “disturbed areas”. In both cases, the legal-spatial definition blurs the boundaries between identity, belonging and security risk. Through these principles, the colonial logic of managing populations is a key component of the perception of “homeland security” practices in recent years in these two former colonies.

Both in the Israeli and Indian laws, the broad legal-spatial definitions and vague terminology used to define the boundaries of terrorism, make participation in political activity in general and public events in particular, a risky affair for minority populations already perceived as dangerous by the regime. It differentiates the possible political repertoire for opposition and dissent by race. The offenses for supporting, identifying with, and abetting terrorism, are defined so broadly (with terms like “terrorist act”, “terrorist organization”, and “membership
of a terrorist organization”) that political identity, belonging to a particular community, or residence in an area designated as “terrorist infrastructure”, can be enough to suspend one’s right to due process. Practically, defining entire populations as dangerous, because they live in a particular area or identify with a general political cause, strongly resembles population management by the British colonial regime. The criminalization of belonging is not confined to these cases, as law enforcement practices and bureaucratic repertoires deployed against opposition are differentiated by race in the US, for instance in Ferguson Missouri Police Department.

Such legislation carries even greater force when it is enshrined in primary legislation. In such context, even a population within the state becomes a potential enemy—in legal and administrative terms—and finds itself at the receiving end of the same measures reserves for external enemies at times of war. The institutionalization of anti-terrorist legislation in both India and Israel, through its classificatory power, charts the boundaries of political membership. Anti-terrorism legislation redefines loyal citizenship because it transforms bureaucratic practices that blur the distinction between political threat and security threat from a temporary toolkit into permanent legislation. If it follows the path taken by India, then basing legislation on political belonging and identity in Israel will enable a broad assault on the civil rights of not only Palestinians but also Jewish members of the opposition, changing the “ethnocratic” nature of the political regime (Yiftachel 2006).

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**Imperial Returns: American Empire and Police Militarization**

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During the Standing Rock protests in North Dakota in 2016 and 2017, Native-American activists and their allies faced hundreds of state police, county sheriff’s deputies from seven states, and the North Dakota National Guard. The police did not come in peace. They brought an array of paramilitary police vehicles, including bearcats, humvees, and at least one Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle. They soon put this equipment to use: attacking protesters with rubber bullets and tear gas canisters shot from grenade launchers. At least one thousand protestors were treated for chemical poisoning, hypothermia, rubber bullet and nonlethal beanbag wounds, among many more serious injuries. But this was not the first time that a heavily armed police used force against racialized minorities on American soil. Two years earlier, at Ferguson, Missouri, African-American groups and their allies had taken to the streets to protest the killing of 18-year old Michael Brown. They too faced a formidable police apparatus, including not only MRAP Vehicles but also Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams wearing uniforms resembling those of the US Marines and armed short-barreled 5.56-mm rifles based on the military M4 carbine. Witnesses were unequivocal: Ferguson looked “like a war zone” (CBS News 2014).

If these two seemingly separate incidents attest to the typical repression of minority voices by the American state, they also testify to the militarization of American policing. According to Kraska’s (2007: 3) often used definition, “militarization” is “the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model”, and this can involve the adoption of “material”, “cultural”, “organizational” and “operational” aspects of the military. The examples from Standing Rock and Ferguson make clear that police have indeed adopted military materials by a program known commonly as the “1033 Program” (referring to the section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997). But police forces have also adopted operational, organizational and cultural aspects of the military too. For instance, the police’s SWAT teams use military-style training and tactics, and by 2005, they were deployed up to fifty thousand times per year.

This militarization of American policing has received wide attention recently. Scholars, the press, and documentary filmmakers have highlighted its origins, extent and detrimental effects. But these discussions rest upon two unstated assumptions that my paper problematizes. The first assumption is that the militarization of policing is somehow something new. Many point to the 1033 Program as the historical origin. Others go back further to the so-called “War on Drugs.” But historical analyses of police militarization that go further back than the past few decades are few and far between, as if before the 1980s or 1990s, policing in America was some sort of prelapsarian utopia uncorrupted by militaristic weaponry or forms.
Yet, even a cursory look at the history of modern policing suggests that the militarization of police runs deep. The adoption or borrowing by police of military tactics, forms and equipment, in fact, goes back to the very founding of modern policing itself. The first modern police force in the Anglo-American world was founded in London by Sir Robert Peel, with the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. This was the London force upon which the first police departments in the United States were modeled (in Boston and New York). But Peel’s London Metropolitan Police was itself a militarized organization. Its structure, appearance, and operations were all modeled after the Royal Irish Constabulary that Peel himself had helped create earlier, in 1822. Operating under the aegis of the English colonial state in Ireland, this was a counter-insurgency military force created to quell anticolonial revolts, squash protests and suppress various other rural disturbances from unruly natives. In this sense, the term “police militarization” is a redundancy: at the core of the very institution of modern policing is a military form. Police militarization is hardly new.

This paper—part of a larger project on empire and militarization in the United States, the United Kingdom and France—overcomes this ahistorical assumption by exploring one moment in the larger history of police militarization in the US: the so-called “modernization” of policing during the Progressive Era in the early 20th century. Historians of policing speak of this period as a formative one. It is known as the “reform era” when police forces professionalized, centralized, and modernized. I show that what this really amounted to, was a form of intense militarization that in turn radically increased the infrastructural power of the police.

The second unstated assumption is about what “militarization” actually is. Contemporary discussions accordingly highlight that the police have adopted military equipment and a military mindset, among other things. But even in these discussions, the “military” which police forces emulate, or from which they borrow, are thought of as a homogenous, flat, and transhistorical regime of power—a static and uniform formation—which has a single function: making war. But while the military is surely an organized system for deploying violent force and coercion, it is a multifaceted formation with different elements deployed for a variety of different functions.

If we define “police militarization” as the process by which police forces emulate and adopt “the tenets of militarism and the military model” we need to complicate what “the tenets” of militarism might be, and recognize that “the military model” might be a heterogeneous assemblage rather than a singular script for organization and coercive practice. When Peel first formed the London Metropolitan Police, for instance, he did not just draw from “the military model” en toto. He drew inspiration from and emulated a colonial-military force in Ireland that had been formed for the specific function of helping to rule, manage or otherwise coerce colonial subjects into submission to empire.

The second claim of my paper follows. I argue that the early round of police militarization in the US during the Progressive era was really a matter of imperialism as much as “the military.” Specifically, police militarization in the US during the Progressive Era drew from and was facilitated by tactics, techniques, and technologies associated with ruling colonial populations overseas and at the frontiers of America’s rising empire of the early twentieth century—an empire extending from the American west, back down to Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, and over to the Philippine Islands. The military was a key part of this empire, not least as the US Army was deployed by the new colonial states to quell resistance to American rule. My claim is that no analysis of the origins of “militarized” policing in the early 20th century can proceed without keeping this empire in view. Militarized policing at home was also a product of colonialism abroad, drawing upon not
just the “military” but, more specifically, a military-imperial regime. The so-called “militarization of policing” should be better described as “the colonial counter-insurgenization” of policing.

To make the case this paper explores the creation of the first state police department in the United States, the Pennsylvania State Police Force, and the “professionalization” and “reform” movement for city police, originating with the Berkeley Police Department and its chief, August Vollmer. Regarding the formation of The Pennsylvania State Police, I show that this largely modeled after the Philippine Constabulary, a counter-insurgency paramilitary organization of the American colonial state in the Philippines. Regarding August Vollmer and the Berkeley police: Vollmer himself was a veteran of the Spanish-American war and the Philippine-American war, in the latter case serving as part of a small elite mobile counter-insurgency unit. I show how Vollmer brought many of the US army’s techniques and schemas for fighting Filipino insurgents back to urban policing in the US. Vollmer would later become known as the “father of modern policing” in America for his innovations (Bumgamer 2004: 142). I show how those innovations emerged initially from the American colonial state in the Philippines.

References


Standing Rock: Epicenter of Resistance to American Empire
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In the summer of 2016, Native Nations and their allies from across North America joined an epic struggle of resistance against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project held at the northern areas of Standing Rock (Sioux – Indian) Reservation. Their presence extended from the encampment on the reservation near Cannonball called “Sacred Stone” to large camps called “Oceti Sakowin”. Thousands of Indigenous people and their Ally protestors were on treaty-based retained federal Army Corps riverine areas referred to as “The Taken Land”. Hundreds of Native Nations supported Water Protectors as they marched from “The Taken Land” to DAPL construction sites.

Transnational corporate-driven oil companies came into sharp conflict with Indigenous people, from whom historically, they had stolen land and resources. At the core of this conflict, rested the legacy of four hundred years of conquest and cultural domination against Indian tribes, nations or civilizations and concealed where for more than two hundred years of armed struggle there had been a resistance to United States’ expansion over Lakota and other Native peoples (Gonzalez and Cook-Lynn, 1998).

Standing Rock Sioux (Indian Reservation) or “Nation” is the result of more than two hundred years of United States expansion. From 1800 to 1900, the United States fought Native peoples that resisted conquest and incorporation in the plains through the Sioux Wars. The United States had hegemony over the region, dominating Indian reservations. American Empire was built on a very real destruction of resisting Native nations (Fenelon, 1998).

We review socio-political analysts of empires as capitalist state actors eliminating resistance or competitive systems against Native Nations and
Indigenous peoples (Deloria and Lytle, 1984). We consider them to reflect imperialism with peripheral resistance as opposed to conquest colonialism, much in the same way that Wolfe (2006) sees settler colonialism shaping relations, with English colonial states as driven by capitalism in political/cultural frontiers. Similarly, Robinson (2017) shows how the transnational capitalist class (TCC) and their global corporations push political/cultural frontiers.

Fenelon (2016: 23-30) identifies four large systems of global expansion and relationships with genocide in four systems of domination: conquest, colonization, capitalism, and hegemonic global capitalism. Using policy constructs and grounded evidence from conflict with the Lakota in the Dakotas (Standing Rock) he demonstrates and argues that the pipeline struggles are an extension of the United States’ Indian policies into the twenty-first century. It is clear that mediated Indian policy structures created favorable conditions to break up the Sioux Nation into manageable Indian reservations.

We can chart the historical-comparative roots of these conflicts as violent transformations: from Oci Sakowin→Lakota Oyate→Standing Rock. Socio-political identity is shaped by policy conflicts with American empire from the onset with Lewis and Clark. The Louisiana Purchase announced “American sovereignty to native people” (Fenelon, 1998), evidenced by President Jefferson's view of the Sioux as the "extension of American power up the Missouri", thereby transforming them to “sovereigns of the country..." (Fenelon, 1998).

The very first policy by the United States with the Lakota “Sioux” targeted sovereignty. The following policies can be broadly summarized into five periods:

1) Attempts at Conquest and Multi-Tribal Compacts (1800-1866)
2) Treaty-Making (1866-1871)
3) Attempts at Removal, Relocation, Reduction of Lands (1871-1876)
4) Land-Takings (1877-1889)
5) Coercive Assimilation (1883-1934)

The United States abrogated the 1851 and 1868 Fort Laramie treaties, moved troops into Lakota territory, and the Great Sioux war, all involved land takings and government controls. U.S. laws banned traditional culture, forced children into boarding schools, destroyed cultural cohesion, and created economic dependence on the Lakota.
The Lakota turned to the 1889 Ghost Dance which caused military mobilization on Standing Rock, the killing of Sitting Bull and the Lakota seeking protection on Pine Ridge. More than 300 people were killed at Wounded Knee in 1890.

We can identify U.S. policy listings for the periods on Standing Rock, in a hundred years of empire-building (see Figure 4: Policy listings for the 1760’s – 1860’s in "Genocide, Race, Capitalism: Synopsis of Formation within the Modern World-system") which target sovereignty (Fenelon, 2016). Similarly, we find invasions from 1850, in which military envoys interpreted events through a lens of protecting rights of settlers, with settler property rights arrayed against treaty tribal rights. The 1862 Dakota uprising and Mankato mass execution (in which derogatory terms like “hostile” were used) lead to 100 years of federal domination over lands, property and criminal justice.

In Figure 5: Policy listings for 1870’s – 1970’s (see "Genocide, Race, Capitalism: Synopsis of Formation within the Modern World-system"), we observe one hundred years of social controls over peoples, land and sovereignty (Fenelon, 2016). We find the legal cultural suppression such as outlawing the Lakota Sun Dance; the use of citizenship in 1924 as legal assimilation; and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act policies providing mediating bureaucracies for coercive assimilation during the Great Depression and World War II. Tribal sovereignty was under assault, while termination and urban relocation policies further weakened sovereignty.

Lakota resistance brought lawsuits over the taking of treaty-driven lands like the Black Hills, and tribal sovereignty over reservations like Standing Rock. We model mediating social systems (see Figure 6: Lakota – Euro-American Comparative Social Structures with U.S. Policies in "Genocide, Race, Capitalism: Synopsis of Formation within the Modern World-system"), used in state corporate take-over of the Missouri River, outlined in the Pick-Sloan Plan (Fenelon, 2016). Deloria and Lawson (1982: xiv–xx) viewed this plan as “the single most destructive act ever perpetrated on any tribe in the United States”, in its efforts to “victimize by fraudulence, ignorance, and deception”; and the “subtle and sophisticated in its land acquisition methods” with which the “statute rather than brute force”, replaced “military enforced reservation and land allotment” policies.

The 2016 Standing Rock conflict took place where the Oahe Missouri dams and the Taken Lands meet. Interviews with Reginald Bird Horse, Vernon Iron Cloud, and traditional elder Henry Swift Horse, document Natives losing lands—“taken” by Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)—at the Sacred Stone camp, along the reservation side of ACE taken areas, at the Oceti Sakowin camps, across the Cannonball, and in floodplain areas demarcated in treaties as “unceded” without formal takings.

The United States used imposters, agent provocateurs, and government spies in the NoDAPL conflict. The First International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) of the Western Hemisphere was formed on Standing Rock in 1974 adopting the Declaration of Continuing Independence of Sovereign Native American Indian Nations, with delegates from 97 Indian tribes and Nations from North and South America. They supported the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN-DRIP), the kind of inter-national organizing the United States feared.

The IITC meetings at Standing Rock were prelude to FBI crackdowns on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, after the American Indian Movement (AIM) occupied the town of Wounded Knee. This was why overflowed camps in the summer of 2016 were called Oceti Sakowin: to represent unified Lakota–Dakota nations before colonization. The Lakota/Dakota people resisted the XL Pipeline, singing their victory songs in Congress, with the oil corporations taking note. Dakota Access Pipelineroutes moved the crossings to just north of Standing Rock with possible poisoning of
Lakota lands along the Missouri River.

By late fall, big oil corporations providing deep profits to North Dakota, were aligned against nearly ten thousand people encamped along the Cannonball River, supported by two hundred Native Nations. Transnational corporations drew their line in the sand and indigenous resistance forces answered with non-violent direct action. Global security forces tracked resistance groups, trying out “weaponized” mechanisms and techniques throughout the nine months up to the violent removals from Oceti Sakowin (Robinson, 2017).

Security forces included companies like Blackwater and agencies like TigerSwan, were contracted to provide both cyber and social media communication controls. TigerSwan described the movement as “an ideologically driven insurgency with a strong religious component” and compares the anti-pipeline water protectors to jihadist fighters. They referred to the camps as “the battlefield” where security was “defeating pipeline insurgencies” through an “infiltration of camps and activist circles.” TigerSwan discussed protesters as “terrorists,” direct actions as “attacks,” and camps as “battlefield,” thereby revealing how dissent was not only criminalized, but also treated as threatening national security (Brown, Parrish and Speri, 2017).

Native journalists identified revelatory points to the Intercept at Standing Rock, that indicate a national level of suppression of international indigenous resistance. They show that Tiger Swan portrayed NoDAPL as a religious movement, akin to a jihad, and worked against the water protectors as if they were jihadists. Security forces had infiltrators working for them. A security contractor planted fake social media pushbacks on social media accounts. TigerSwan saw dispersal of water protectors as a diaspora that needed to be tracked and contained. It stated that the water protectors had “generally followed the jihadist insurgency model while active,” and that it predicted “the individuals who fought for and supported it to follow a post-insurgency model after its collapse.” They referred to water protector camps and associated movements in militaristic terms and displayed an unnerving level of hostility (Indian Country Today Staff, 2017).

Suppression of the NoDAPL resistance camps along the northern boundaries of Standing Rock was tactical as it targeted local people. It was also strategic, because it closed down local highways, reinforced closures with National Guard troops and private firms that engaged with “water protector” protest groups who were employing spiritual religious ceremonies and practices, and who called upon Oceti Sakowin ideologies and “unceded land” treaty claims. Extreme economic pressures on the Standing Rock casino drove down Council support for the movement after it was clear that the Trump administration would drive the pipeline through at all costs. Additionally, internal tensions at Cannonball derailed local support.

After prolonged conflict through the winter—including law enforcement assaults at river, land, and Backwater Bridge in November, a December stand-down with Veterans, and other conflicts until Trump’s orders to the ACE to resume drilling—local support for the camps began to fade. North Dakota made it clear that the 1806 highway would not re-open until the Oceti Sakowin camp was dis-banded. The Standing Rock Council voted to close down the camps, which lead to re-invasion by state, federal and private security forces, and the deployment the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) against camps on Standing Rock. Combined
economic and political pressures caused the tribal council to give in, letting the state/federal forces, pipeline oil companies, TCC corporations, and intelligence groups as proxy for neoliberal empire win. It is not a stretch to call this a re-colonization of the lands and the reservation.

Conclusions on Standing Rock and U.S. Empire from the Local to the Global

Standing Rock (Sioux Indian) Reservation makes a perfect case to study Indigenous resistance to colonizing United States expansion and the building of Empire. Initial penetration and invasion of the territories followed classic settler colonialism. Treaties were used by government forces to demarcate lands and identify resistance. Wars were fought to pacify defenders, and policies were developed to divide and conquer Lakota and Dakota allies. Pipeline infrastructure was relocated under the Missouri River with potential for pollution and poisoning. Like the Pick Sloan dams, required consultation was bypassed, and construction began in 2016. Dakota and Lakota leaders on Standing Rock formed camps to resist the pipeline.

Security forces of global petrochemical companies were employed using mercenaries with attack dogs to dispel protestors in classic non-violent civil dissent strategies. Thousands joined large camps at Oceti Sakowin. Two hundred Native Nations sent emissaries, each entering camp with traditional protocols. Native Nation resistance forces and Indigenous Peoples from around the world joined together in spite of government suppression. Redeployment of militarized law enforcement with security firms and intense surveillance, resembled earlier invasive forces at Standing Rock that were arrayed against global capitalism, highly profitable industries reliant on fossil fuels, suppressing resistance and wiping out all that stand in its way.

For Standing Rock, these events perpetuate the violent suppression they have experienced for two hundred years. Native Nations and Indigenous Peoples of the Americas engage in resistance and revitalization in an attempt to survive the American Empire of the 21st century.

References


Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism in Québec
by Geneviève Zubrzycki

providing a new set of engaging comments. I have greatly benefited from these multiple exchanges and welcome the opportunity to continue the conversation in these pages. GZ

Secularization à la québécoise

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The question of secularization is among sociology’s core theoretical debates, and one of the most controversial ones. In its original formulation in postwar sociology, classical secularization theorists (such as Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1966) observed and predicted a somewhat steady decline in the social significance of religion through various modernizing forces. Then came the religious economies paradigm in the 1980s, which assumed a rational choice methodology to document increased individual religiosity, and claimed to have killed the secularization thesis once and for all (Hadden, 1987; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). “Not so fast”, said the neosecularization scholars in response. Going back to and building on the original texts, they showed that secularization was never argued to be linear, irreversible, or really about individual belief in the first place. Instead, they put forward, secularization is best understood as a complex phenomenon involving religious change at multiple levels, and it almost always presents itself in uneven, fluctuating, and contradictory forms (Lechner, 1991; Yamane, 1997).

Whichever side one might take in the

Author's Note: I’d like to extend warm thanks to Sam Nelson for organizing the Author-meets-Critics panel at the Social Science History Association last November in Montréal. I am deeply grateful to critics Phil Gorski, Marcel Fournier and Claudio Benzecri for their incisive comments, as well as to members of the audience for their stimulating questions. While Phil’s remarks were published in the Journal of the Academy of Religion and are not included in this issue, I address them in my response. I’m indebted finally to Efe Peker for stepping in and
secularization conversation, there is no denying that the crux of the question is, at the end of the day, a comparative-historical one. To determine whether or not secularization occurred requires tracing the trajectory of religious change in time, and within one or more geographies. Despite this seemingly obvious fact, the study of history, politics, and actual processes of secularization was surprisingly missing in both paradigms. Underlining this weakness, Gorski (2003, 2005) made a call to historicize the secularization debate using the tools of comparative-historical sociology. Historicizing would mean empirically and comparatively demonstrating the social, political, and cultural contentions inherent in the making of secularization. It necessitates viewing secularization as a dynamic and contingent conceptual variable dependent on historical actors, events, and processes, as opposed to a latent, teleological, and homogenizing developmental trend. Since the early 2000s, many case-studies and comparative works emerged to contribute, directly or indirectly, to historicizing our understanding of secularization (some examples are Künkler, Madeley, & Shankar, 2018; Kuru, 2009; Mayrl, 2016; Smith, 2003).

Geneviève Zubrzycki’s Beheading the Saint is an immense contribution to the historicizing efforts, although it does not intend to speak explicitly to the secularization debate. At first glance, Québec seems like a textbook case of secular nation-building that corroborates the classical paradigm. During the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the centuries-old dominance of the Catholic Church over the province was toppled almost overnight. Inspired by the anticolonial spirit of the time, and defining itself in opposition to English Canada, the Revolution emphasized Québec’s national-economic development to ensure rattrapage (catching up), political self-determination to be maîtres chez nous (masters of our own house), and its autonomous secular culture based on the French language. In the process, Quebeckers also “rid themselves of Catholicism”, which they saw as an impediment to modernization, and “a gangrenous limb poisoning the national body” (Zubrzycki, 2016, p. 2). Education, healthcare, and social services were removed from the hands of the Church to be transferred to secular ministries. Mass attendance plummeted as fast as fertility rates. The Church’s hold on gender relations, culture, elections, and labor unions were broken, and religious skepticism became constitutive of Québécois nationalism. In 1969, when a group of young demonstrators beheaded a statue of Saint-Jean, the patron saint of French Canada, Québec’s rupture with its religious past for a fast-track entry to secular modernity was symbolically confirmed—hence the title of Zubrzycki’s book.

Zubrzycki’s purpose, however, is not to retell another epic story of Québécois secularization, which is itself part of the national mythology today. Instead, she sets out to make sense of its ambiguities and contradictions. Her book digs into the historical and symbolic trajectory of the province to understand why “the new national configuration still very much depended on Catholicism to serve as its foil”, and how, even today, this “ghostly presence … haunts new social projects” (Zubrzycki, 2016, pp. 9, 10). Indeed, the reasonable accommodation debates since 2006, the Charter of Values controversy of 2013-4, and the 2017 burqa controversy revealed the paradoxes in Quebeckers’ contemporary relationship with Catholicism. In contemporary Québec, only 6% attend mass, belief in God is the lowest in Canada, but 80% declare themselves Catholic. Confused? There is more. Since 1995, the government spent close to $300 million to preserve and maintain Catholic heritage buildings and artifacts. A Québec court upheld Catholic prayers in municipal council meetings as compatible with secularism, because it was deemed a patrimonial—and not a religious—practice. Likewise, legislators maintain that the crucifix hanging in the Québec national [provincial] assembly since 1936 does not represent religion, but heritage.

Québec’s Catho-laïcité, or secularism with Catholic partialities, is due to a convoluted
relationship with the Church, Zubrzycki’s historical account demonstrates. Although Québécois nationalism developed through the rejection of the Church in public life in the 1960s, Catholicism continued to represent a distinctive cultural marker to hold on to against—the largely Protestant—English Canada. And after the non-Christian immigration wave of the 1980s and 1990s, Catholicism is now becoming a cultural marker in the face of newcomer religions such as Islam, Sikhism, and ultra-orthodox Judaism. However, the return of Catholicism as a core element of Québécois identity is happening in novel and secularized forms, where Catholicism is embraced not as religion per se, but as “religious tradition”. Zubrzycki borrows the distinction from the work of Riesebradt (2010), where the latter term denotes “the historical continuity of systems of symbols” that derive from religion, which often gets intermingled with ethnicity, nationalism, and the larger cultural framework in which it has historically grown. In the case of Québec, Zubrzycki observes the making of what she terms the “patrimonialization” of the Catholic tradition, that is, “the discursive, material, and legal ways in which religious symbols, artifacts, and practices are sacralized as secular elements of the nation and its history” (Zubrzycki, 2016, p. 164). Conceptualizing patrimonialization and historically tracing its symbolic transformations in Québec stands out as one of the central achievements of the book.

Patrimonialization attests to the theoretical assertion that secularization is not unilinear; religion may indeed come back in different forms, such as tradition, and may get re-blended with ethnicity and nationalism. Secularization, moreover, is replete with contradictions, as exhibited by Québec’s unique mishmash of Catholic heritage with fervent religious skepticism. Secularization is also the product of contentious processes where symbols and aesthetics play a significant role (see Claudio Benzecry’s review in this issue). Although its revolution was rather quiet, and anticlericalism was not its defining character as it was in France, Québec’s secularization took form in a politico-cultural battle against the Catholic Church, as well as against English Canada. In the face of the English, the will to preserve the language led Québec to prioritize French-speaking immigrants, an unintended consequence of which was the arrival of Francophone yet non-Christian minorities from North and West Africa. The politico-cultural question was thus further complicated, because the new religions “shifted the meaning of Québécois and pressed an older generation … to reflect on secularism and their historic rapport with Catholicism” (Zubrzycki, 2016, p. 15). Secularization is no longer an isolated debate among Québécois de souche (old-stock Québécois); it now involves the relationship with the “other”. Québécois de souche, although not at all religious themselves, fear that the complete undermining of Catholicism may be equivalent to the undermining of the French-Canadian culture in North America, as religion and ethnicity have been inseparable to them for centuries.

This is precisely what is known in the literature as “cultural defense”, a countervailing force against a secularizing trend. In such cases, “identity and sense of worth are challenged” by an alien source, and “religion often provides resources for the defense of a national, local, ethnic or status group culture” (Bruce, 2009, pp. 152-153). Scholars who study secularization in the colonial context, or the Western cases of Poland and Ireland, are all too familiar with the phenomenon, where the dominant local religion becomes an element of national unity and/or mobilization. Québec’s patrimonialization of the Catholic tradition in response to the growing religious “aliens” at home is one such example of cultural defense, which has been provoked and capitalized on by opportunistic politicians in the province since at least the 1990s. Zubrzycki’s book helps the reader to consider the new roles religions/religious traditions may assume in the age of rising populisms around the world, and can be considered as part of that growing research agenda (Arato & Cohen, 2017; Marzouki, McDonnell, & Roy, 2016).
Finally, and relatedly, another important theoretical conclusion of the book is to reframe the relationship between religion and nationalism. While the literature on nationalism traditionally assumed that the secular-national identity was born to fill the void caused by the retreat of religion, Zubrzycki proposes that the Québécois case witnessed rather the opposite. It was the emergence of Québécois nationalism during the Quiet Revolution –along with its ideals of economic development, political autonomy, and cultural sovereignty— that pushed the Church aside, as it was deemed a hindrance to this project. Reversing the causal mechanism matters due to two reasons: First, because it breaks the linear understanding of secularization as a smooth transition from the traditional-religious to the modern-national, and second, it makes visible the contingent and non-teleological nature of secularization. In reality, as secularization à la québécoise demonstrates, religion and nationalism can be intermingled in various and ever-changing ways based on the course of sociopolitical as well as cultural-symbolic contentions. Zubrzycki’s work is proof that historical sociological perspectives have a lot to say on the matter.

Nationalism and Religion in Québec: Saint-John-the-Baptist Day as Ambiguous National Holiday
Marcel Fournier
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For over a century, the feast of Saint-John-the-Baptist, celebrated on June 24th on the Catholic calendar, served as both a religious feast and a national event in French Canada. The holiday is rooted in pre-Christian times related to summer solstice and mid-summer festivals; after conversion to Christianity, elements of these festivals were syncretically combined with feast days for Christian saints. In France, the celebrations around the nameday of Saint-John the Baptist were widely enjoyed and French settlers brought these traditions with them to North America. St. John-the-Baptist eventually became the Patron Saint of the French Canadians in North America. Until 1970, the holiday was celebrated on its eve with bonfires and dances, and on the day itself with a great parade with brass bands and elaborate floats. The closing float was dedicated to the Saint, Patron of the French Canadians, who was typically impersonated by a blond and curly-haired boy with a lamb at his feet. The holiday is nowadays primarily celebrated with popular concerts and rock shows, and although well-known by all the Quebecers, it has been the object of few serious studies. Geneviève Zubrzycki provides the first important sociological study of this holiday. Born and raised in Québec, the author knows the holiday through her own experiences, but conducted rich archival research on its origins, evolution and transformation. It is through the holiday that she analyzes the shifting relationship between national identity, Catholicism and secularism in Québec.

Zubrzycki embraces the "iconographic turn" in social sciences, relying on a multiple visual data such as commemorative posters, documentary photos and family snapshots, commerical ads, satirical cartoons, amateur films and television broadcasts. The result is an amazingly original study: she documents and analyzes the subtle and not-so-subtle transformations in the representation of the national icon/patron-saint since the 1960s, paying attention to the heated debates at the source of these transformations. For example, she shows how the lamb accompanying the saint became the object of derision as it came to symbolize not the French Canadians’ Providential mission in North America, but their problematic passivity. Its removal from the parade in 1963 led to a series of material and symbolic transformations that ultimately resulted in the title’s beheading of the saint, when on June 24 1969 members of the leftist Front de libération populaire overturned the float and its papier mâché statue, breaking the saint’s head in the process. The event was seen and read in the days to follow according to
the biblical script, in which Saint John was beheaded at the request of King Herod’s step-daughter Salomé. While the head of the biblical St-John was served to the beautiful young woman on a platter, that of Montreal’s Saint was never found. And with that "beheading" ended a century of religio-patriotic celebrations of the French Canadian nation. The parades were abolished and Saint John disappeared. Zubrzycki, through her detailed visual and semiotic analysis of a decade of debates about the saint and the parades, sees the crystallization of a new identity, that of secular Québécois. That identity, in formation in the 1960s, was cemented with the "eventful" death of the patron-saint of Catholic French Canadians.

Although the saint and his parades disappeared, the holiday survived as a national and secular holiday, renamed la Fête nationale. Zubrzycki shows in that peculiar evolution a new syncretic fusion. The new national fête is a double hybrid; it is a religio-secular one as it blends both the Catholic tradition (the saint’s name day) with secular national(ist) ones; and ethnic (French Canadian) with civic (Québécois) nationalism. The hybrid, in the end, underlines the unfinished character of Québécois nationalism since the holiday relies on a cultural tradition instead of commemorating a political institutionalization that never occurred.

Zubrzycki argues, in the last chapter of the book, that this ambiguity, hybridity, of Québécois national identity and nationalism is at the source of two important debates of the last 15 years: that of the reasonable accommodation of the religious practices of cultural minorities, and that of a proposed “charter of values”/ “charter of secularism.” Zubrzycki shows, in her analysis of proposed bills, legal briefs, court decisions and debates in the public sphere that (and how) Catholicism is discursively turned into cultural heritage. She concludes, provocatively, that most of (French) Quebecers remain Catholic in their secularism.

What Zubrzycki beautifully shows, in the end, is how difficult it is for a (national) collectivity to forget its past and reinvent itself, and seemingly even more difficult when that past is a religious one.

The Paradoxical Material Work of Cultural Recognition
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My first year as a grad student in the US, I was taken by a fellow sociologist and co-national to *El Gauchito*, an Argentine restaurant in Corona, Queens. As many recent migrants, I had had a hard time reconstructing in the new context the ways in which I felt “myself” when I lived back home. The restaurant had a tile mural depicting famous musicians, sportsmen, and actors. It depicted some local figures I could not identify, but the props they carried suggested they were tango and folklore musicians. More recently, Pope Francis was added to the mix. Despite the obvious kitsch character of the mural, sitting at a barbeque joint with little resemblance to the places I spent my time while living in Buenos Aires, and warmed by the heat of the kitchen and the familiarity of the figures that served as a background landscape, I felt at home. *El Gauchito* – its name already a marker of national identity – provided me with some obvious material and cultural opportunities for feeling, narrating and embodying who I thought I was in relationship to national self-identification. Reading *Beheading the Saint* was an opportunity to revisit that experience and make sense of it; to realize that being part of a nation is not about being surrounded by people like you and artifacts you attach yourself to, but rather an opportunity to engage in a conversation with people you might be different from or even against. In doing so, the book directs our attention to the role of recognition in engaging with cultural forms we are not invested in or those we aim to distinguish ourselves from. *Beheading the Saint* provides us with a vocabulary to think about how cultural materials are able to generate patterns of national
identification that are durable yet multivocal and contested.

The book’s organizing question is about how national secularism shares, inhabits, and distinguishes itself from religious forms of affiliation. More specifically, it wants to show us how it is that being Québécois went from being a catholic ethnic identity to a secular identification based mostly on language and territory. In advancing a detailed and meticulous reconstruction of the key moments under which this can be studied, Beheading the Saint (Or Zubrzycki) provides us with a template for how to think about the role of objects in identity (trans)formation. We learn both what it is that people do with objects and what objects do to people.

A central line of inquiry within cultural sociology has been to analyze the long-term purchase of particular objects by establishing a one-to-one set equivalence between objects and collectives, in which objects mean only one thing and there is a taken-for-granted link between meaning and emotion. The Durkheimian tradition (which can be recognized in the work of scholars as different as Bourdieu, Lamont and Fournier, Alexander, and Collins) emphasizes the role of cultural structures, focusing on the collective effervescence produced by rituals that aim to generate fusion and catharsis between the object qua totem, and the collective. The book engages with and departs from this idea by scrutinizing “national” objects as the site of struggle, with different constituencies trying to imprint competing meanings. The object goes from being a cemented and a given to a site where competing claims are mobilized.

In an earlier work, Zubrzycki (2011) coined the idea of “national sensorium” to call attention to the multiplicity of media and sites – including soundtracks, advertising, food, and film – that bring to life relatively abstract and often emotion-laden ideas that link self and nation. In Beheading the Saint, she delves deeper into how materiality and imagination (a concept notoriously absent from cultural sociology) become intertwined. This happens in three different ways:

1. The first one – best exemplified by what Zubrzycki called a process of aesthetic revolt – fully develops the role of conflict and conflicting interpretations and practices about the same objects in generating linkages among people. These linkages are as strong, patterned, and durable as the solidarity produced by collective effervescence and collaboration. In observing how adversarial parties contest and rework icons, Zubrzycki shows how agents are paradoxically compelled to give entity and recognition to that which they want to oppose, something we could call the Lacanian-Hegelian problem of modern politics. Why do we ask for recognition from those we actually aim to oppose or supersede? While political theory has explored this in depth over the last two decades, recent cultural sociology has not been interested in this key dimension of meaning in social life in the same way. This is particularly salient with issues of national self-identification given the inescapable character of the discursive social formation we call “nation” in modern life.

2. This inescapable character of the nation is underscored in the book’s second analytical move regarding the way we see culture as an artifact as well as an environment. Though much of the data in the book is about the materials that make the nation (more on this later), we also learn by seeing icons and their materiality as part of a larger ecology of meaning: one that becomes organized as a semantic field of positions and one that you can be for or against, but that you have to engage with regardless. We can see the interrelation between the two versions of meanings and materials by looking at what happens with the introduction of a new element to a pre-existing and relatively finished object. The new element transforms the objects, of course, but at the same time transforms the placement of the object within the pre-existing constellation of meaning – think here of the
original idea behind Weber’s use of the term “elective affinity.” Taking a page from her colleague Webb Keane (2003), Zubrzycki observes how the intended meanings and uses we assign to objects fracture over time, giving way to new meanings. So the bundle of qualities affect both the cultural object and the meaning we attribute to it.

For example: we learn how the lamb – which is part of the original iconography as a companion to Saint John the Baptist– is erased over time, changing the meaning of the saint himself. With the removal of the lamb, Saint-John is no longer recognized as the patron-saint, but as an effete and passive child, infantilizing the nation. That new interpretation moved the organizers of the parade to viralize the icon. Paradoxically, in doing all this work to both stabilize the meaning of the festive occasion, the parade becomes more of a profane event and ultimately less symbolically effective.

These affordances and resistances can be seen in the reluctant beheading of the saint, what she calls after the work of Bruno Latour, iconoclasm. The book’s title indeed refers to the fact that the national patron-Saint’s head, made of papier mâché, resulted in the physical separation of its cranium, and the desecration of the symbol at large. The St John’s parade provides an ideal site to understand the intimate connection between the material and the tropes that make the deep culture of the Québécois.

3. While culture operates at multiple levels and through multiple means in Beheading the Saint, the third contribution of the book is to show that culture is not only about narrative turning points, but also about understanding the deep tropes that cement a certain continuous “character” in a patterned national way. Zubrzycki shows how narrative turning points are key elements in the production of the eventful character of social life and how the deep, culturally-ingrained, national tropes serve as common ground for interpretation, even while they change over time. In this latter version, culture becomes a model of experience that operates through contextual barriers. By doing so, Zubrzycki shows how the national sensorium generates a particular kind of affect.

The three-pronged version of culture is emphasized by the organization of the book into three narrative threads. Zubrzycki uses the core text, five interludes in between the empirical chapters called Key Tropes, and the figure captions to produce different kinds of analysis. The captions and figures work as a particular kind of text and paratext, allowing us to see in detail the multiple images alluded to in the text. This layering allows the reader to reconstruct the everyday life of some of the images as they circulate, helping us to grasp their transformations over time and the multiple contextualized meanings attached to them in different historical periods. The work of that thread is contrasted with the idea behind the Key Tropes interludes, in which the author analyzes poems, songs, and images from advertising to religion, to make the case for deeper and more continuous patterns of culture. This adds a particular dynamism to the argument advanced by the book, since the text resembles the polyvocality of claims as Zubrzycki analyzes different agents posing their own interpretations of the national and religious icons.

I have three questions specifically related to the broad empirical analysis and its conceptual import: 1. What does nationalism provide that others sensoria do not? What does it mean to narrate yourself through the nation instead of, say, religion, soccer or music? 2. Is the national sensorium something specific to Quebec? Are the models of culture and subjectivity proposed in the book transposable to other cases? To the US context, for example? Could this be a fruitful framework to study the debates over monuments and flags ongoing in the American South?

I’d like to shift gears here and move to the author’s use of psychological and psychoanalytic metaphors in the text. I found myself wanting more on the socio-psychological work
done by cultural materials, especially given that one of its main warrants was to empirically study identity transformation. *Beheading the Saint* convincingly shows the process of identification and how it is produced; it does not denounce its artificiality, but shows the variable character of its production. In advancing this idea, the book presents a proto theory of the lash-up between people, objects, and meanings that flirts with classic psychology and psychoanalytic vocabulary but falls short in moving towards the study of the psychosocial undertaken by other sociologists like George Steinmetz, Claire Decoteau or Debbie Gould. While there is an implicit theory of identification and subjectivity, this is never spelled out in full, and ultimately is left in the background. I said “flirting with,” because the book is full of psy metaphors and psy vocabulary inserted between sociological conceptualizations. This leads me to the following question: What model of personhood do we need to make sense of the theory of culture advanced by the book? The book’s title resonates already with a psychology- meets-political theory. If we read it as the body of the sovereign and its public representation – a lot of it seems to be in conversation with Kantorowicz’s *The King’s Two Bodies*, a piece of scholarship conspicuously absent from the book. It is, after all, the beheading of the saint that works as the myth of origin that allowed for secular parades to exist. But the use of psychological vocabulary does not stop with the beheading: we read about the ghostly presence of the past through haunting, the gangrenous limbs of the national body, and the use of classic analytical categories like repression, trauma, phantom form, unconscious, impotence, or empty symbolization. This adds up to the point that the text itself playfully asserts, when discussing an important debate about the place of religion in the public sphere, that “Quebec was put on the couch!”

And so while not fully developed, the processes of identification that correspond to this multiform version of cultural theory are thematized. This is, of course, a prerogative of being an author, choosing what to foreground and what to leave in the background or set aside. I am however curious about what would happen if we chose to theorize those metaphors. Would we go beyond the prevalent vocabulary of sociology in which personhood is mostly a matter of selfhood? Would we go from selves to subjects in the processes of libidinal investment (cathexis, in Bourdieusian parlance), making recognition and misrecognition central elements in the construction of our own identifications? Would this produce a better version of how culture and agents become imbricated, going beyond the prevalent cognitive metaphors and the dual model of how we process meaning and act?

Geneviève Zubrzycki, in this book, shows why studying objects hermeneutically is important, since materials are – to paraphrase Fernando Domínguez Rubio (2015) – not external things that need to be accounted for as one more extra dimension of social life, but rather as a central component of how culture operates; a key medium for practice, and a unique site to be talked and acted upon. After *Beheading the Saint*, we understand how even in totem-like situations, there is always the potential for a different affordance or a different claim about the totem’s importance and meaning. There is always the possibility for the correspondence between affect, individual, and object to be different from a one-to-one homology. The key lesson of its 226 elegant pages is that those homologies should not be taken for granted and must be investigated; that doing sociology with, and of, cultural materials should focus on the work it takes to hold such correspondences together.

**Author’s Response**

Geneviève Zubrzycki  
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**Nationalism, Secularization, Secularism**

While crude secularization theories have been
productively refined (e.g. Casanova 1994, Gorski 2000, Riese 2010) to be less ideologically driven, more empirically accurate, and theoretically more robust, the scholarship on nationalism lags behind. Problematic causal assumptions linking the rise of nationalism to the decline of religion are still common. The paradigmatic narrative claims that the secularization of society in the nineteenth century not only made room for the articulation of new identities and modes of political legitimacy, but that national identities and nationalism emerged because of the void left by the retreat of religion. As Phil Gorski and Efe Peker point out in their comments, Beheading the Saint shows that the secularization of national identity and the articulation of a new secular, territorially-based Québécois identity in the 1960s was not the result of the secularization of institutions and the building of the modern welfare state in Québec, but that, rather, a new conception of the nation fueled those structural/institutional reforms. I demonstrate that through a meso-level analysis of debates about of the annual St-Jean-Baptiste parades and the material modifications in the representation of the national icon preceded institutional changes. Heated contests over Catholic “French Canadianness” afforded by the annual parade in honor of the patron-saint were far from being passive reflections of ongoing institutional reforms; they instead made possible the articulation of a secular Québécois identity that in turn provided ideological muscle for ambitious institutional reforms. Of course, the St-Jean-Baptiste feast was not the only occasion to discuss and debate national identity; but it was a privileged one because of the cyclical and ritual nature of the event.

It is the focus on the saint himself—the icon’s representations in the parades—that made it possible to uncover the 1969 beheading’s significance. At the micro-level, I show the direct consequences of specific material modifications of the national patron saint’s icon, from the removal of the lamb from the saint’s side to the child-saint’s maturation; from the severing of the saint’s head to the interpretation of that incident as “a beheading” in the days and weeks that followed. I show the chains of signification created by a rich web of visual, material, and discursive/scriptural interpretations that led to a widely shared “reading” of the event that resulted in the invention of new modes of national celebration. With the material and discursive “beheading” of the saint in 1969, the macro, meso, and micro levels fatefuly intersected to produce an event in the Sewellian sense, crystallizing a secular Québécois identity that had been in construction for a decade and institutionalizing that new identity through the institutionalization of new national practices.

Beheading the Saint therefore focuses on the process of becoming secular—on the aesthetic, social, and political practices of enacting secular identities. Becoming secular does not imply the total disappearance of religion. Rather, it involves reconfigurations of the religious and secular spheres. By examining the process of patrimonialization of religion, through which religious symbols, artifacts, and practices are sacralized as secular elements of the nation and its history, I show the continued significance of religion under conditions of secularity. If we were to look at more “traditionally religious” spaces in Quebec, we might very well miss that religion still matters, as well as how and why it does. By doing so, the book participates in the elaboration of the “new sociology of the secular” (Asad 2003; Taylor 2007; Warner, VanAntwerpen and Calhoun 2010).

National Sensorium and Aesthetic Revolt

Marcel Fournier notes the diversity of sources I consulted and the wide array of data I use. This was necessary to get a feel for the time and place; to capture how national identity, articulated by religious and political elites, was expressed on the ground by ordinary people—what I call the “national sensorium”. The national sensorium consists of the visual depiction and embodiment of historical narratives and national myths in cultural forms,
the built environment and the landscape. As social actors sensorially experience national narratives and myths, the abstract idea of the nation becomes concrete, acquiring political traction and potentially mobilizing groups. Within a certain sensorium and aesthetics, elite constructions can cue paradigmatic stories and sentiments, or their subversion in iconoclastic acts. My companion concept of “aesthetic revolt” likewise is useful to capture the dual process whereby social actors discursively contest and materially rework iconic symbols, granting those symbols new significations that push forward the articulation of new identities and provide momentum for institutional reforms.

What is the comparative purchase of that conceptual framework, asks Claudio Benzecry. How useful are the concepts of national sensorium and aesthetic revolt for the analysis of other cases? I first developed the concept of the national sensorium in my work on Poland (2011) and productively used it to study nationalism in Quebec. It is also useful to understand American national identity and nationalism. In today’s United States, the American national sensorium is being challenged from two sides: from ultra-nationalists who adopt the rituals and symbols of white supremacy, borrowing both from the KKK, Nazi Germany, and Trump rallies to create its own aesthetics; and from African Americans and their White supporters who kneel during national anthems in sporting events to protest racism in American society and implore fellow Americans to face up to its promise of equality and fairness. Both are examples of aesthetic revolts that have acquired political traction and are shaping nationwide discourse about “Americanness”. Together, they can potentially produce change. The point is that national sensoria differ from nation to nation. It is up to the analyst to identify the key sites, symbols, and rituals of national reproduction/subversion in the societies they study.

Benzecry also asks what the differences may be between different types of sensoria. One difference is the extent of the national sensorium’s dissemination. Because nationalism tends to use state (or state-like) institutions, the national sensorium tends to be spread in a multitude of spaces. It is also widely shared across social groups—much more so than more “specialized” sensoria like sports or religion. Different types of sensoria can however overlap, reinforcing each other. In Poland, the Catholic sensorium has been integrated into the national one. In the US, the sensoria of sports such as baseball and football are interlocked with the national sensorium that create a sense of “Americanness.”

Finally, Benzecry notes my use of psychological and psychoanalytic metaphors in Beheading the Saint, lamenting that I do not explicate which model of personhood I adopt. I’m afraid that my response here will be rather disappointing, since my use of bodily metaphors was itself unconscious. It was guided not by epistemological stances but by aesthetic and literary preferences. I shall be more careful in the future and consider what my choice of metaphors might suggest.

Ultimately, what I propose in Beheading the Saint is an approach to nationalism that pays equal attention to the ways in which the ideological and material are imbricated, and how together they become involved in institutional arrangements and identity formation and transformation. One of the book’s objectives was to provide a methodological blueprint for sociologists intrigued by visual studies and the new materialism but unsure about how to tackle the task. I’m therefore especially gratified that my critics found the approach I develop in the book both original and productive.

References (Combined)


What Can We Learn about Story-telling Technique?

Review of Ken Burns' 2017 Documentary, *The Vietnam War*

by Jerry Lembcke, College of the Holy Cross

Admirers of this eighteen-hour ten-episode series that aired in September 2017 praise it for having revived interest in the American war in Vietnam. For some followers, that appreciation is rooted in the humanist insight that to know ourselves we need to know our past. More prosaic viewers find lessons in the series that need to be relearned to not let the mistakes made in Vietnam be repeated. The “lessons” reason for watching seem especially compelling now, as Americans see their military bogged down once again in conflicts that lack purposes and end-game definitions.

*The Vietnam War* is destined for the classroom and the “lessons learned” objective will occupy many course syllabi. But historians can also use the film to hone student skills for viewing documentaries. By naming the techniques that Burns and Novick use to narrate the history of the war, and pointing out how those methods themselves become part of the message, the cultural literacy of students is raised and their competence in critical thinking is increased. Along the way, of course, the historical and political details of the war itself become more appealing subjects of inquiry.

**Framing**

The technique of framing is as old as writing itself: you tell the readers what you are going to say, say it, and then tell them what you have said. That is how speedreading a book can begin with reading the introductions and conclusions of each chapter.

Each of the ten Episodes of the Burns and Novick film can be viewed as a chapter, and most of them begin and end the same way: U.S. veterans featured as victims of the war itself or the divisiveness that ensued on the home front over the war. Episode 1 begins with veteran Karl Marlantes recalling that “coming home was as traumatic as the war itself”. It ends with veteran Tim O’Brien recalling his fear of losing an arm or leg on a booby-trapped trail. Episode 2 opens with John Musgrave describing the night terrors he still suffers and the difficulty of explaining to his children why he sleeps with a light on. It ends with strains of Sam Cook’s Mean Old World. Episode 3 uses the story of “Mogie” Crocker—the model “good kid” who enlists in the Army at age 17 and dies in Vietnam—to begin constructing the narrative of American innocence betrayed by the anti-war movement and government deception about the war (both of which are graphically imaged at the end of the episode).

The spaces between the beginnings and ends of Episodes are filled with scenes and accounts of battles—battle after battle, 25 battles in total according a New York Times review.

Segments on the history of the Pentagon Papers and audio clips of White House tapes that document government lying about the war will shock all but the most jaded viewers.

No matter their actual content, however, the middle episodes of the series continue to be framed as veteran coming-home stories.

But it is the framing of the series as a whole that
matters most. The closing episodes intensify the
cues provided by the early episodes that the real
war was played out within the United States as
opposition to the military mission in Vietnam
distain for its veterans. Karl Marlantes, who
opened the series recalling the disparagement he
felt upon arriving home, leads off Episode 9 with
a dramatic story of having been met by
protesters after deplaning from Vietnam:
“snarling” he says, as they “pounded on the car”
while it pulled away from the terminal. “It
happened over and over,” he says.

As Marlantes describes his unwelcomed arrival,
we see it visually “documented” with what
appears to be newsreel footage. But it is not
newsreel because it never happened. The truth is
that the antiwar movement recruited veterans to
the cause of ending the war. For the scene we
see, Burns and Novick patched-in footage from
some other source creating the false impression
that the images support what Marlantes is
saying. Troublingly, the scene they have
composed resembles closely the airport arrival of
“Bob” the Marine officer in the 1978 film
Coming Home that starred Jane Fonda. (1)

It is probable that Burns and Novick tapped that
filmic iconography because they knew it would
resonate with viewers. A later segment of
Episode 9 treats credibly the organized
expression of veteran resistance, Vietnam
Veterans Against the War (VVAW), but the
political significance of that movement has been
preemptively neutralized by Marlantes’s
framing. (2)

Episode 10 is punctuation for the Burns and
Novick narrative that the war was lost on the
home front, the loss registered most acutely on
its veterans. The filmmakers put into play all the
clichés pertinent to that storyline: the Vietnam
veteran so unnerved by the war that a honking
horn launches him onto the car’s hood, the
abandonment of POW Hal Kushner by his
wife—having been likened in Episode 9 to Jane
Fonda, aka “Hanoi Jane”, the penitence of
former activist Nancy Biberman for having

slandered Vietnam veterans as “baby killers”—a
now-common meme in the coming-home-from-
Vietnam discourse for which there is no evidence
of its happening.

The Limits in Oral History as Primary Sourcing

Oral history is the practice of collecting and
recording participant and witness accounts of
events as they happened. It gained currency
during the 1960s as part of reform movements in
the humanities and social sciences that were
skeptical about the validity of historical accounts
shaped by the experiences and values of elites in
established institutions. Alternatively, oral
history privileged the “view from the bottom”,
the testimonies and interpretations as
remembered but never recorded in written form.
Labor historians and students of race and gender
studies pioneered the field.

Veterans of the war in Vietnam provided fertile
new subjects for oral history. The widespread
distrust of White House and Pentagon authorities
as sources of information on the war made
returning soldiers valuable witnesses for
journalists and scholars interested in “what is
really going on over there.” A half-century later,
suspicion still lurks about official accounts of
the war, which makes Burns and Novick’s
commitment to ground-level memories of it an
inviting quality: “No historians or other expert
talking heads” they promised New York Times
reviewer Jennifer Schuessler. “Instead,” she
reported matter-of-factly, “79 onscreen
interviews give the ground-up view of the people
who lived through it.”

But knowing, as we do, that lawyers and courts
distrust eyewitness accounts of crimes that are
only hours old, what should we make of veteran
memories that are fifty years old? The grunt-
level views provided by Burns and Novick come
with additional baggage of intense reworking by
movies, novels, newspapers, and television. In
the hands of a skilled professional, interview
material can be turned into a valuable classic like
Christian Appy’s Patriots: The Vietnam War
Remembered from All Sides. In the hands of filmmakers, conversely, they are too easily misused, as they are here, as another kind of framing that disarms viewers’ alertness to the actual preponderance of views from the top.

Burns and Novick do give us lots of exciting footage of Marines in rice patties and GIs jumping out of helicopters—grunt-level stuff—but the prevailing interpretations of what we are seeing come from elites, some of whom would be better cast into confessional booths than onto PBS screens. John Negroponte? What were Burns and Novick thinking? Negroponte has used diplomatic appointments to cover his covert maneuvers in a half-century of U.S. engineered regime-change, coup d’état operations from Vietnam to the near-present. As ambassador to Honduras in the early 1980s, he built the small nation into a staging area for incursions against the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. At the United Nations in the early 2000s, he helped sell the false claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Characterized by journalist Stephen Kinzer as “a great fabulist,” Negroponte’s appearances in the film are strikingly discordant with the unheard voices and views that the filmmakers promise to bring to us.

We also see Duong Van Mai Elliot in every episode. Identified as Vietnamese with family members on both sides of the conflict, Duong worked during the war for the U.S. Rand Corporation contracted by the U.S. government for military intelligence gathering. Her background is upper-class, with ancestors who for generations served the French colonial regime. She and her husband David Elliot, not in the film, were both advisors to the film’s production. Joe Galloway was at Ia Drang Valley as a reporter, but his use of that experience to build a career as the best-selling author on his work We were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, the 2002 film starring Mel Gibson was based, hangs some asterisks on his credentials as a source for oral history—qualifiers only accentuated by his affected John Wayne drawl.

The actual veterans brought to the screen as eyewitnesses to the war in itself are a curious collection. Merrill McPeak, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, is no ground-up witness, having flown bombing missions from 30,000 feet in the air that created 72 cemeteries along the Ho Chi Minh Trail—but he is used repeatedly by Burns and Novick. Hal Kushner is used to recount the POW story, the chapter essential to the history of the war having been strung out for years by the Nixon administration, and the vilifying of the Vietnamese as torturers. But the POW experience is given short-shrift in the series, and distorted beyond recognition by their reliance on Kushner. Kushner was a doctor taken prisoner in the South, not a pilot shot down over the North as were most of the POWs. His memory of the Vietnamese’s “brutal torture” conforms to the top-down “official story” of the POW history rather than the better-documented account provided by historians such as Craig Howes in his Voices of the Vietnam POWs. Mostly, Burns and Novick use the Kushner story for its value to the home-front betrayal thesis they want viewers to come away with. While he is in prison, he tells us, his wife Valerie came out against the war, endorsing George McGovern for President at the 1972 Democratic Party national convention.

Next to Karl Marlantes, the raconteur with the home-from-war war stories, the veteran ground-pounder we see most often is Tim O’Brien. O’Brien is the best-selling novelist who writes riveting stories about combat in Vietnam and the men who fought there. But he writes fiction and has made up the stories he reads for the camera. O’Brien is rightly celebrated for capturing and conveying the existential reality of combat, but he is not a historian or war correspondent credentialed for documenting the war—which is the forte claimed for The Vietnam War.

Collateral Messaging

French cultural theorist Michel Foucault implores us to ferret the representations of history for their subliminal or hidden messages—finding “what is being said in what
was said,” as he phrased it. In their May 29, 2017 New York Times op-ed, Burns and Novick said the film is about “healing,” a theme reiterated in the film that is loaded with unspoken messages.

The discourse of healing insinuates that prewar America was a harmonious unity, an America of primordial goodness descended from its origin as the City on a Hill. The Australian sociologist Keith Beattie chided the idea a prelapsarian America as a myth; in his 2000 book The Scar that Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War, he points out the real America was riven by racism, class conflict, and political ideology before the war began. But the comfortable onsie of a suburban and rural America that was torn apart by the war, is exactly what Burns and Novick slide us into. Episode 3 of the series introduces us to the Crocker family: a white two-parent household with four kids and a home in the college town where Dad is a professor. The first image of mom holding baby-boy Mogie, born in 1947, is followed by a series of snapshots and her remembrances of him as the kid who loved to read about American heroes. With Bob Dylan’s soulful With God on Their Side providing the audio backdrop, we are cued: American innocence is at stake as the war in Vietnam plays-out in families like the Crocker’s.

Mogie Crocker is in Vietnam by the end of Episode 3; strains of Little Drummer Boy tell us it is Christmas. The family listens to the taped message from Mogie and worries. Later episodes revisit the Crocker’s story. Episode 7 opens with Thanksgiving-ready turkeys on parade in Worthington, Minnesota, the turkey-growing capital of America that happens, also, to be the hometown of novelist Tim O’Brien. In short order, we see snapshots of boy scouts and Little League baseball boys, and a vintage convertible, top down, festooned with a VFW banner and an older veteran perched atop its backseat. As if those images are not evocative enough of an idyllic America, O’Brien’s voiceover tells us of having grown up with “the great virtues” of “small-town America”—all of which a visit to Worthington’s Gobbler Café would confirm.

This was the America disrupted by the war in Vietnam, the Purple Heart nation through which we can best know the war itself, and the America that is still healing from the war. O’Brien’s remembrance of growing up in Worthington serves Burns and Novick especially well for this purpose because his book The Things They Carried already has iconic status with high school teachers, making his voice credible, and the film and book natural companion pieces for teaching.

The arc running from childhood innocence to war to postwar distress, drawn by Burns and Novick through veterans’ biographies, is metaphoric for the societal trajectory traced by America from the early 1960s through the early 1970s. The photographs of babies and young boys are the anchors for that arc, and the filmmakers use boys’ ages to vivify the impression that it was teenagers, innocents, who were sent to fight: Crocker and Musgrave were 17, Earhart and Vincent Okomo (prominent in Episode 8) were 19. Reporter Joe Galloway testifies to the valor of the “kids” who fought at Ia Drang, writer Neil Sheehan likens the “kids” sent to Vietnam to the WWII generation remembered as “the greatest”, Okomo and Marlantes confirm the quality of the “kids” they led into combat.

The imaging of U.S. troops as youthful innocents was so important to the way Burns and Novick wanted America depicted that they resorted to myth to do it. The actual mean age of the troops was 22—not kids.

False Balancing

Their careless uses of framing, oral history, and collateral messaging serve Burns and Novick well for the technique of “false balancing” that is the real hallmark of The Vietnam War. False balancing is the use of one storyline to counter another, to create the impression of objectivity. Its use here is most evident in treatment of the antiwar movement, whereupon we get a
collection of veterans and veteran-activists recounting their pride in having resisted the war, followed by their feelings of regret. Jack Todd does the right thing by deserting the Army and going to Canada, but now regrets having renounced his U.S. citizenship. In Episode 4, antiwar leader Bill Zimmerman begins with testimony to the sincerity of the movement, but then recalls the self-interest of middleclass draft resisters. Clips of Marines low-crawling through mud in Vietnam are interspersed with hippy revelers dancing in mud at Woodstock with voiceovers calling-out the indignities inherent in those contrasts. Episode 8 tells about the Thanksgiving Day antiwar fast of medical personnel at the Army hospital in Pleiku, but follows that with veteran John Musgrave’s recollection of being “so hurt” when campus protesters called him “baby killer.” (3)

"False balancing is the use of one storyline to counter another, to create the impression of objectivity. Its use here is most evident in treatment of the antiwar movement..."

The numerous images of American casualties, helicopter extractions, grieving families, and Vietnamese dead piled like cordwood might themselves compose a powerful antiwar message, but Burns and Novick have that balanced too. Strikingly, they pair combat scenes with the rock-and-roll period: we hear “Mustang Sally” as young recruits deploy, Hendrix’s “Are you Experienced” accompanying a beach assault, and a Marine company heading into combat to CCR’s “Bad Moon Rising”—hard stuff to resist for young men today looking for meaningful life. (4)

The discordance of the hearth-and-home framing of The Vietnam War with the scenes of destruction rained down on Vietnam only makes sense when coupled with the damage on the home front represented by emotionally traumatized veterans, scared witless in combat and attacked by protesters upon return. The faintly discernible through-line of the film is its collateral iteration of President Jimmy Carter’s “Mutual Destruction” thesis that the U.S. and Vietnam were left equally damaged by the war. The irony, as the film would have it, is that the U.S. damage was self-inflicted—dishonesty in Washington and disloyalty in Berkeley and Madison cost America dearly.

The attribution of the defeat in Vietnam to the war-at-home has underwritten the backlash fueling conservative political culture for over forty years, it is the wellspring of resentfulness that Donald Trump tapped for his run to the White House. It also recalls the legends of treachery and betrayal that fueled European revanchism following World War I that led to a second World War.

The America seeking repair and restitution for its lost war in Vietnam, that Burns and Novick sketch, is dangerous imagery which, left unchecked, can lure us down dark paths with deadly endings.

Endnotes

(1) I wrote about the demonizing of Jane Fonda as Hanoi Jane in Hanoi Jane: War, Sex, and Fantasies of Betrayal (Umass Press, 2010).

(2) For the history of VVAW, see Andrew Hunt’s The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (NYU Press, 2001).

(3) The best history of in-service resistance to the war is David Cortwright’s Soldiers in Revolt. The 2006 documentary film Sir! No Sir! is also a good source.

(4) Doug Bradley and Craig Werner’s We Gotta Get Out of This Place: The Soundtrack of the Vietnam War is a compendium of GI interests in music.
The Clandestine Lives of Solidarity
Resistance to "State Thought" during a Massacre in the Dominican Republic

by Amín Pérez, Princeton University

The making of a nation is accompanied by the construction of a legitimate representation of the social world. The State is at the foundation of the production and inculcation of these categories of perception. Once these forms of classification are imposed and get normalized in the minds of the subjects, “State thought” perpetuates the politics ruling the economy of injustices (Bourdieu, 2014). The elite-sponsored history has been one of the key instruments used to maintain this order, and to make invisible the social practices that can threaten its structure of domination. The study of a mass annihilation from below in the Caribbean offers a unique account of how people subvert this State thought. It contradicts the idea according to which ordinary people follow the mandate of power and execute symbolic and physical violence in the circumstances of a massacre (Arendt, 1963). Rather, it confirms that even in situations of rule by terror (De Swaan, 2015) people resist authority by creating forms of justice in the margins of the legitimacy. This paper is about this pragmatic culture performed by the clandestine lives of the official history.

In October 1937, one of the most atrocious yet least-known genocides of humanity was executed. Between 15,000 and 20,000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent were cruelly killed with machetes and clubs in the border area of my country, the Dominican Republic. Although this massacre has been documented by multiple sources, including the testimony of many survivors, international records, and historical research, the State has never acknowledged it. Worse still, they have hidden its real history as a way to keep silencing the population of Haitian origins on the Dominican soil up to this day.

I was born in 1984 in Santo Domingo. Like most of the people from my generation, I had just vaguely heard about this massacre. As a child, I never sought to know how or what led to the extermination of this population solely because of their ethnic origin. People commented about the existence of a common grave just a few meters from the hill that bordered the house of my great-grandparents in Puerto Plata, a northern province of the Dominican Republic. I grew up without knowing what really happened there. I only knew that I didn’t want to get close to that place when I played nearby.

"I was born in 1984 in Santo Domingo. Like most of the people from my generation, I had just vaguely heard about this massacre."

Only recently have I become interested in listening to my grandmother’s testimony. Some say that it is in moments of crisis that one is led to question one’s history. This time was no different. My grandmother’s near-death experience from an asthma attack, in which she almost died in my arms running to the
emergency room, prompted me to ask more about her memories of the massacre. The experiences of this rural woman, who lived through this inhumane slaughter, not only confirms that our official history is a fraud but also explains why a recounting of solidarity between Dominicans and Haitians poses a danger to the guardians of the Nation.

The Strength of Sociability

Abuela was born in 1924 in Ranchete, a small village located on the north side of the Dominican Republic, not far from the border with Haiti. Her name is Anadilia Jiménez, although at home we all know her by Aleja. She is the oldest of seven siblings. Her father, Don Toño, was a small farm owner in the area. He owned several plots on which he harvested coffee, cocoa, and root vegetables. When Abuela was born, this part of the Cibao enjoyed a high degree of political and economic autonomy vis-à-vis the central power in Santo Domingo. A constant daily flow of people from one side of the border to the other had brightened the social reciprocities between the two populations since the end of the nineteenth century. Haitians lived in nearby villages such as Marmolejos, Ranchete, Laguna Salada, Monte Llanos, and Bajabonico. They grew coffee and cacao, cut sugar cane, and planted yucca with which they made and sold casabe in the village. One frequently saw Haitian kids in Dominican schools and trade between Dominicans and Haitians; the formation of bicultural families, the daily use of Spanish and Kreyol, and the exchange of music and religion stood in contrast to the borderlines devised by the elites and intellectuals of the capital. As historian Richard Turits points out, these elites wanted to portray “the Haitian presence ... as a 'Pacific invasion' endangering the Dominican nation. This 'invasion' was supposedly 'Haitianizing' and 'Africanizing' the Dominican frontier, rendering Dominican popular culture more savage and backward, and injecting new and undesirable African admixtures into the Dominican social composition.” State policies aimed at curbing this sociability, regulating the migratory flow through taxes on travel and permits of stays on both sides of the border, emerged. But this policy was broadly avoided in practice by a population that did not find any sense to these rules. Indeed, they were based on racial prejudices and social barriers that people who did not even live there wanted to impose.

One case of this refusal was my grandmother. Aleja did not perceive it as an "invasion" of strangers or believe that people were inferior to her because they were black. Abuela sympathized with Antoine, one of the Haitian workers in her home. In the fields, everyone called him Antonio. But it was more pleasant to her to call him by his Kreyol pronunciation: Antuén. Don Toño gave him a conquito (a small piece of land) where he grew cacao and harvested and collected coffee. Antoine had the best breeding hens in the area, which he exchanged with the community for something more than money, quickly gaining the trust of people and popularity by his friendly personality and work skills. Unlike other Haitians who lived there for decades, Antoine had been living there for five years. He had no wife or children. His family was the people of the village.

State Violence

But during the first nights of the fall of 1937, this coexistence was drastically transformed by the dark turbulence of a political mandate. The dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo ordered the imminent extermination of all the inhabitants of Haitian origin living in the border zones of the country. By September 28, three hundred people had been killed in a town called Bánica. Everything was unexpected. There were no warnings or signs of tension. But the State, craving economic control of the trade in the border area as well as political and racial domination in the region, triggered the forces of hate that perpetrated this massacre. For this purpose, Trujillo mobilized the military. To make it look like a pogrom, there were few deaths by bullet. Their method was to kill them with
machetes or big wooden clubs. Some were able to escape. Others were trapped when, on October 5, the Dominican State decided to close the border and kill them in the waters of the Massacre River that separates Haiti from the Dominican Republic. Aleja tells me that aside from her house, “the Haitians passed by with all their terques, bed sheets, clothes, well, whatever they could carry on their shoulders. They took the path by Marmolejos, and when they came from the Cruce de Guayacanes to Manay, that was their ending. Down the hill near my house, was the slaughter... There they were killed. Poor Haitians, my God, that had no comparison! They were given a hit with a big club on their heads and later thrown into a hole. It was a huge hole. They killed them and threw them there. The point was to disappear them.”

In this area, the carnage lasted for weeks, and in some places, it lasted for months. The military prevailed with all the weight of physical violence, but they did not always render it visibly. Aleja tells me that they came medio incógnitos to the houses where they knew that there was a long coexistence between Haitians and Dominicans, as in the communities of Ranchete, Cabia, and Bajabonico. The army forced the local people to murder. This seems to be the case with my great-grandfather. My grandmother tells me she never knew if he had killed someone when they took him to the ridge. In Unijica, by the house of her father-in-law, Don Tibe, she remembers hearing the rumor that the workers from the village butchery slaughtered a large number of people of Haitian origin.

But, as these brutalities were carried out, this terror story also had a back of the coin in which solidarity and resistance were decisive. Historians have shown how crucial this solidarity was (Derby 1994, Hintzen 2016, Paulino 2016, Turits 2003), and reported that civilians and military were killed for refusing the order to kill Haitians. Abuela saw how many people also helped them escape: “They hid them in the houses so that the guards could not see them. Dad gave Antoine money to leave. But the State militia caught him on the way.” Trying to escape to Haiti, Antoine was caught when he was crossing the Yaque River and was murdered by Cornelio, another employee of my grandmother's house. After this, Cornelio was not welcomed back to work in my grandmother's house.

Sorrow and fear followed in the months after this horrible event. Aleja tells me that people in the village were shocked. They couldn’t understand the meaning of so much violence against people who had worked in the same places where they were dismembered, and others that had even been born and grew up there. At school, they couldn’t talk about it. The fear became private: “Oh god, people were sad, very sad. I can hardly describe it. We kept talking about that in the village, between us. Do you know what it's like to kill all these innocent people? Trujillo wanted to end the normal life that we had with Haitians.”

Illegalizing History

Abuela is right. This genocide was the beginning of the making of a history of division between Dominican and Haitian populations. The guardians of the State had declared war on this coexistence. In their eagerness to perpetuate their political hegemony — from what they understand should be and not what actually constitutes our Nation — the Dominican ruling class tries to make invisible the social logics that create community through distorted narratives.

"In this area, the carnage lasted for weeks, and in some places, it lasted for months. The military prevailed with all the weight of physical violence, but they did not always render it visibly."
and disturbing policies that seek to create antagonisms.

Since this massacre, a history of constant rejection of any form of community between the two populations has been built. The cutting of the sugar cane in the Dominican Republic was scrupulously reserved for Haitians. It would not kill them physically, but socially. Everything was done to deny them their very right to life, fixing them to the most sordid social and labor conditions on land, with no possibility to claim their rights. Everything was done to avoid their socialization with the Dominican population, reducing their existence strictly to the confines of the bateyes (a type of barracks) that still surrounds the sugar cane fields of the country.

Today, as in 1937, we have been led to believe that these two populations are incompatible. As if anti-Haitianism is the definition of what is Dominican. This rejection by the elites of the very heterogeneous Dominican population comes to fulfil a function: to legitimize social injustice by dividing the working classes and making up a false enemy within it. The purpose has been to dissimilate the State’s responsibility for the social misery in which they live by exacerbating tensions between the “They” and “We,” the “Black” and the “Others,” which ends nefariously by punishing them for this situation.

Far from being just a past, this history keeps updating its incidence in the present day. In September of 2013, a decree of the Constitutional Court (the highest judicial instance in the Nation) ordered the revocation of Dominican citizenship to men, women, and children born of at least one Haitian parent between 1929–2007. This mass racialized denationalization does not seek to expel this population from its territory but to maintain them in the most vulnerable social and labor conditions (Martínez, Wooding 2017). Through the force of law, the real goal for the State is legalize inequality and to make coexistence illegal. Today, as yesterday, the true fear of the Dominican elites lies in the transgressive practice of solidarity and pacific coexistence among peoples that blur border lines, transcend their political visions and substitute them by principles of hospitality. In brief, by humanity.

The Socialism of the People

Abuela opened my eyes on how troubling this cohabitation between Dominicans and Haitians has been for the State. But also, to how a people’s version of this massacre brings us crucial lessons about the power of a history from below. Her story makes visible the social process that shaped the will to continue living together, and which continues to shape the unthinkable nation. Every day in the country, the official history is subverted.

This is what I observed in the city of Santiago of my childhood, where I spent time helping my grandparents sell groceries in the bodega. Recently, the residents of a working-class neighborhood subverted an order of the mayor, expelling the municipal police who were preparing to arrest and dismiss the Haitians who lived and worked there. I also lived it a few months ago conducting fieldwork in the sugar cane fields of the country. There I found the answer I was looking for, of how, despite the animosity that is created from above between the populations, and that longed-for social explosion that many sectors are looking for (and that from time to time, tend to happens), most of the time it doesn’t occur. The answer is simple. These populations are permeated by the experience of community that I call the socialism of the people. This is not a political-ideological issue, much less morality inherent to a particular cultural group. It is rather that solidarity tends to develop within a community as a result of a common historical situation of domination. The force of this social bond emerges in the daily conditions of precariousness, consciously and unconsciously, creating ideals of communal justice and structuring and giving meaning to collective life, overcoming the particular interests of the elites. Mostly, it is in those inner-cities confined to segregation where new
nuances of solidarity arise from the feeling of living and fighting the same conditions of misery. And, it is in those fields and bateyes where the question is not where do you come from, but what makes us stand together and where do we hit from now on.

"...solidarity tends to develop within a community as a result of a common historical situation of domination."

Aleja will soon be ninety-four years old. She hasn’t mourned the loss of her friend Antoine yet, but the State has never been able to destroy her love of building community. People from this Caribbean island have paid a very high price for freedom (Eller, 2016) — a price too high to keep letting a political order trap the sense of our history and impose boundaries that dehumanize our social relations.

References


Logics of Crisis Resonate in Academe
Perspectives from the Post-1945 Era to Contemporary Turkey

by Ash Iğsız, New York University

Political crises resonate in academe. Recent purges of thousands of academics in Turkey brought visibility to the scale of the plight of our colleagues. Violation of academic freedom, however, is never a problem on its own. It is a symptom of a larger issue. Targeting the production and the dissemination of knowledge, along with the academic cadres who carry this task, also implies a struggle to secure a particular régime of truth—as appears to be the case in Turkey today. The crisis-ridden political landscape in the contemporary world complicates this picture and makes it harder to institutionally respond to a situation like the Turkish case. Indeed, the contemporary dynamics bear disturbing resemblances to the 1930s (1), and the international régimes of truth developed in the post-1945 era to address the ruins and ruination (2) of the Second World War offer important insights to reconsider contemporary dynamics, especially from the perspective of alterity management.

At the time, the atrocities of the World War II and the massive refugee crisis that accompanied it were widely identified as a crisis of Humanity or of Civilization. Given the magnitude of the crisis, one might have logically expected to see the racialized logics and archives of knowledge—including repertoires of fascism—that contributed to such crisis to be put into question. An overview of the 1950s’ international management of alterity, however, demonstrates how despite an epistemological and institutional push against scientific racialism, the effort remained largely a liberal humanist one. (3) Liberal humanism (4) emphasized brotherhood and equality through a shared human essence anchored in the body, instead of social and political rights, or solidarity. UNESCO spearheaded such efforts, while United Nations, on its onset, was geared toward maintaining the status quo. (5)

Demographic policies included enforced assimilation and mass “transfers” of minorities, widely deemed to bring instability and war to Europe. It clearly mattered which groups’ numbers were to be regulated, not merely through birth control or mass killings, but also systematized population transfers en masse operating on a segregative principle. Unsurprisingly, the fusion of fascist eugenics and demography has continued to inform policies of forced migration and refugee integration. Scholars who had previously supported fascism or adopted a biological approach to social matters moved swiftly to the terrains of refugee study after the war.

Throughout the 1950s, spatial redistribution of racialized populations widely continued at a local level in different
parts of the world. Racialized thinking was pervasive, even in cases where race did not appear to be a primary concern. Spatial regulations of alterity may differ in details, but they shared the general concern with “unmixing” and segregation: walls, partitions, apartheid, population exchanges, among other practices exemplify this trend. In that context, every case of mobility was simultaneously a case of social and/or physical immobility.

At the same time, ending human suffering and finding solutions to human pain were promoted internationally as depoliticized slogans of peace and coexistence. As for the emphasis on suffering, it lent itself to liberal humanist discourses: accordingly, because we are all humans and are capable of feeling pain, we should consider this capability as part of our shared humanity. Liberal humanism thus promotes a brotherhood that configures being human as an essence which unites people despite racialized differences, rather than through a reconsideration of politics and history. In that respect, liberal humanist emphasis on suffering risks divorcing the affect from its political and historical contexts and thus obscures modes of relationality other than human feelings or essence to consider segregative biopolitics that marked the post-1945 era.

Those who previously supported fascism like renowned Italian eugenicist and statistician Corrado Gini collaborated with Turkish sociologists such as Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Turkey’s leading eugenicist psychiatrist Fahreddin Kerim Gökay (6) to work on the refugee crisis. Their collaboration led to the founding of a refugee study association in Europe, and several years later, to launching a sister organization that expanded its scope from Europe to the study of refugees in the world—the Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem. The sphere of influence of the associations was broad: members of the Council of Europe, UNHCR and the Red Cross, as well as leading political figures regularly took part in their conventions. Gökay served as the elected president of both refugee associations for about ten years. The objective was articulated as alleviating pain and human suffering.

In September 1954, the European refugee association held its convention in Istanbul—the home town of its president Gökay, who was also both the mayor and governor of the city. At the convention in Istanbul, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Fahreddin Kerim Gökay repeated the same mantra of no more suffering and declared their wish to end all human misery, only to be involved in a plot that targeted the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul within a year. When the state-orchestrated anti-Greek pogrom—comparable to race riots in some respects—swept the city on 6-7 September 1955, Gökay was the official responsible of Istanbul and the safety of its residents. He was reportedly complicit in the plot. Menderes and Gökay were thus instrumental in reproducing exactly the same kind of human suffering they had grandly condemned the year before. Who exactly then, one might ask, qualifies as human?

The most controversial figure of these circles was arguably Corrado Gini, well-known for developing the Gini coefficient to calculate income inequality. In Italy, he was a former president of the Italian Society of Genetics and Eugenics. In 1936, after he spent a year teaching at Harvard University, he also received an honorary degree in Sciences from there. (7) By that time, he had published “The Scientific Basis of Fascism” in English (8), had a significant impact on Mussolini’s political campaign, and served as President of Central Institute of Statistics in Italy. (9) After the Second World War, when UNESCO launched an initiative to found the International Sociological Association, Gini attended the initial meeting in Oslo, together with Hilmi Ziya Ülken, who represented Turkey at the meeting. UNESCO publications and meeting minutes at the time indicate how an emphasis on the international study of “social relations” was configured as a move toward building peace. In Oslo, Gini infamously sought to bring the organization under his power when
he declared his revival of the International Institute of Sociology—an organization that had stopped its activities during the war. Ülken supported Gini’s proposal to combine the two organizations, but the proposal was rejected.

Ülken’s newspaper columns at the time suggest that he saw no difference between UNESCO’s and Gini’s initiatives. Is it possible that he was unaware of the political implications? It seems unlikely. In 1952, when the Gini-led International Institute of Sociology convened in Istanbul, Ülken gave a speech in favor of Gini and complained that the president of the ISA had put pressure on the Turkish government to prevent the conference from taking place in Istanbul. The attempts to prevent the IIS conference did not succeed, however, the number of international attendees was a record low, and Turkish state officials did not attend the opening. Yet, the same figures who did not attend the conference, or distanced themselves from IIS on the grounds that it was tainted by fascism, did not show the same scruple in collaborating with Gini’s circle, including Ülken, when it came to refugee integration. This suggests that at best, institutions associated with a certain reputation were put into question—if at all, as distancing does not necessarily mean putting the underlying logics into question. That Gini was a complex and controversial figure, there is no doubt. Indeed, in the late 1950s, Gini collaborated with scholars in the racialist camp that were either overtly in favor of segregation in the United States or did not oppose it. In many ways, he is a leading figure in the first fusion of fascism, demography and eugenics. He continued this line of work in the context of refugee integration.

In 1950, Gini was invited to Turkey to found the Institute of Statistics at Istanbul University, where he would also teach a course on demography. The Turkish Parliament assembled to issue his work permit, and he was offered a handsome salary—about fifteen times more than Ülken’s wage, who also taught at the same university. Ülken was the president of the Turkish Sociological Society and together with the vice-president of the same organization, author Peyami Safa, he organized tea receptions to introduce Gini to other colleagues and students. Today, the lecture notes from Gini’s Istanbul University course and translated works can be found at the Turkish Parliament’s library. In Turkey, he was indeed a valued scholar.

At the refugee association, Gini promoted the notion of the human capital—calling for engaging the refugees and the displaced in terms of labor-ready bodies whose training was already paid by the country of origin, and therefore a profitable business for the host country. Yet, what happens to those who do not qualify as a human capital, to use Gini’s terms? (10) At the refugee association conference in Istanbul, Walter Schätzel, a German scholar of international law, addressed the case of those emigrants and refugees who have no exchange value as capital and are thus deemed to be the “undesirables” (les indésirables). He explains that this group of refugees are often called “social burden” (bagage social). The so-called social burden includes “the old and sickly, the orphans, criminals and the asocials, in short all those people that no State wants to receive” and who, according to Schätzel, cannot be easily employed. It is indeed a primarily economic move that is materialized here: one that focuses on rendering the refugee or the emigrant productive, but addressed in humanist terms via the concurrent mobilization of discourses to alleviate pain and suffering. Integration thus implied both economic productivity and cultural assimilation. Considering the prevalence of biopolitical approaches in configuring social order—as a means to remedy the “crisis”—not just as a social, political and economic problem, but also as an epistemological one, it is not surprising that controversial eugenicists found a niche in matters of refugee integration in the aftermath of the war. Emigrants who were sick, orphaned, or too old—that is, for the most part, those who were in a precarious position—were considered to be a social burden, a deadweight on society. These dynamics, in turn, raise
questions about the limits of humanitarian discourses to alleviate suffering: if the socially vulnerable are considered to be a nuisance, what exactly is defined and recognized as pain?

In an article in the first issue of Corrado Gini’s revived *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* in 1954, Carl Schmitt asserts that what at the time was called “world history in the West and the East is the history of development in the objects, means, and forms of appropriation interpreted as progress.” The implications of Schmitt’s assertion are three-fold: in form, it is offered a platform by Corrado Gini’s controversial revival of International Institute of Sociology—*Revue* being its official publication—in what appears to be a power struggle with the UNESCO-sponsored International Sociological Association; in content, it reminds how every form of appropriation generates its own régime of truth that configures dispossession as “progress”; in praxis, it crystallizes the broader dynamics of the post-1945 era, when UNESCO’s liberal discourses, institutional patronage and cultural policies toward building peace after the Second World War were widely interpreted as progress. In an attempt to ensure peace—necessary for economic growth within the capitalist world after the Second World War, UNESCO launched new transnational cultural, epistemological and educational initiatives to develop new policies. In addition to promoting the ISA, UNESCO also organized conferences that led the path to reconfigure the study of Humanity as Humanities—in the plural, as a gesture of recognition of alterity. Towering upon the ruination, ruins, and the biopolitics of the Second World War, Humanities at the time was presented as a way to inform students of different cultures. It was thus deemed to be a medium to build peace and coexistence, despite the clear shortcomings of this project.

Much happened from the “crisis of the Humanity” of the post-1945 era to the “crisis of the Humanities” in the contemporary world dominated by securitarian capitalism, rise of authoritarian tendencies, systematized regimes of surveillance and incarceration, capitalist and authoritarian encroachment on relatively autonomous professional fields—including academia, proliferation of digitization and information technology, segregative biopolitics, and racism, among other things. Yet again, we find ourselves in another era marked by a massive refugee crisis and an array of responses that range from humanist slogans (exemplified with the signs “we are all refugees”) to segregative logics that simultaneously seek to build visible walls or invisible frontiers—like the Mediterranean that has turned into a massive death sea and the borders of Turkey that turned into a metaphoric wall separating Europe from the refugees en masse. The exchange value of human life is racialized. The management of alterity through segregative biopolitics is intact, and liberal humanist discourses are far from offering a remedy. In fact, in the hands of politicians, discourses of brotherhood have become tools to domesticate demands for restitution. Securitarian campaigns tap into eugenist paradigms of crime, casting categorized groups as potential threats based on their background. From the United States to Turkey, the political landscape offers a stark picture.

"The management of alterity through segregative biopolitics is intact, and liberal humanist discourses are far from offering a remedy."

In Turkey, the social mobility of minorities have long had its limitations, depending on the community and the demands from the state. Internal forced migration, resettlement policies to dilute the numbers of certain groups like Kurds have long been a practice. On 6-7
September 2015, on the sixtieth anniversary of the gruesome anti-Greek pogrom, Turkey’s newspapers reported that events were organized to condemn the violence of sixty years ago. The pages of the newspapers were decorated with the pictures of people writing “never again” when the thousands of Kurds were segregated from the rest of the country and not allowed to leave their homes for weeks in a series of brutal counterinsurgency and urban warfare. Disturbing reports that the law enforcement did not allow health care providers, firemen, among others to help the local residents were abundant. Entire towns and neighborhoods were leveled to ground zero. Rumors of urban renewal and resettlement have since been circulating in the public domain.

The targeting of Turkey’s academe became more systematic during that time, and because of its scale, gained more visibility. In this case too, grievances of academic freedom were a symptom of a broader problem and a particular régime of truth was reconfigured. For instance, Mardin Artuklu was an important university near the Syrian border, where for the first time Kurdish and Syriac studies were established. Shortly after these programs were launched, Middle East Studies Association in North America has reported what appeared to be a systematic campaign of changing the academic climate at the University, which eventually led to multiple dismissals and lawsuits, as well as disciplinary investigations. And when more than one thousand scholars signed a petition that condemned the government’s Kurdish policies and counterinsurgency campaigns, they have become visible targets. Their persecution and the exodus that followed brought a limited visibility to the broader problems, but simultaneously risked instrumentalizing the hardship of these academics in generating a smokescreen to the disturbing reports of violations of rights. It is crucial to be able to address the precariousness and persecution of our colleagues in Turkey, while recognizing that theirs is part of a larger problem. Today, the political and economic powers in the world appear to try to manage the crisis.

In Turkey, rather than addressing the problems themselves, professionals—doctors, lawyers, academics, journalists—who articulate the problems have been persecuted. Scholars and scholarship have been targeted before, and not just those who worked on the Kurds like Ismail Beşikçi, or the criminalization of addressing 1915 as the Armenian genocide. Targeted scholars included those who brought up public health issues such as the case of Onur Hamzaoğlu, the former Chair of Public Health at Kocaeli University, who publicly shared his research findings on the health hazards caused by pollution in two industrial towns. He found chemicals such as lead in breastmilk and infant feces and warned the residents of industrial pollution. The mayors of the two towns, Kocaeli and Dilovasi, filed a lawsuit against him alleging academic misconduct. The list of grievances is long. Yet what brought the visibility to an existing problem was the scale of academic purges that followed the bloody coup attempt of 15 July 2016. Since then, Turkey is officially ruled in a state of emergency—declared to prevent a military coup, and the emergency decrees issued have resulted in multiple detentions, purges of thousands of academics and civil servants. Important to note that the legal infrastructure for the present-day policies has been established by the military in the past coup d’états, and that militarism is not confined to military coup.

In sum, today’s world might disturbingly resonate the dynamics of the 1930s, but what we can reconsider in the light of some of the dynamics discussed in this piece is how policies and the régimes of truth developed to deal with a crisis manage it at best, rather than getting to the core of the problem and exposing its underlying logics. In that respect, the management of the crisis of Humanity of the post-1945 era has important implications to rethink present-day dynamics and the exchange value of the human life. It also points to the importance of maintaining a critical distance between “crisis” as a category of analysis and as a set of practices that manage, prolong, delay, or simply
perpetuate the problem by continuing to operate within the structural limits of its underlying logics. The management of alterity is an important site to begin to address these questions.

Every day in the country, the official history is subverted.

"...the management of the crisis of Humanity of the post-1945 era has important implications to rethink present-day dynamics."

Endnotes


(10) I am grateful to Begüm Adalet for calling my attention to the fact that while human capital was implicated in Adam Smith’s work, it was widely promoted during the Cold War, especially in the 1960s.
Decolonizing Knowledge (Part I)
Roundtable on New Directions in the History of Knowledge and Postcolonial Theory

Interview with Manu Goswami (NYU), George Steinmetz (IAS/Michigan), and Andrew Zimmerman (GWU) by Nadin Heé (Free University of Berlin) and Alexandra Przyrembel (University of Hagen, Germany).

Editor's Note: This interview grew out of an International Workshop at the Freie Universität Berlin on February 16-17, 2015 on "(De-)Colonizing Knowledge: Figures, Narratives, and Practices". The conversation is broken into two parts; the second part will appear in the Spring issue of Trajectories.

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Question 1: The history of knowledge is one of the most dynamic fields in historiography. How would you explain the intensity of recent debates? And what would be your definition of knowledge?

Manu Goswami

Response

I think we are at a consequential juncture in histories of knowledge. There is an impasse generated by, on the one hand, the challenge-and-riposte structure between abstract universalizing frameworks (whether beholden to orthodox Marxism or variants of modernization theory) and, on the other, the epistemology centered version of negative dialectics that key strands of poststructuralism and postcolonial theory forged. In many ways, this encounter was beholden to a particular historical and theoretical moment, a moment that has now passed. One concrete illustration of this superseded dynamic is the ways the caution about claims of universality advanced by postcolonial theories (and varieties of post-structuralism) has been domesticated across regional historical fields. Such theories now serve as an implicit point of departure for studies of such apparently distinct themes as: the geopolitical underpinnings of social-scientific discourses; the constitution of enlightenment discourses; or the entwined genesis of slavery and capitalism in the Atlantic world. It is not an exaggeration to say, I think, that the once regionally circumscribed problematic of postcolonialism has migrated from the periphery to the very center of what Dipesh Chakrabarty conjured as a “hyper-real Europe” (Chakrabarty, 2000). At the same time, postcolonial scholarship tended to focus less on providing alternate explanations of social and cultural formations than marking the limits of inherited and dominant conceptual schemas. This internal limit is now more acute. That is, it is both more visible and untenable, in a contemporary historical landscape marked by a veritable explosion of “global and transnational” studies. A shared characteristic of this diverse research horizon is the way historians and historically-minded scholars have begun to wrest conceptual and empirical terrains away from the ‘harder’ social sciences. Consider, for instance, the following subjects: the recasting of older debates about the differentiated regional and experiential histories of capitalism; the burgeoning literature on the making of international regimes, institutions, and projects; or the growing literature on the variegated genesis and trajectory of such keywords of political modernity as democracy and secularism, liberalism and political economy, decolonization and internationalism.

The reanimation of questions of ‘the social’ in histories of knowledge has broadly coincided
with the forging of multi-scalar and multi-temporal modes of analysis that no longer assume state-territorial boundaries or the nation as their default units of analysis. Scholars interested in “the social” are alert to the differential and multiple temporal rhythms internal to historical temporality. Some of the most persuasive scholarship in this arena---whether histories of political economy and economic thought or the multi-sited genesis of keywords, institutions, and practices associated with political modernity---neither treats the “social” as a fixed representational whole nor as a closed totality. A recent wave of critical historiographical stock-taking has proclaimed that “we” live and think, at least in the US academy, in an “age of fracture”, where the objects and aims of regnant models of social history and analysis have been decisively dismantled (Rodgers, 2011). Yet the orientation of “actually existing” historiographical practices seems to suggest less a single-stranded or decisive cyclical movement (from social to cultural approaches or the rise of big history) within histories of knowledge than a kind of open-ended juncture. This juncture recalls the Gramscian notion of a transitional crisis, where the new has not fully appeared and revenants persist. As historians have long claimed, such junctures are often incubators of substantively new objects and practices of knowledge.

I should conclude by noting some of the challenges that histories of knowledge face today, in light of the above sketched shifts. How can we attend to the contemporaneity or simultaneity of the appearance of concepts and categories across regional and local domains without supposing that temporal contiguity implies substantive convergence? How do we make sense of both the “formal similarities” across sociopolitical forms (whether the nation-state, projects of development, or modes of accumulation) and their variable, regionally inflected political valence and experiential purchase? How might we underscore the commensurability of categories of analysis and practice without bracketing the lived actuality of “durable inequalities” that have subtended the transposition and transfiguration of practices, institutions, and categories across a differentiated and uneven global terrain? A central task, I think, is to foreground a critical and reflexive notion of comparability within histories of knowledge. To do so would elucidate both homogenization and differentiation as a dialectical product of a particular historical process, conjuncture, or formation. This requires, at the outset, moving beyond notions of comparison as a neutral metric or formal method as well as counter-claims of incomparability and singularity. We need instead to attend to the conditions or grounds of comparability across domains (whether science or political forms or political economy). In other words, we need to treat comparison itself as a historically variant, politically partisan, and socially embedded epistemological practice. That is, comparison is not just an object of histories of knowledge but their substantive ground.

"We need to treat comparison itself as a historically variant, politically partisan, and socially embedded epistemological practice."

Question 2: Before we come back to the question of ‘transitional crisis’, what did postcolonial theories actually add to the history of knowledge?

George Steinmetz

Response

Postcolonial theories made a series of contributions to the history of knowledge. Taken individually, none of these arguments and their contributions are entirely unique to postcolonial theory. Taken as a whole, however, the
postcolonial intervention shifted the terms of debate.

The first central argument is that metropolitan forms of knowledge are constituted at least in part by imperial and colonial peripheries—often in ways that are unnotice or disavowed (Spivak 1987; E. Said 1993). Historians now routinely track the flows of locally sited forms of knowledge between metropoles and colonies or imperial outposts. Of course, comparable arguments were also present in colonial social science prior to postcolonial theory, especially between the 1930s and the 1960s. It is also important to keep in mind the difference between arguments for global determinants of local knowledge and imperial or colonial sources. The conceptual slippage between colonial situations and transnational or global conditions is reminiscent of earlier elisions of the concept of empire with capitalism or colonialism with imperialism.

A second argument associated more with colonial historiography than with postcolonial theory is that modern colonialism entailed a very specific form of political rule, one that was different from ancient and non-western Empires, different from most cases of state formation within Europe, and different from continental imperial expansion by Napoléon and Hitler. Colonial rule entailed foreign conquest or annexation of territory, followed by the partial or complete seizure of sovereignty and ongoing rule over a population treated as inferior by the conquerors. Geopolitical domination and conquest are not specific to modern colonialism. What is specific to modern colonialism, however, is the combination of conquest followed by loss of sovereignty and the installation of a form of governance organized around definitions of the conquered as inherently inferior to their rulers. This is the “rule of colonial difference,” as defined by Partha Chatterjee (1990). The rule of difference was often written directly into colonial law.

A third and related argument was stated succinctly by Edward Said: “From travelers’ tales … colonies were created” (Said 1978: 117). Historians have explored the ways empires and specific colonial policies were shaped by metropolitan forms of knowledge about the periphery, including ethnographic and civilizational discourses (Burke 2014; Steinmetz 2007; Goh 2007).

Fourth, postcolonial theory contains an array of psychoanalytic arguments about colonial subjectivity (Fanon 1952, Memmi 1957, Bhabha 1990) and epistemological arguments about access to the Other and the singularity of “southern” philosophies and cultures (Chakrabarty 2000). Once again the basic structure of these arguments is not specific to postcolonial theory. German Historicism insisted on the irreducible uniqueness of cultures (Steinmetz 2014a). Psychoanalysts and sociologists examined dominated and marginal forms of subjectivity. Marxists and feminists theorized the epistemic privileges putatively linked to dominated status (Lukács 1968). Cultural anthropologists discussed the plausibility of understanding radically different cultures. What was unique to postcolonial theory was that it connected these questions of subjectivity and epistemology to the colonial situation (Balandier 1951) and colonialism’s aftermath.

How does the forgoing relate to the history of knowledge? I do not want to suggest that all histories of knowledge would benefit from taking colonial and imperial power relations into account. Postcolonial approaches lose all analytic power when they are applied to any and all situations. The word colonialism changes from a concept into an epithet when it is used metaphorically. But any intellectual history that takes contextual influence seriously needs to have theoretical categories for making sense of the relevant contexts. What postcolonial theory has done is to call attention to imperial and colonial determinants of knowledge that were previously invisible.
"Postcolonial approaches lose all analytic power when they are applied to any and all situations. The word colonialism changes from a concept into an epithet when it is used metaphorically."

The history of scientific work in and about the colonial and postcolonial Africa points to the contributions and the limitations of postcolonial approaches. On the one hand, European knowledge was produced in despotic colonial and imperial conditions. On the other hand, colonial science was partially shielded from external contextual determinations of this sort by virtue of being produced within the semi-autonomous arenas that Pierre Bourdieu calls “fields.” This was especially true of European thinkers in Europe, where cultural fields already consolidated their autonomy during the 19th century (Bourdieu 1996; 2013), but it was also true of some of the knowledge produced in overseas colonial sites (Steinmetz forthcoming). This is not to say that semi-autonomous fields are realms of intellectual freedom, however, since fields are traversed by differences, conflicts, and power asymmetries. Nonetheless, the determinants of knowledge that exist inside a specific intellectual field are of a fundamentally different sort from the determinants existing outside that field. Postcolonial theory, like Marxist sociological approaches to the sociology of knowledge, has not been attentive to protections against the heteronomization of knowledge. Both tend to trace cultural works to determinants that are usually quite remote from the point of intellectual production, such as capitalism or colonialism. Bourdieusian field theory resembles Marxism and postcolonial theory in seeking to explain cultural production contextually, but it has a more capacious sense of the relevant determinants of knowledge, most of which are located at a more proximate distance from intellectuals and their work than in traditional approaches to the sociology of knowledge. Bourdieu’s approach also overcomes the opposition between sociological approaches that limit themselves to explaining the conditions of production of works and humanities approaches that focus on the formal analysis and understanding of works (see Bourdieu and Haacke 1995). Intellectual historians should not take sides with contextualist or internalist accounts or with some simple combination of the two, but should try to establish the exact constellation of determinants of knowledge including those that are irreducible to the individual author.

Postcolonial theory has criticized metropolitan conceptual and explanatory formations in the social sciences that take a universalizing form. I agree with M. Goswami that the division between a universalizing Marxism and a particularizing postcolonial poststructuralism is a dead end. A good example of overcoming this division, despite the author’s own intentions, is Chibber (2013; Steinmetz 2014b). Chibber’s account, though putatively Marxist and universalist, acknowledges that the “ensemble of social relations in any region need not be subsumed under one set of rules,” and that the various practices that comprise a historical-regional whole can be governed by very dissimilar logics, even as capital tries to universalize itself at the same time (Chibber 2013, p. 239). At the opposite end, Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe (2000) emphasizes “dissimilar logics” rather than universalizing ones, but fully acknowledges the latter. This debate is reminiscent of the late 19th century German methodological debates around Historical Economics and the Geisteswissenschaften (Steinmetz 2014a). To some extent Chakrabarty’s approach aligns with the German historical school and Chibber’s with the generalizing, universalizing approach of the Austrian School or the “positivist” historian Karl Lamprecht. The resolution of that earlier
historicism debate in the work of Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and Meinecke retained the idea of the singular, unique historical fact or event but argued that it could also be explained. This debate and its resolution appear to be very relevant for the current discussion.

References


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