Chair’s Introduction
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It is my honor and privilege to serve as chair of our section at a moment when so many exciting intellectual developments are afoot in comparative and historical sociology. Much of what is exciting can be glimpsed in Trajectories. The editors always invest so much time and thought to help us keep our finger on the pulse on what is happening in our subfield, and the current issue is no exception.

More broadly, what strikes me as exciting is the intellectual vitality and dynamism of comparative-historical sociology right now. A simple way to glean a sense of the questions, voices, subjects, and approaches that currently command the imagination and devotion of comparative-historical sociologists would be to consider the books and articles that have received the Moore or Tilly Award in the last ten years. This exercise has obvious limits as a way of mapping what has been happening intellectually in the subfield, but it can deliver insight if approached with caution.

When I look over the list of winners and their work, starting (arbitrarily) with winners in 2009, what jumps out at me right off the bat—besides their outstanding quality—is the intellectual
diversity of books and articles that have recently won section awards. They pose many different types of questions, range across many different times and geographies, and draw on many different kinds of evidence. ¹

Of course, it is true that many of the award winners over the last decade do seem to be concerned explicitly or implicitly with politics. How is power organized and exercised in different societies and applied to a range of problems? What accounts for patterns of change and continuity in the way that different societies choose to organize and exercise power? What consequences flow from the different choices that different societies make? Yet the winners seem also to cohere into studying a number of different constellations that are not wholly reducible to politics. The vigor of the ongoing work within and across the different constellations is striking to me.

The work of these winners can be grouped into seven distinct constellations, although some pieces of scholarship clearly belong to more than one constellation and some constellations overlap with others.

The first and perhaps largest research constellation addresses questions about state-building and institutional development. This work is often motivated by a desire to parse and explain variation in types and trajectories of state capacity and institutional change, usually across different countries but also not infrequently across different subnational units of analysis.

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This constellation features several distinct clusters. One cluster revolves around economic policy, including studies of fiscal policy and financial regulation. Wenkai He’s book on the modern fiscal state explores whether the intersection of a credit crisis and certain socioeconomic conditions explain why England and Japan but not China were able to achieve centralized tax collection and long-term debt financing. Nicholas Hoover Wilson’s article examines whether the perceptions of colonial administrators accounts for why forms of tax administration varied in colonial India between the more intrusive and less bureaucratic ryotwari system in Madras and the less intrusive and more bureaucratic zemindari system in Bengal. Greta Krippner’s article considers whether the nature of the credit relationship is partially responsible for why American feminists who sought to open up consumer lending in the 1970s were less successful in democratizing access to credit than Chicago-based community activists who sought to open up mortgage and business lending.

Social policy is another cluster, and recent winners have focused on the subnational puzzles. Prerna Singh’s book examines why the Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala have achieved higher levels of social development since the 1970s than those of Rajasthant, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, focusing on the sense of “subnational solidarity” among “challenger elites.” Cybelle Fox’s book looks at the United States from the Progressive Era to the New Deal and considers why African Americans, Mexican Americans, and European immigrants—each of which were concentrated in different regions of the country—were incorporated into the welfare state so differently.

Fiscal policy, financial regulation, and social policy all receive attention in Monica Prasad’s book, which explores whether the efflorescence of “agrarian statism” in the nineteenth century United States explains why it eventually developed a domestic policy regime that featured a unique combination of progressive taxation of individuals and corporations, financial regulations that promoted credit-fueled consumption over production, and low levels of public social spending—all of which

¹ A list of Moore Award and Tilly Award winners from the early 2000s can be found on the CHS Section Web page: http://chs.asa-comparative-historical.org/awards/.
saddled the country with higher poverty rates than other rich democracies.

Another distinct cluster is research on the labor market. In her book, Kathleen Thelen observes an unexpected pattern of variability in the liberalization of industrial relations, vocational education, and labor market policy in the United States, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and she explores whether the scope of producer groups and state capacity to broker broad agreements explains why liberalization takes a more egalitarian route in some countries and not others. Elisabeth Anderson’s article considers whether ideational strategies played a significant role in the passage of an 1839 law in Prussia that limited the factory employment of children, comparing the politics of that law to the politics of an earlier proposal that failed.

Work on the carceral state forms a newer cluster and here the main focus has naturally been the United States. As with social policy, institutional developments in subnational jurisdictions have been a major concern. Chris Muller’s article finds that reliance on convict leasing across the counties of post-bellum Georgia is associated with urbanicity and the extent of black landholding, while David Garland’s book asks why capital punishment has persisted in pockets of the country, pointing among other things to the critical role of federalism.

Studies of political parties also form a newer cluster of work on institutions. One part of this cluster explores the analytical relevance of political parties to classic macro-sociological questions about democracy and revolutions. Ziblatt’s book and de Leon’s article (see below) come to mind. Another part of the cluster focuses on the transformation of political parties themselves. Stephanie Mudge’s book explores whether changes in the fortunes, status, and ideology of the economics profession explain why left leaning parties in Germany, Sweden, and the United States turned away from socialism and toward neoliberalism over the course of the twentieth century. Josh Pacewicz asks why political parties in a Rust Belt town have become increasingly disembedded from the local community since the 1980s, taking on a highly ideological and partisan edge. Barry Eidlin’s article explores whether the responses of the ruling party to the social unrest unleashed by the Great Depression accounts for why the United States never developed a labor party, unlike its Canadian neighbor.

A second constellation of winners is addressed to questions about democracy. Why did democracy emerge in some countries but not others? Why did it expand and even thrive in some of the countries where it initially took root? Why did it altogether collapse in other countries? What are the consequences of the manner in which democratization has proceeded and developed? These are among the puzzles tackled by Daniel Ziblatt’s book on conservative parties and the different paths to democracy taken by Great Britain and Germany, Cedric de Leon’s article on the Republican Party and the transformation of American democracy through the “bourgeois revolution” of the Civil War, Dan Slater’s article on democratization in seven southeast Asian countries from the 1970s, Ivan Ermakoff’s book on democratic breakdown in Weimar Germany and the French Third Republic, and Robert Fishman and Omar Lizardo’s article on the cultural consequences of the different transitions to democracy taken by Portugal and Spain in the 1970s.

A third constellation is concerned about advent of the nation-state and the achievement of nationhood. What accounts for the emergence and proliferation of the nation-state as a predominant model of political organization? Why have some countries organized as nation-states succeeded in achieving a lasting degree of political integration and robust sense of national identification among their citizens, even when they feature multiple ethnic groups? Andreas
Wimmer’s article with Yuval Feinstein examines why the nation-state has become the most prevalent form of modern statehood, and it explores the role of nationalists in creating and exploiting power shifts away from incumbent regimes. Andreas Wimmer’s book considers how the strength of associational life, state capacity to provide public goods, and linguistic diversity converge to explain why some countries under the nation-state model come together while others ultimately fall apart.

A fourth constellation of work examines social movements and other kinds of collective behavior. Some studies revisit existing frameworks about mobilization with new theory and new evidence. Yang Su’s book examines the collective killings that wracked the Chinese countryside during the Cultural Revolution, and he proposes a community model to account for their incidence, timing, and pattern of geographic concentration at the subnational level. Andrew Walder’s book considers a different aspect of collective behavior during the Cultural Revolution; namely, why the student red guard movement in Beijing was so intensely factionalized and whether the process of factionalization was driven by the nature of the political encounters that the students initially faced. At the same time, there has also been continuing interest in chronicling and explaining the outcomes of social movements. Tianna Paschel’s book asks whether “political field alignments” explain why race-based social movements were ultimately able to achieve political significance in certain Latin American countries starting in the 1980s, securing affirmative action policies in Brazil and collective land rights in Colombia. Slater’s article (discussed above) shows that democratic mobilization in southeast Asia can succeed, depending on how “communal elites” are positioned.

A fifth constellation of work focuses on race and ethnicity. One cluster within this robust constellation examines how racial division and unequal representation has shaped and mostly limited American political development. Fox’s book, Garland’s book, and Muller’s article (all discussed above) can be understood as focusing on some of the institutional consequences of racial politics, while Melissa Wilde and Sabrina Danielson examine some of the cultural consequences of racial politics. Wilde and Danielson’s article examines the fault line between religious “progressives” and religious “conservatives” on sexuality and gender, and they find that the division can be traced to racial and class anxieties about southern and central European immigrants that first surfaced in the interwar United States.

A complementary cluster of work is predicated on the observation that the degree to which racial and ethnic divisions limit political development is historically variable. Paschel’s book (discussed above) explains why some nation-states have succeeded in achieving greater degrees of ethno-political inclusion than others. Angel Adams Parnham’s book takes the system of racial and ethnic classification itself as her object of investigation. Examining how racial identity in southern Louisiana was transformed over two hundred years after a large influx of migrants from St. Domingue/Haiti in 1809 and 1810, Parnham chronicles how a tri-partite, Latin/Carribean system of racial classification was slowly supplanted but was never fully replaced by a binary, Anglo-American system, leading to the formation of a “racial palimpsest” whose contradictions are still palpable today.

Studies of empire form a sixth constellation, and they grapple with a wide range of critical questions. What led to the establishment, expansion, and transformation of the imperial enterprise by different powers? What are the forms and technologies of imperial rule, elementary and advanced? Why did empire prove so durable in certain cases? Why did it
collapse in others? Michael Mann’s book—which is the third volume in his *magnum opus* on social power—explicitly takes up the topic of empire, starting in the middle of the nineteenth century and grappling with the rise and transformation of the imperial projects established by the most developed countries. Krishan Kumar’s book examines how imperial rulers and their allied elites imagined the task of running their empires, contrasting the Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, British, and French Empires. Wilson’s article on colonial India (discussed above) explores the sources of subnational variation in tax administration and highlights the importance of whether colonial administrators imagined their subjects as resembling or differing from them. Karen Barkey’s book considers how the oft-overlooked longevity of the Ottoman Empire might have been related to the way it managed ethnic and religious difference. Fatma Müge Göçek’s book identifies the late Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century as the moment that gave rise to Turkish denial of collective violence against Armenians, as Sultan Abdulhamid II found it necessary to avoid the acknowledgement of violence against any of his “flocks” in order to preserve the waning legitimacy of his dynastic reign.

A seventh research constellation places culture at the center of analysis. In one cluster of scholarship (all discussed above), culture is invoked in various ways to account for a wide range of outcomes. Göçek’s book on Turkish denial examines how structural and affective factors come together over time to fuel the legitimation of denial in the minds of deniers, whether they are based in the state or society. Anderson’s article on Prussian child labor laws and Wilson’s article on tax administration in colonial India each in their own way examines how ideas figure in institutional change, and Singh’s book analyzes the role of shared identification in promoting social development among Indian provinces. Slater’s article argues that “communal elites”—who in his view serve as “repositories of nationalist and religious authority”—hold the balance of power in southeast Asia when it comes to determining whether democratic mobilization arises and whether it succeeds or fails.

In another cluster of scholarship, comparative-historical approaches are applied to investigate cultural outcomes. Fishman and Lizardo’s article on cultural omnivorousness as well as Wilde and Danielson’s article (both discussed above) on the division between “progressive” and “conservatives” in American religion each comes to mind. Kane and Park’s article explores why Christianity become successful in Korea but not China or Japan, and it asks whether the outcome was related to critical moments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when it came to be seen in these countries as either compatible or incompatible with nationalist sentiment. Barış Büyükokutan’s article compares the elite-led secularization of Turkish novels with the broader secularization of Turkish poetry, and it explores whether the difference is related to differences in interaction density between poets and novelists. Heather Haveman’s book explains how and why a certain segment of American society was able to achieve a “pluralistically integrated” public culture by the middle of the nineteenth century, and it points to magazines as a critical organizational agent of socio-cultural change.

This overview is necessarily cursory and abbreviated, but I hope it makes clear why I am excited by what I see in comparative-historical sociology. When I look at the articles and books that have won our most prestigious awards in the last ten years, I see numerous signs of a lively and energetic subfield.

There are signs that a global perspective continues to develop. While scholarship on the United States and countries in Western Europe still predominates, other countries and other places in the world are coming increasingly into the field of view. There are signs of some accumulation in our knowledge. One example is
the rich constellation of scholarship on state-building and institutional change, but I could easily point to any number of other areas. There are signs that new intellectual ground is being broken. The constellation of studies on empire, for instance, strikes me as intellectually transformative in many ways. It seems to have reached a critical mass in the last decade, and many more studies seem to be in the pipeline. A similar point could be made about the constellation of studies on culture.

There are signs that our pool of intuitions continues to deepen. Crude invocations of class analysis and economic factors are rare, and treatments of social structure and political economy strike me as more sophisticated than ever. At the same time, the list of theoretical and conceptual possibilities—conservative parties, communal elites, field alignment, and nationalism and nationalists to name just a few—continues to grow longer, even as the ideas themselves become richer and more refined. There are signs that our methodological armamentarium is expanding and developing. “Big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons” remain a staple of the subfield, but they are far from the only way of generating compelling evidence to support a theoretical claim. Quantitative work of various kinds is becoming more prevalent, and some of the most advanced techniques are beginning to see application. A growing number of studies are based on new facts discovered by deep dives into the archives. Subnational comparisons are becoming more common, and a growing number of studies incorporate close-up analysis that is highly sensitive to process and context in relatively narrow windows of time. It is more common than ever to see mixed-method approaches, and historical-comparative sociologists are exploring new and eclectic sources of evidence with which to bolster their claims, including memoirs and oral histories. Comparative-historical sociologists also continue to reflect intensively on our critical concepts and their methodological entailments, as Ivan Ermakoff’s essay on contingency shows.

There are signs of growing diversity in the background of comparative-historical sociologists. The list of winners includes a substantial number of women as well as non-trivial numbers of scholars of color and scholars with non-American backgrounds. Though patterns of racial and gender segregation within the subfield remain, they do not seem as stark as they have been (and still could be with backsliding). There are signs that other subfields and disciplines find us intellectually relevant. Our ties to political sociology, social movements, race and ethnicity, and the sociology of culture seem fairly clear. There is also clearly a substantial link to comparative politics: roughly half a dozen winners in the last ten years hold a doctorate in political science.

Perhaps my sense of excitement is unwarranted. Maybe the vitality and dynamism that I am seeing would appear less pronounced if I were to look back further and more deeply. Maybe studies that have won the Moore and Tilly Award are simply unrepresentative of what is happening in the subfield more generally. Maybe the list of award winners is better interpreted as a catalog of our aspirations, values, priorities, or wishes than as an index of what most practicing comparative-historical sociologists are actually doing right now in their work. Maybe my own personal threshold for feeling a sense of intellectual excitement is simply too low.

There are certainly significant issues with the subfield that merit further discussion and reflection—one of the most significant being the underrepresentation of feminist perspectives and gender analysis among award winners. These perspectives are not entirely absent—Krippner’s article is one example—but surprisingly few studies foreground them or take them as a central focal point. The “feminist challenges” identified by Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff
nearly fifteen years ago would seem to remain relevant today.\textsuperscript{2} This is just one of many other issues that recommend our reflection.

Nevertheless, having now surveyed some of our best work in the last ten years, I cannot shake the sense that good things are afoot intellectually in comparative-historical sociology.

Our remit remains as large as ever; it contains multitudes. But the work of our most accomplished practitioners suggests that we are as equal to the task of making sense of it as we have ever been.

A Global Authoritarian Turn?

by Barış Büyükokutan, Marco Garrido, Benjamin Merriman, Gregory Duff Morton, and Besnik Pula

An invited panel sponsored by the Comparative-Historical Section at the 2019 ASA Annual Meeting addressed the possibility of meaningfully talking about a global authoritarian turn in contemporary politics. Organized by Marco Garrido (University of Chicago) and chaired by Anna Skarpelis (Harvard University), the panel featured an interdisciplinary cast spanning anthropology, political science, and public administration in addition to sociology. The presentations by Garrido, Barış Büyükokutan (Koç University), Benjamin Merriman (University of Kansas), Gregory Duff Morton (Bard College) and Besnik Pula (Virginia Tech) discussed contemporary politics in the Philippines, Turkey, the United States, Brazil, and Eastern Europe respectively. Taken together, the presentations challenged a one-size-fits-all approach to developments that the presenters found quite distinct.

In “The Turkish Train Wreck,” Barış Büyükokutan took up the question of how to make sense of contemporary Turkey, especially of the steadily growing centrality, at the expense of virtually everybody else, of the country’s combative president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Büyükokutan contended that the Turkish case is an instance of populism, if we understand that highly charged concept the way Jan-Werner Müller proposes to, namely as an exclusive claim to represent a homogeneous “people” against its internal and external enemies. In the Erdoğanist world view, the external enemy of the people is a nebulous “West” while internal enemies consist of secularistic cultural counterelites on one hand and, in Murray Milner’s phrase, “unrespectable nonelites” such as Kurds and Alevis on the other. Erdoğanism operates, Büyükokutan argued, via a strategy of “double scapegoating” that casts highly dissimilar internal opponents as agents of the same nefarious conspiracy, which is ultimately led by Europe and the United States. In other words, Erdoğan and his party have managed to stay on top of the game of electoral politics largely by portraying themselves as the only political actors who care about the “average Turk.” That claim has resonated because other political actors are credibly tied, using the media apparatus, to the secret Unholy Alliance that Erdoğanism conjures in order to vilify.

Büyükokutan argued that other things regularly associated with populism, such as a lower-middle class base, the performance of the populist leader, the savvy of his/her audience,
the use of new media, and the transformative role of global economic shifts are also found in the Turkish case. As such, it is truly overdetermined—it constitutes, in Büyükokutan’s terms, a train wreck not just because of the damage it deals to human dignity but also because in it the initial crash was compounded by others that followed quickly, exponentially increasing the impact. That, according to Büyükokutan, is the challenge that the Turkish case presents: adding rather than subtracting variables while recognizing that the underlying logic of populism is simple to the point of being trivial.

Büyükokutan held that once this view of populism is adopted, the pertinent question is not “why” or “how” but rather “why now.” His answer highlights the contingent combination of three factors. Internally, Turkey’s economy was increasingly ensnared in the middle income trap, with misleading episodes of spectacular growth undercutting the possibility of a permanent qualitative transformation in favor of high value-added goods. Before that decline set in, however, Turkish economic growth combined with the decline of U.S. hegemony to give Erdoğanism a brief opportunity to play the role of the Weberian power-state, projecting power and glory beyond its borders in what has been called the country’s neo-Ottoman moment. That window’s inevitable closing coincided with the deepening of the Syrian Civil War, which turned the neo-Ottoman moment into one of runaway risk, forcing the Erdoğan government to preemptively turn against prospective challengers who could now frame the immense wealth that Erdoğan’s circle has accrued over nearly two decades of uninterrupted rule as theft from the nation. The government shut down free media and revoked judicial independence to hold on to power—it took a carefully calculated authoritarian turn not as it successfully unfolded a long-formulated master plan but as its unexpected failures threatened it with total collapse.

In “Disciplining Democracy: How the Middle Class in Manila Envision Democratic Order,” Marco Garrido started by observing that despite strong support for democracy, people in many developing countries, including the Philippines, remain open to authoritarian forms of government, including rule by experts, a strong leader, or the military. The question Garrido posed is how we can account for this seeming contradiction.

Garrido noted that there is reason to think that this ambivalence is more pronounced among the middle class in the developing world. Again, the Philippines is no exception: Thirty years after a middle class-led protest brought about the ouster of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, in 2016, the upper and middle class came out largely in support of Rodrigo Duterte, the country’s most anti-democratic president since Marcos. Their support has furthermore remained stable despite a series of moves on Duterte’s part blatantly inimical to democracy.

Clearly, a peculiar vision of democracy is at stake. If, argued Garrido, we are to understand the causes of democratic recession, at least for a set of middle-income developing countries like the Philippines, then we need to be able to articulate this vision as well as to identify where it comes from. It is not enough simply to abstract from middle class populations discrete attitudes or certain kinds of values and interests. We have to actually examine the social contexts in which these values and interests come to be defined. We need to flesh out the subjectivity underlying the middle class’s disparate attitudes toward democracy. And this requires a thick description of the middle class experience of democracy.

Drawing upon several years of ethnographic research, Garrido discussed the experience of democracy of the upper and middle class in Metro Manila. He argued that informants largely accept democracy but want to see it “disciplined.” The idea of discipline is key to their vision of democracy. It mediates between
an experience of democracy as disorder and their support for “strong” or quasi-autocratic leaders. He developed this idea by elaborating four claims.

First, the idea of discipline is predicated on the perception of disorder. Informants identified four main sources of disorder: corruption, rule-bending, populism, and informal settlement. While there are other sources, such as crime, these four are distinguished by their institutionalization. They represent courses of action grounded in everyday practice. As such, they are taken as relatively normal forms of behavior in Philippine society. These social forms significantly structure informants’ political and social relationships. It is the contradiction between these disvalued forms and valued ones taken to govern the same relationships that produces the perception of disorder. Informants feel that things should be done one way, but instead they are done another way: Corrupt rather than clean, bypassing instead of following rules, constituents treated as clients rather than citizens, private property rights disregarded. It is clear to them which way is the right way and which the wrong one. Nonetheless, they see practices they abjure prevail.

Second, informants associate democracy with disorder. In fact, they view democracy as having made disorder worse. They say that elections have encouraged politicians to pursue populist politics. Informal settlers have gained political power. Corruption has grown entrenched and widespread. They say that democracy has enhanced the ability of powerful others to bend the rules. Compared to the period of martial law, people have become less fearful of government sanction. As the government’s authority diminished, the power of money to determine various outcomes increased. Consequently, law enforcement has become less certain. People know that they can pay to bypass the law or avoid being punished for having broken it. This knowledge has led to a proliferation of mundane rule-bending. It has bred a sense of impunity among the most powerful and a feeling of outrage among those witness to it.

Third, informants do not necessarily reject democracy. Rather, they want to see it “disciplined.” Garrido’s data, he argued, suggest a more nuanced interpretation of “authoritarian nostalgia.” The nostalgia may, in fact, be less for authoritarianism than for the order that came with it. Informants imagine this order to be not incompatible with democratic government. Although several waxed nostalgic about the early Marcos years, many of these informants also made clear that they didn’t want a return to martial law.

Informants had a lot of ideas about how to “fix” democracy. A number called for restricting democracy to the upper and middle classes. Some advocated limiting the franchise to taxpayers and others disenfranchising squatters altogether. These proposals are taken seriously and debated in middle class circles, but Garrido feels that most informants are not especially wedded to any particular proposal. Indeed, the same informants sometimes proposed multiple, contradictory ideas. Overall, informants were more interested in participating in a conversation about the future of democracy. They were engaged in a process of working out a vision of democracy they deemed appropriate to Philippine society. In this endeavor, they expressed not hard and fast commitments to one configuration over another but, rather, an openness to experimentation. What emerged clearly, however, was the conviction that democracy had become intolerable, and that it had to be “disciplined” somehow. The term “discipline” has a very specific meaning in context.

Lastly, disciplining democracy means curbing disorder by strictly enforcing valued rules. To informants, discipline is a state where valued rules are enforced. It came up repeatedly in interviews as the answer to disorder. Whenever someone invoked the term, they would point,
almost invariably, to one or more “pockets of discipline” in space or time. “Look at Subic,” they would say, or “Go to Singapore,” or “Things were different during martial law.” These pockets served as an example of what discipline actually looked like, a critique of the surrounding space, and a model for what the country could one day become.

These pockets were generally seen as the work of “strong leaders.” This leader has to be strong enough to overcome the pressure exerted by powerful actors with a stake in disorder (i.e., corrupt officials, populist politicians, informal settlers, and inveterate rule-benders). Informants described the strong leader as having “political will” or “an iron hand.” Commonly cited examples include Marcos, Lee Kwan Yew, Bayani Fernando (the former mayor of Marikina City), and Duterte (at the time of interviews, the mayor of Davao City). These leaders were credited with bringing people’s behaviors in line with valued rules, usually by scrupulously punishing transgressions.

Despite the association of these pockets with autocratic leaders, informants do not necessarily believe that discipline can only be achieved through authoritarian government. Most maintained that discipline could be achieved within the context of democracy, just not democracy as presently constituted. “We need democracy,” one informant said, “but we also need discipline, and discipline requires some sort of authority. We need a combination of the two. It can’t be like democracy in the US. That’s just chaos in my view. It can’t be the other extreme either because people won’t put up with it. We need something in the middle, a blend of freedom and authority.” Above all, he emphasized, “we need rules to be enforced.”

By unpacking the notion of discipline, Garrido clarified informants’ vision of democracy. This vision helps us understand why the Philippine middle class supported Rodrigo Duterte, and it puts this support in the context of their experience of democracy. More generally, we are led to adopt a more nuanced view of the so-called “authoritarian turn” in several developing country democracies. In some of these countries, the middle class may not be turning away from democracy toward authoritarianism but, rather, seeking to “discipline” democracy. They are engaged in an effort to work out a practice of democracy appropriate to their societies. In these countries, Garrido argued, the “authoritarian turn” may represent more of a democratic experiment.

In “The Fortunes of Popular Nationalism: The Relevance of Institutions and Timing,” Benjamin Merriman argued that the situation in the United States is quite unlike the other countries discussed in the panel. It is important, he noted, to take the situation in the United States seriously, but part of being “serious” about it is to understand the current situation in a comparative and historical perspective. Compared to other countries discussed on the panel, the situation in the United States is much freer, Merriman contended, and much closer to the baseline operation of its public institutions.

According to Merriman, the reason why the situation in the United States is different is historical: the working of the country runs through several old institutions that are deeply unrepresentative, including a system for allocating political representation that is not proportionate to population; an extremely powerful constitutional court; and a large, well-entrenched civil service that has significant control over the speed of policy change and implementation. Many of the country’s key public figures have long or indefinite terms in office. Further, state governments have wide scope to act independently of the national government, and in the past decade or so, states have begun to assert their own powers very strenuously.

Working major change to the structure of U.S. institutions would require, Merriman argued, significant cooperation across several of those
institutions, as well as a very high level of public support. Those institutions have shown little inclination to do that, in part because they will generally seek to maintain their own powers and prerogatives. In short, no populist or political outsider, whatever their political leanings, would have much chance to alter or unsettle the basic arrangements in the United States, ironically because those basic arrangements are already far from being truly democratic.

In “In Search of Seriousness: Republicanism and the Far Right in Contemporary Brazil,” Gregory Duff Morton started by recalling a high school principal in the backlands of Northeastern Brazil say “They don’t administer with seriousness.” The principal felt alarmed that they – her superiors – tended to steal cash from official bank accounts. And her sense of outrage, Morton claims, was hardly an idiosyncrasy. That feeling, multiplied over millions of people, is a characteristic feature of the contentious politics surrounding Brazil’s new far right; so, too, is her idiom. Like the principal, many Brazilians use “seriousness” to mean the opposite of corruption. Why seriousness? Morton suggests that we interpret seriousness as a core problematic, at once an emotional style, a political platform, and a way to complain about other people.

In the context of Brazil’s current rightward lurch, Morton argued, seriousness is a sign that builds a feeling that Brazilians know as “middle-class.” To foreigners, Brazil’s far-right often seems not serious, but absurd. But it is a mistake, Morton warns, to miss the seriousness of Bolsonaro. He suggests that we interpret the resurgence of “seriousness” by beginning with an economic fact: from 2001 to 2011, real income doubled for the poorest 10% of Brazil’s population. Over those same years, real income for the top 10% increased by 16%. The income distribution became more equal, and this transformation provoked heart-wrenching tension between the traditional occupants of the middle-class position and new aspirants. The resulting traffic jam has activated a venerable middle-class discourse that Morton calls authoritarian republicanism. Seriousness is one of its keywords.

A middle-class mystery is highlighted by polling data from the last four elections. While all income groups voted more conservative in 2018, the gap that increased most dramatically is the distance between the poorest group and the second-poorest group. In some senses, that is the story of the 2018 election.

The far right in Brazil, Morton reminds, relies on the creation of a feeling of difference between the middle class and the poor. The right, that is, needs to make meaning from the distance between the two groups who diverged so much in 2018. Brazil’s massive Car Wash corruption scandal has allowed right-wing politicians to express middle-class sentiment as seriousness in doubled form. The serious middle-class voter is distant from the (corrupt and unserious) governing elite above. At the same time, this voter is distant from an (impoverished and unserious) mass below.

In Brazil, such a double difference has a long history. It hearkens to the military officers who founded the Republic by deposing the Emperor in 1889: the officers were anti-monarchical, but also suspicious of mass democracy. They embraced the doctrine that J. G. A. Pocock has famously called “republicanism,” an animating doctrine of civic sacrifice. To be republican is to denounce the problems of social life as failures of resolve and virtue, and republicans remain always alert to the danger of corruption. If they are an elite, they are, at least in their own understanding, an elite of virtue.

The contemporary far right is thus deeply republican, in the martial tradition of the Republic’s founders. This tradition was kept alive for decades through a series of barracks revolts led by mid-level officers, the most famous being the Luiz Carlos Prestes uprising of the 1920s. Prestes, a communist, had no
politics in common with Bolsonaro. But at the level of style – that is, at the level of seriousness – it can hardly be a coincidence that Bolsonaro was himself an army captain and that he went to the brig in 1986 for publishing a defiant magazine article about soldiers’ wages. As an insurrectionist soldier of rank, Bolsonaro reignites the authoritarian republican flame.

Seriousness in Brazil is not therefore always authoritarian. During the era when Bolsonaro was going to jail, perhaps the truest inheritor of the republican tradition was the Workers Party, with its reformist zeal, its opposition to the military dictatorship, and its perennial losing candidacies. When the Workers Party finally took the presidency in 2002, it benefited from an extraordinary surge in exports of iron ore and soy to China. The government used export revenues to implement redistributive policies in the name of a single political actor: *o povo*, the people, figured as the excluded masses.

Of course, the more redistribution policies succeeded, the more they undermined the conditions of recognition that made it possible to distinguish the excluded masses from a middle class. In those years, a friend who is a peasant farmer told Morton, *I can’t be rich, but I can wear the same shirt as a rich person.*

But wearing the same shirt did not go on forever. Seriousness made a deeply shocking and utterly unplanned return in 2013, when millions of Brazilians suddenly swarmed the streets in protest. These protestors were ideologically varied, but what they had in common was seriousness. They identified the source of Brazil’s trouble as corruption. In particular, they condemned the plans for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. These events were denounced by protestors as empty festivities that wasted money needed for health and education. Protest against corruption, protest against festivals: the protestors were reviving the rhetoric of republicanism.

By 2014, China’s appetite for exports was faltering, and the resulting crash led to an extraordinarily severe recession, accompanied by the Car Wash corruption revelations. Dilma Rousseff, the Workers Party president who was never accused of stealing money, was impeached in an arcane dispute about whether the executive branch or the legislative branch had authority over banking. Her departure led to the interim presidency of Temer and the election of Bolsonaro last October.

In this chaotic setting, the 2013 protests became a recipe. Activists took them as a template in the 2016 anti-Dilma rallies, in the 2018 trucker strike, and, ultimately, in Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign. At such moments, protestors emphatically replaced “the people,” the core political subject of the Workers Party project, with a new actor, “the middle class.” This middle class sounded serious. Listen to one of the most famous slogans: "A teacher shouldn’t earn less than a soccer player.” *A teacher*: could the class imaginary be more clear?

In Brazil, to criticize the soccer World Cup as a frivolous party is to distance oneself from other people. These are words that carry out the task of middle-class distinction. This task of distinction, with all of the anger it requires, is fundamental to an interpretation of Bolsonaro. Clearly, Bolsonaro’s campaign has offered an opportunity to the traditional occupants of the middle-class position. The campaign has given them a chance to reclaim the signs of their own difference, and in particular the characteristic attitude that Morton described as seriousness.

But one does not have to earn middle-class money in order to make middle-class statements. The magic trick of the 2013 protests is that they turned out an amazing number of low-income Brazilians to speak with the voice of the middle class. Perhaps we can discover some of the deep background to Bolsonaro’s rise, Morton suggests, if we remember that Brazil is now living through its first deeply
urban generation, the first generation in which a majority of citizens were born in the city. Many impoverished Brazilians today are the children of parents who migrated from the countryside in the 1960s and 70s. Their parents may have identified as the people, even as the excluded. But they themselves feel comfortable with the codes of urban distinction. Even if they lack cash, they know how to express their distance from the poor. And so we might even read the radicalism of Bolsonaro’s rhetoric as something of a recursive loop. When traditional middle-class claimants begin to distinguish themselves from the poor by using harsh rhetoric, the new aspirants themselves adopt the same harsh rhetoric, which leads the traditional claimants to use even harsher rhetoric. Everyone voices seriousness – that is, distance from the people. But there is no one left to voice the people.

Brazil’s present agonies may fit inside a bigger story, the close of a great forty-year cycle of globalization in 2008. Morton proposes to think of this in relation to a new spirit of monopolistic competition. A monopoly gains power because people belong to the monopoly’s network, and so loyalty to the network becomes a moral imperative. Among the world’s wealthiest, loyalty might mean a predilection to use a digital network belonging to Apple or Google. In middle-income countries like Brazil and China, loyalty often refers to affiliation with a national monopoly champion corporation. In either case, groups scramble to identify and protect the signs of their own difference. One might call it the move from neoliberalism to neoloyalism.

Morton offers “neoloyalism” because monopolistic competition is not only a matter of market strategy; it also means a new way to feel about the world. Today one finds it harder to sense the familiar neoliberal affects of acceleration, euphoria, anxiety, and exhaustion. Instead, one feels connectedness, unity, betrayal, and rage. These are the emotional foundation for monopolistic competition. Also for the authoritarian crowd. In Brazil, today, the core emotion, perhaps, bears the name invoked by the high school principal: seriousness. Elsewhere in the world, how does loyalty feel?

In “Theorizing the Populist Situation,” Besnik Pula started by noting that talk of a potential “global authoritarian turn” often refers to the idea of populism. As Pula reminds, the meaning and proper definition of that term is much debated across varied literatures. Following Cas Mudde, Pula uses a baseline definition of populism as movements of the radical right that play on the theme of populist leaders and parties speaking on behalf of “the people” situated against a complacent, incompetent, or even treacherous “elite.” Populists are out to get the “elite” who, through their moral failure, have left “the people” – often characterized by a distinct national, ethnic, religious, or racial identity – vulnerable and exposed to one or more existential threats. A worldview characterized by a belligerent and Manichean division of the social, political, and international order is one of the essential features of populist politics.

In the case of Europe, Pula notes, one of the challenges for the literature on populism has been the fact that until recently, populist parties were electorally insignificant. Radical right parties waxed and waned in popularity, while scholars found consolation in the fact that populist parties largely remained confined to the fringes of mainstream politics. Part of the recent challenges of understanding populism is the fact that in some states populist parties have moved from the margins into the center. Central and Eastern Europe appeared as the first site of such populist electoral coups, beginning with Hungary in 2010 and followed by Poland in 2015.

As populists became serious political players, the nature of the phenomenon changed. Some pushed to expand the definition of populism to include new members, such as Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Putin’s political and organizational alliances with the conservative-nationalist right
in Europe and the United States would seem to make him part of the populist coterie, but populism is not the term that has been typically used to describe the political regime in Russia. These ambiguities have additionally complicated conceptual divisions of populism and its significance in democratic and authoritarian contexts. Indeed, some scholars describe the rise of populism as either accompanying or at least signaling the decline of liberal democracy and the spread of Russian-style authoritarianism. In this view, Putin’s Russia is not only a member of the global populist movement but the torchbearer of the new ideology and practice of twenty-first century authoritarianism.

Pula’s contribution to this debate is a preliminary effort at conceptual and theoretical elaboration in order to understand global populism from a comparative-historical perspective. Rather than speaking of populism as a process or an event, he proposes the concept of populist situation—a meaning context that characterizes political action by populist leaders as corporate (collective) political agents and which generates the interactive space between such leaders, their supporters, and opponents. Why focus on the populist situation as a particular kind of interactive space grounded within the political order, rather than an ideology, a set of interests, or specific policies? This approach is dictated by the heterogeneity of the phenomenon itself. There are certain threads that tie populism together, but also much that separates distinct instances of populist politics around the world. The challenge is thus to understand the operation of apparent commonalities across very different social, institutional, and cultural contexts.

Pula began with the fact of populists in power: a populist situation exists when a populist movement exercises state power through control of government. This contrasts with the situation of a populist challenge when such movements exist as oppositional to mainstream or dominant political parties. Political action from an oppositional role is limited to mobilizational symbolic-expressive action. Populists have shown great mastery in manipulating threats represented by foreign powers and fueling fears against immigrants, ethnic/racial/religious and/or sexual minorities. Decades ago, the political scientist Murray Edelman differentiated the language of politics between “referential” and “condensation” symbols. While the former serve to describe objective elements of the situation by referencing specific events, facts, or data, the latter “condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, [and/or] promises of future greatness.” The use of condensation symbols is not unique to populists, but populists seem to make most extensive and effective use of them. As Edelman observed, the power of condensation symbols rests in their lack of possible referential checks against real conditions, while offering “symbolic reassurance” to address varied economic and social uncertainties experienced by constituencies. Indeed, for Edelman, much of electoral democracy is about the manipulation of condensation symbols. Seen from this standpoint, populist symbolic politics do not stand against the general norm of mass politics. What distinguishes populists is not the use of condensation symbols but rather the particular symbolic-referential schema invoked. Some argue that populists have also proven effective in the method by which they deliver their message. Reliance on electronic and social media has enabled populist leaders to by-pass traditional channels and communicate belligerent political messages in ways that appear more proximate to the addressee and thus more “authentic” than mainstream politicians.

In addition to differences in the institutional settings of populist politics (liberal democratic vs. authoritarian), differences across uses of symbolic-referential schemas are an important dimension that distinguishes populists globally.
Trump’s attacks against the media, immigrants, or China differ not only in targets but also in thematic context, compared to Viktor Orban’s invocation of a civilizational discourse in defense of “Christian values” to attack the moral and economic liberalism he sees embodied in the European Union, and Vladimir Putin’s references to the restoration of Russian greatness after decades of humiliation at the hands of the United States and other Western powers.

Differences in institutional settings and symbolic-referential schemas are two key dimensions that differentiate global populism. Each of these are contextually bound. So are organizational features, such as the ability of populists in power to deploy state violence, and structural features, including social bases that form the popular support of populist rule. These range from disempowered workers in the North, to politically assertive middle classes in the South and East, and monopolistic and oligarchic business groups worldwide. Combining these dimensions, Pula suggests at least three configurational ideal types of global populism: transgressive-symbolic, cultural-civilizational, and patrimonial-populist. The first type is characterized by a loose ideological cohesion bound by the “negative solidarity” of symbolic-transgressive acts against the values of centrist-liberal (and sometimes constitutional) politics. The social disembeddedness caused by decades of neoliberal restructuring, especially for those in the lower rungs of the class structure, would appear as the main driver behind popular support for this kind of politics. The case of Trump would seem to best fit this type. The second variant characterizes its role in cultural and civilizational terms, addressing more directly and earnestly the defense of religious or national values. This is the approach that Timothy Snyder calls “the politics of eternity,” based on millenarian visions of national birth, salvation, and moral purification of which populists, as representatives of the morally uncorrupted few, are the stewards of. Hungary’s Orban seems to fit this mold. The third type is a subvariant of the second. What differentiates the patrimonial-populist from the cultural-civilizational type is not so much the spirit of the populist movement but its organizational basis. While the first depends on broad support from popular groups, the second is much more entrenched in the state apparatus. Putin’s regime in Russia is a good candidate for this type.

Properly differentiating the distinct symbolic-expressive, organizational, and structural properties of populist politics are important first steps towards developing a comparative-historical analytic of global populism and its relationship to previous historical waves of authoritarian diffusion. The theoretical sketch Pula presents is far, he argued, from a fully developed framework, but global comparative work is increasingly necessary.
The Global Rise of the Right
ASA 2019 Panel

Organized by Smriti Upadhyay and Sefika Kumral, this panel took place at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association. Panelists Cihan Tugal, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Peter E. Grimes, Eugene N. Anderson, Richard Lachmann provide a summary of their work, and Sefika Kumral discusses the panel for Trajectories.

Trump: Authoritarian, Just Another Neoliberal Republican, or Both?
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Donald Trump commands media attention to a greater extent than any US president in memory. His open bigotry, vulgarity, and obvious incompetence for the duties of his office are sources of outrage and despair throughout the world and among a majority of Americans, although Trump’s behaviors are seen positively by a core of supporters who, depending on the poll and the moment range from 35% to 45% of US voters. Observing Trump on a day-to-day basis one can get the impression that he and his presidency are sui generis and unprecedented.

My paper looks beyond the rhetoric to answer one basic question: to what extent is Trump just another, albeit flamboyant, neoliberal Republican, adopting essentially the same policies as any of his 2016 primary opponents would have done if they had won the nomination and presidency, or is he pushing the US toward a level of authoritarianism unprecedented outside of the Southern states during the eras of slavery and segregation? Of course, the answer could be that he is doing both, and we need to remember that Trump’s achievements have been determined as much by the level and success of opposition from various sources as by his Administration’s own desires and efforts.
The best way to evaluate Trump is to review his policies in key areas. I begin by looking at Trump’s single significant legislative accomplishment, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. I then turn to his appointees’ work to overturn regulations enacted under Obama and earlier presidents, and trace the effort to confirm Federal judges. Trade and immigration are the issues Trump discussed most often as a candidate and as president. I seek to disentangle rhetoric from accomplishment in those two areas. I identify what is new, and what’s not, in Trump’s foreign policy (which is not included in this short summary.) Finally, I look at Trump and the Republicans’ ongoing efforts to suppress voting rights and to attack opponents in government and the media, while manipulating information. This review of the range of policies is designed to disentangle rhetoric from accomplishment and provide the basis for a conclusion (also not included in this short summary) that can specify the extent to which the US has become more authoritarian under Trump and allow for an informed prediction of what is likely to happen in the coming years.

Tax Cuts: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, like the tax cuts passed in 1981 under Reagan and 2001 under George W. Bush, gives the vast majority of its benefits to the wealthiest Americans. In 2018, the first year of implementation, 65.3% of the cuts in individual, corporate, and other Federal taxes go to the top 10% of taxpayers, 20.5% to the top 1%, and 7.9% to the top 0.1%. In 2025, the last year when many of the law’s provisions remain in place, those percentages remain the same for the top 10% and 1%, but for the top 0.1% they rise to 10.5%. The provisions that are permanent almost exclusively benefit the rich. So in 2027, 82.3% of the cuts will go to the top 1% and 59.8% to the top 0.1% (Tax Policy Center 2017). This tilt is, in the last years, greater than in the Bush bill, and significantly greater throughout than for Reagan’s tax cuts.

Deregulation: The Trump Administration stands out for the sloppiness of its deregulatory efforts. The rules for writing, revising, or abolishing rules are elaborate and fixed by past laws, above all the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. When an administrative agency does not build a sufficiently detailed and accurate record of fact courts can and do overturn regulatory changes. The process for building a record and writing a rule takes years. Trump’s appointees have been ambitious in their goals, but most of them so far have wasted the first two years by not doing the serious work. This is in contrast to both Obama and Bush II. Clinton had little commitment to enhancing regulation in any area, hence the late rush to institute environmental rules in 2000 in response to Nader’s candidacy, most of which were easily cancelled by Bush in 2001 since they had not made their way past all the needed regulatory goalposts.

Judges: The key change under Trump comes out of the Senate. In all previous administrations senators were allowed to veto (“blue slip”) nominees for district judgeships in their own state. This gave the minority party some leverage in the states in which they had a senator. Charles Grassley, the Senate Judiciary Committee chair, ended this practice when Trump took office to ensure that while Republicans retain a Senate majority they could push through any nominee. They were aided in this by the Democrats’ decision in 2013 to end the filibuster for district and appeal court judges, lowering the confirmation threshold to 51 from 60 votes. This shift in Senate procedure has allowed Republicans to confirm Trump’s nominees for Appeal Courts at an unprecedented rate.

Trade Wars: Trade is one area in which Trump departs from past Republican orthodoxy. His withdrawal, in his first week in office, from the Trans Pacific Partnership marked a break from a string of trade deals dating back to the 1930s that steadily reduced tariffs and eliminated other restraints on international trade, all while
positioning the US at the center of the world capitalist system. Trump was both riding and fueling anti-trade fervor, leading Hillary Clinton, who once had called the TPP the “gold standard” of trade deals, to renounce it in her presidential campaign. Whether she would have again reversed her position as president, and if so could she have gained Senate ratification for the treaty, remains unknowable.

Trump has gone well beyond a halt to further expansion of trade treaties by attempting to abrogate, renegotiate, or undermine existing treaties and imposing unilateral tariffs. Such moves are a real departure from past Republican service to the largest US corporations and banks that look to their government to lubricate entry into markets abroad, even at the cost of US jobs.

Immigration: Trump made opposition to immigration the centerpiece of his campaign. His pledge to build a wall and make Mexico pay for it was, along with chants of “lock her up,” the emotional highpoint of his campaign rallies as a candidate and now as president. ICE removed fewer people from the country in 2017 than in 2016 and 2015, Obama’s last years in office. However, the overall numbers mask a profound shift in who is being deported under Trump. Most of those deported under Obama were arrested at the border upon their arrival in the US and then expelled relatively quickly afterwards. Trump directed ICE to focus its efforts on undocumented immigrants who have been in the US for years. Trump’s policy of deliberately separating parents from their children when ICE apprehends families is unprecedented in the history of US immigration enforcement. This deliberate cruelty appeals to a hard core of Trump supporters who value abuse of non-white immigrants.

Suppression of Democracy: All of Trump’s efforts, so far, to undermine American democracy build on existing Republican strategies and accomplishments, which reinforce each other. Restrictions on voting rights and gerrymandering, which give Republicans victories even when a majority of those who vote or want to vote favor the Democrats, combine with Republican obstructionism and vulgarity to demoralize voters, further reducing the electorate. Unlimited political spending by the rich mix with the distortions of networks like Fox and Sinclair and the lies that Trump tells to convince ever more citizens that there is no way to objectively evaluate public officials and their programs’ performance. Republican domination of the presidency and Senate allow them to appoint Federal judges who allow all of these anti-democratic practices.

If Trump’s efforts to restrict voting rights, degrade public discourse, and call into doubt the very existence of objective truth succeed he will have advanced US politics further along a road toward weaker democracy that was paved by other Republican politicians. The solid five justice conservative majority following Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to the Supreme Court ensures that existing and most conceivable future efforts to restrict voting rights and gerrymander districts will continue, and that the rich will be able to inject unlimited amounts of money into political campaigns.

It will take a decisive turn to the left by the Democrats and a clear electoral shift combined with mass mobilization to reverse these developments and revive American democracy and create the political basis for progressive policies that can undo both Trump’s limited accomplishments as president and the decades-long efforts of the Republican party that were barely challenged during the Obama and Clinton years.

The rise of the Right cannot be studied separately from the retreat of the Left. This paper traces the Western Right’s Bolshevization by focusing on the United States (and connecting it to the strategic devolution of the European-American Left). From the 1960s onwards, the Left has moved to autonomism and liberalism, leaving the properly political ground to the Right. In each phase, this transformation was shaped by a refutation of a misinterpreted Lenin. These misinterpretations were structured not simply by the Cold War-induced, distorted reading of the Bolshevik Revolution’s dynamics; they were reconstructed at every turn, due to domestic as well as global changes in the intellectual-political climate. The actually existing Leninisms and anti-Leninisms of the late 20th century contributed to the Left’s fall from grace.

The Right, by contrast, utilized both the historical Lenin and the Cold War caricature in more flexible fashion. Plundering Leninist vocabulary and history, competing factions of the Right built massive cadres and networks (for conservative, libertarian, anti-tax, and ultimately alt-right purposes). Even though the earlier “Leninists of the Right” stuck too closely to the historical Lenin’s anti-parliamentary tenor, the more mature movements built on a more updated version of Lenin. Starting with the 1980s, these latter factions combined the examples of Lenin and Gramsci to implement a variegated overall strategy that includes: 1) post-sectarian elimination, incorporation, and/or disciplining of collaborationists and hardliners; 2) (semi-secretive) cadre-raising; 3) (“hegemonic”) coalition-building; 4) infiltration of institutions; 5) a simultaneous division, weakening, and isolation of the enemy camp; 6) the creation of a parallel universe of material interests. Avoiding the Lenin vs. Gramsci binary prevalent among leftists, the Gramscian-Leninism of the Right thus blends revolutionary, reformist, and “interstitial” strategies.3

The libertarian Murray Rothbard paved the way for much of this appropriation. Beginning with the 1950s, Rothbard exalted the Leninist model. One of his central contributions was a “strictly confidential” memo titled “What is to be Done,” which was initially circulated only among a restricted number of libertarians. In this 1961 memo, the author called libertarians to model themselves after Lenin, who developed an art of combatting “opportunism” and “sectarianism.” In this and other works, Rothbard further specified how libertarians should learn from Marxists the art of infiltration, as well as that of coalition-building. Rothbard attempted to put these into practice by building an anti-Vietnam War, anti-authoritarian coalition between libertarians, conservatives, and the New Left. This culminated in the foundation of the Libertarian Party in 1971.

His frustrations with mass politics, however, pushed Rothbard to focus more on cadre-cultivation. His encounter with Charles Koch boosted this shift. In 1976, Rothbard personally convinced Koch to take a close look at Lenin in order to build a conspiratorial cadre. Much later than that conversation, Koch listed Marx and Lenin as two primary influences on him. Yet, after allying with Koch in the founding of the Cato Institute, Rothbard grew weary of his emphasis on policy and Congress. Even though the Institute’s dismissal of Rothbard in 1981 has been interpreted as a “farewell to revolutionary strategy,” the Cato Institute has instead further modernized and “Americanized” Rothbard’s Leninism. In contrast, as brilliant as

3 The analysis of the Right summarized here is published (first online) in Critical Sociology (“The Counter-Revolution’s Long March: The American Right’s Shift from Primitive to Advanced Leninism,” 2019). The paper’s analysis of the Left (its first half) has not been published.
it was, Rothbard’s Leninism remained very “early 20th century.”

A Cato Institute paper (“Achieving a Leninist Strategy,” 1983) laid out a strategy the Right would follow in dismantling the New Deal. Since destroying Social Security in a single blow was unfathomable, the paper suggested creating a deluge of private retirement investment schemes, so as to gradually convince the middle classes that welfare handouts were not essential to their well-being. This mental transformation would later enable a total privatization of the welfare system. However, the mental transformation could not ensue only from (“Gramscian”) cultural battles: that is, pointing out what is wrong with social security and laying out an alternative. It also required 1) gathering together a coalition of diverse interests; 2) a simultaneous division, weakening, and isolation of the coalition of interests behind social security; and 3) the step-by-step creation of a diversified parallel insurance universe to secure these two political goals.

Why call this strategy Leninist? The authors were well aware that Leninism in a country such as America did not entail an overnight seizure of power. Rather, it meant the implementation of a complex and long-term plan. Still, unlike that of the culturalist-Gramscian right-wingers (whose strategy was also derived from the Left), the Cato Institute’s “long march” was not confined to ideological institutions. Their wars of position would simultaneously target policy, economy, Washington DC, and civil society, and culture (and therefore avoid the tired binaries between ideology and economy, society and state, and Gramsci and Lenin).

This Cato Institute paper has shaped anti-welfare strategy of the following decades. Beyond that, Koch and the Cato Institute have become even more central with the rise of the Tea Party. The Tea Party’s combination of cadre-leadership and grassroots activism has not only blocked any meaningful Obama reform, but also paralyzed the GOP and made it subservient to far right goals.

The Kochs were not alone in preparing the ground for the Tea Party. While they worked through their institutes, Grover Norquist did the heavy-lifting on 1) coalition-building; 2) rendering old (“New Deal”) coalitions ungovernable; and 3) weeding out non-revolutionaries from leading positions. Norquist absorbed Lenin’s tracts while a student-journalist at Harvard. He then travelled to Angola to aid anti-communist paramilitaries and imitated communist guerillas. Labelled as a Market-Leninist by the Wall Street Journal, Norquist saw himself as “the Lenin of the conservative revolution and Ralph Reed is his Trotsky and Jack Abramoff is his Stalin.” Starting with the 1990s, Norquist held weekly meetings to cultivate cadres who would implement his ideas. The famous “Wednesday Meeting,” held at his NGO Americans for Tax Reform, pushed DC and state capitols to a civil war-like atmosphere. Participating in these exclusive meetings required full allegiance to hardcore Right principles. However, Norquist used this Vanguard, not to reduce the broader (less ideological) population to silence, but instead to incite it to anti-tax action. These Leninist strategies aligned business, far right intellectuals and activists, and religious right constituencies; and thereby got son Bush elected.

Even though Koch’s and Norquist’s strategies were out of line with Republican principles, most of the content of their ideology was not. This differentiates them from Samuel Francis (the ideological precursor of the Trump administration): Francis’ strategies had nothing to do with Lenin, but his ideology was distinct from the Republican mainstream. To be more precise, Francis used a culturalist-Gramscian strategy to implement paleoconservatism (a specific blend of white nationalism and welfarism). Francis miserably failed, but Bannon combined the paleoconservatism of
Francis and the Leninism of Rothbard. Without this synthesis, there would be no effective alt-right, and the mainstream would probably never have heard of the neo-Nazi (Richard Spencer) who coined that term.

Up until August 2017, it seemed that Bannonism was in control of the White House. Yet, before he could deeply shape policy, Trump dismissed Bannon and sidelined alt-rightist Leninism. The dismissal came only a few weeks after Bannon announced his plan to raise taxes on the rich (to fund Trump’s infrastructure promises). Norquist responded immediately and called Bannon “cruel;” his ongoing anti-tax crusade contributed to Bannon’s downfall. Norquist’s Leninism is (for now) the victorious one. In any case, even though Bannon drew public attention to the radical right’s appropriation of Lenin, he is not the most knowledgeable and consistent Bolshevik among them, and is unlikely to be the last one.

Each phase of the Right’s Leninist leap forward was paralleled by a strategic turn within the Left, itself based on a particular misreading of Lenin. In the 1940s and 1950s, Lenin was used to legitimize Stalinist gradualism. The New Left of the 1960s shaped up as a rebellion against Stalinist (as well as New Deal) bureaucratism, but its mainline got stuck in gradualism. At the end of the 1960s, activists dissatisfied with such gradualism rediscovered the revolutionary Lenin, but read him through left-communist lenses. For the postmodern and liberal Left that survived the demise of Stalinism and left-wing communism, excerpts from Lenin’s *What is to be Done* provided tools to denounce revolutionary organization. Most left-liberals withdrew from class politics. Radicals to their left drew thick boundaries between themselves and (a misinterpreted) Lenin. The road to the strategically poor (global) uprisings of 2009-2013 was paved through these misreadings. In the United States, the Occupy debacle led to much strategic soul-searching, which might lead to a carefully reconstructed Bolshevism of the 21st century.

The Right plundered Lenin to reap from his texts and experience whatever fit its Machiavellian advent, whereas the Left either idolized or villainized Lenin. The only way out of this situation is a pragmatic re-appropriation of Leninism. The paper concludes by a discussion of what the Left can, and the Right can’t, learn from a Gramscianized Bolshevism.

**Life on File: Archival Epistemology as Theory**

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An understanding of the current right-wing national and transnational social movements can benefit from comparing them to the global and national conditions operating during their last appearance in the first half of the 20th century and by carefully comparing 20th century fascism with the neo-fascist and right-wing populist movements that have been emerging in the 21st century. This allows us to assess the similarities and differences, and to gain insights about what could be the consequences of the reemergence of populist nationalism and fascist movements. Our study uses the comparative evolutionary world-systems perspective to study the global right from 1800 to the present. We see fascism as a form of capitalism that emerges when the capitalist project is in crisis. World historical waves of right-wing populism and fascism are caused by the cycles of globalization and deglobalization, the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, long business cycles (the Kondratieff wave), and interactions with both Centrist Liberalism and the Global Left. We consider how crises of the global capitalist system have produced right-wing backlashes in the past, and how a future terminal crisis of capitalism could lead to a reemergence of a new form of authoritarian.
global governance or a reorganized global democracy in the future.

Recent changes in world-economy that are important for understanding the evolution of the Global Right include: job losses by formerly protected workers in the core states via automation and out-sourcing; global migration from south to north spurred by global warming, and the automation of agriculture and mining. These developments have enabled deflection by demagogues in the core of working-class anger away from global capitalism toward unwanted immigrants and deflection of class contradictions in favor of racism.

Comparing the 20th and 21st incarnations of the Global Right yields many similarities but also some important differences. Religious fundamentalism played much weaker role in the early 20th century wave. It was present, but not so dramatically. The rise of religious fundamentalism after the World Revolution of 1968 was partly due to the perception that the Old Left had failed. Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms have been important sources of frames for the counter-hegemonic right-wing forces that have emerged since the 1970s. The important role that the threatened fossil fuel industry plays in funding and supporting right-wing causes is another difference. In the early 20th century the fossil fuel industry was a rising force in providing cheap energy for a great wave of industrialization. But the challenges of anthropogenic global climate change have put the fossil fuel industry on the defensive (Daub and Carroll nd). Though the fossil fuel industry has always been conservative it has increasingly funded right-wing causes during the contemporary rise of the Global Right (Mayer 2016; Wenar 2016).

The whole paper can be reached at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows134/irows134.htm

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Discussion
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The world is facing an alarming rise of right-wing politics. The three papers in this panel provide new perspectives to the scholarly discussions of why we have been experiencing this important world-historical moment by extending our understanding of the conditions, consequences, and possible trajectories of the right.

Richard Lachmann’s paper, “Trump: Authoritarian, Just Another Neoliberal Republican, or Both?” provides an excellent and in-depth analysis of the Trump phenomenon by going beyond the analyses of far-right rhetoric. The paper focuses on actual policies of the Trump administration by paying specific attention to continuities and ruptures from the Republican line (as well as the previous administrations). In doing so, the paper enables the reader to understand how previous policies actually paved the way for Trump’s rise.
Hence, the paper successfully redirects our attention to the role of elites in the study of far-right politics and populism. This is an essential contribution as most of the current analyses of “right wing populism” in the West give primary attention to the ‘electorate’ (working and middle classes) to account for the rise of “populist” leaders and parties. The paper also provides a grounded discussion of the implications of Trump’s leadership on American democracy through an extended comparison of the current situation with historical fascism of the interwar period. The overarching argument is that the United States is heading towards neither fascism nor authoritarianism. Instead Trump has been accelerating the de-democratization route that the United States was already put by the previous Republican governments.

In this extended comparison, Lachmann emphasizes the lack of militarism in the current period that was crucial for the rise of fascism in the interwar period. But can we safely assume in today’s world that militarism and heightened geopolitical conflict is not possible in the future? After all, various right-wing authoritarian leaders in many countries such as Turkey, India, and Russia adhere to different version of imperial notions of nationalism. Furthermore, as Lachmann also discusses in the paper, Trump has been engaging in trade wars (which is one of the novelities of the current administration) which may foster militarist competition as well. Whether Trump’s protectionist agenda will trigger an actual geopolitical crisis among the core nations is largely unknown. Yet, nationalist competition and geopolitical crises, whether they turn into world wars or not, have enormous weight in determining how democracies turn into authoritarian regimes.

Cihan Tugal’s paper, “The Euro-American Left’s Abandonment and the Right’s Surreptitious Adaptation of Leninism”, provides a novel perspective to the discussion of the rise of the far right in relation to the trajectory of the left in the Euro-American context. Tugal’s analysis overcomes the existing analyses which sees right and left-wing populism as two sides of the same coin that emerged as a response to the collapse of the center. Rather, he provides a truly relational analysis of right and left, by showing how the current rise of the right is related to the historical ‘retreat’ of the left (or its inability to rise) in the Euro-American context. His rich and interesting historical narrative successfully shows how the right in the US has incorporated a Gramscianized version of Leninism, while the U.S. left increasingly distanced itself from it.

In discussing how the right in the United States have incorporated Leninist strategies (Tugal calls them “right Bolsheviks”), the paper does not incorporate much discussion about interwar fascism. After all, there would probably be no fascism in Italy, for example, without the Bolshevik revolution. And much of the success of the interwar fascists was due to their incorporation of organizational forms and political strategies (including coalition building, swift political strategies of retreat, etc.) of the communists. From this perspective, can we say that the “right-Bolsheviks” today actually resemble classical fascists -at least in its movement and party stages? Another question that arises is regarding the paper’s emphasis upon key ideologues of the U.S. right. That is why, one wonders where Trump administration is situated in this overall process once Bannon is out of the picture? More specifically, how does the current analysis guide us in thinking about the present and future politics of the United States under Trump, i.e. when the right is no longer operating on the hostile terrains, but has acquired power?

Chase-Dunn, Grimes and Anderson’s paper, “Evolution of the Global Right,” extends the comparative-historical thrust of the previous papers in the panel by providing a macro-historical outlook to what is taking place in the current moment. Utilizing world-systems analysis, the authors compare the global rise of
the far-right and neo-fascist movements in the current period to the early twentieth century. Through their long-historical comparison, Chase-Dunn et. al. aim to flesh out the similarities and differences of the structural conditions that produce waves of far-right and fascism in these two centuries. The authors compare two time periods in terms of the structures of the political economy, geopolitical relations, and the characteristics of the far-right mobilizations.

This timely and important paper brings a much needed long-historical and global outlook to the current studies of far-right. The authors’ emphasis regarding the necessity of studying far right movements in relation to world-revolutions is extremely important. However, in its current form, the paper does not provide a dynamic spatial analysis of the current upsurge of far right and uneven spatial development of capitalism. More specifically, the analysis largely generalizes from the structural dynamics of far-right mobilization in the global North, leaving out the major differences in the structural conditions that help far right movements mobilize in the Global South. For instance, following Dani Rodrik, the authors identify the rise of global far-right has as a backlash against neoliberal globalization, which produced deindustrialization and unemployment in the Global North (Chase-Dunn et al, 2019: 14). While this statement is important to explain dynamics in the Global North, it fails to properly address the revival of far right in non-core regions of the Global South -- such as in India or even in Turkey -- where globalization played a more complex role than simply bringing deindustrialization, job losses and immigration. To get a fuller picture of “what” is the current state of far-right in the world, spatial variation in movement dynamics; and of course, to the uneven impacts of globalization and crisis of capitalism needs to be considered.

Finally, based on their comparative analysis, the authors “a return to military conquest seems unlikely”. This important observation brings up the relationship between military conquest and fascism. It is true that the forms of imperialism and warfare in the late 20th and the early 21st century are categorically different from the forms they assumed in the late 19th and the early 20th century. However, a world-systemic analysis shows that from one world hegemony to the next, forms of imperialism and warfare have constantly transformed. Thus, today, we should expect to see elements of continuity and rupture in the relationship between fascism and far-right.

If we turn our attention from the examples of Western Europe and North America to the rest of the world, the story might get more complicated than an unlikely return to military conquests. We must keep in mind that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was the first act of annexation by a European power since the end of the World War II. Instead of seeing this as an anomaly, we can also see it as the beginning of new round of military expansionism in a new form, which can be used by existing far right leaders. The idea of greater India, for instance, seems to be well alive among Hindu nationalists in India. From Erdogan’s de facto annexation of Afrin to the expansionism of ISIS, there are many instances which might suggest that the link between (new forms of) military conquests and new forms of far right mobilization (that are different from the examples of the early 20th century) might still exist especially in the non-core locations of the world-system.
Introduction

Peter L. Berger, renowned for his sociological research on how humans construct meaning, once referred to the historian as the “one traveler whose path the sociologist will cross more often than anyone else’s on [their] journeys.” He then cautioned that “the sociological journey will be much impoverished unless it is punctuated frequently by conversation with that other particular traveler” (Berger 1963, 20).

As our discipline, alongside the broader social sciences, strives to satisfy increasing demands for quantification, these words inspire my consideration of how historical sociologists have maintained our ties to our cherished fellow travelers in history. They also inform my search for similar and dissimilar trends within our other kindred discipline, political science, and how its practitioners approach the past through historical research. Below, my reflections suggest the rough outlines of a path toward interdisciplinary and multimethod learning.

1. Outcomes and Processes

Why did X happen when Y was expected? Why here and not there? Why then? Political science is a puzzle-driven discipline peopled by scholars who tend to be motivated by “deviant” cases. To solve the puzzles, the political scientist-cum-investigator compares the deviant with the “normal,” testing hypotheses, identifying variables, and otherwise seeking to explain varying outcomes. Hence, puzzle-posing and puzzle-solving are a sort of variation on Mills’ methods of difference and agreement: experimental in inspiration and driven by an outcomes-based logic of inquiry. As a result, when applied to historical research, the method is unavoidably a process of reverse-engineering, of back-casting, that moves from an outcome back to a point where an explanation begins to form.

Three recent, excellent examples of puzzle-based historical political science are Laia Balcells’ Rivalry and Revenge, Evgeny Finkel’s Ordinary Jews, and Lisa Blaydes’ State of Repression (this list is inflected, of course, by my own interest in political violence). The first questions why, in conventional civil wars, armed groups target civilians in some local settings and not others. Balcells combines archival documentation from the Spanish Civil War with quantitative statistics generated from this data. Then, like any up-to-date political scientist, she includes a brief analysis of an outside comparative case—here, Côte d’Ivoire—by drawing on local-level voting returns and information on noncombatant deaths. Balcells argues that citizens are targeted by armed groups in conventional conflicts when ideological commitments predating the onset of war meet desires for revenge that intensify with ongoing violence.

Finkel’s book asks why some Jews, confined to ghettos during the Holocaust, chose to cooperate and collaborate with Nazis, while
others chose to cope and comply, evade, or organize resistance. What, he asks, led to such varied responses? The threats and violence in each case were similar, but, he finds, pre-war political activism, which inevitably was tied to Jews’ pre-war social integration and thus states’ pre-Holocaust political regimes, shaped decisions to select some strategies over others. Finkel’s data sources include over 500 survivor testimonies produced by 8 different organizations as well as published memoirs, primary and secondary sources published in four different languages, and three quantitative datasets: the Jewish Ghettos Dataset, the Zionist Elections dataset, and the Polish National Elections dataset.

Blaydes, too, analyzes archival material to tease out a puzzle: why did some Iraqis comply with Saddam Hussein’s violent autocracy while others resisted? Using Ba’th Party Archives’ documents captured by the US military in its 2003 invasion, Blaydes quantifies even School Registers once used by the regime to examine high school students’ fitness for Ba’th Party recruitment as a way to evaluate the regime’s ruling strategy, then works to map the chronologies and geographical distributions of that most tantalizing of data: rumors. Her results reveal how the regime treated its Sunni, Shi’i, and Kurdish citizens differently in different places, shaping Iraq’s political identities in turn, but because these dynamics varied across contexts, Iraqi society at large cannot be neatly divided along sectarian lines. In turn, Iraqi communal identities cannot explain their behaviors under Hussein’s dictatorship; rather, their behaviors were closely tied to the regime’s actions—namely, its distributive and punitive policies.

The methodological pattern across these three books is exemplary of current historical political science more generally. The scholar identifies a puzzling variation in outcomes, then seeks out the factors causing such puzzles through a crafty combination of historical qualitative data, quantitative data, and the quantification of qualitative data. This approach is common to sociology as well: recent examples from historical sociology include Andreas Wimmer’s “Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart,” Robert Braun’s “Protectors of Pluralism: Religious Minorities and the Rescue of Jews in the Low Countries During the Holocaust,” and Patrick Bergemann’s “Judge Thy Neighbor: Denunciations in the Spanish Inquisition, Romanov Russia, and Nazi Germany,” not to mention the pioneering work of computational historical sociologists such as Carly R. Knight, Laura K. Nelson, and Charles Seguin.

Yet two other trends have arisen in sociology in recent years, pulling us away from the tidy, outcomes-based methodological positivism that undergirds puzzle-seeking strategies. First, the revision of comparative-historical sociology away from outcomes-focused work and toward comparisons across sequences of meaningful action; second, the surge of scholarship in cognitive cultural sociology. The first is motivated by the “post-positivist” turn (Lichterman and Reed 2015; Reed and Lichterman 2019) and aims to focus not on varying outcomes, but on causal mechanisms that inhere across cases to produce outcomes of interest—what Ivan Ermakoff (2019) classifies as a “genetic” approach to social science history (see also Mayrl, n.d.). It argues against the identification of empirical similarities and differences across cases, insisting that because there may be multiple pathways to the same outcome, empirical similarities cannot, on their own, reveal casual mechanisms.

Relatedly, cognitive cultural sociology has influenced historical sociology through a growing recognition that individuals’ actions are often motivated by a mix of unconscious habit and explicit reflection (Type I and Type II thinking in dual-process models of cognition, respectively), and that these can change
throughout the course of a single “event” (in quotations because events, too, are processes). Against the messy reality of history, these pioneering scholars also follow a venerable lodestar: variables-based logic cannot adequately make sense of how shifting geographic and temporal contexts influence cognition, therefore the historical sociologist must privilege interpretive analysis over attempts to impose control and order over history. Instead of applying elegant positivist designs to archives, it asks: how do actors’ meanings and interpretations of actions and interactions shape their subsequent actions and interactions, and how do these chains of action produce outcomes?

These approaches, in contrast to the puzzle-posing model, are forward-thinking. They also draw creatively on ethnographic research procedures, rather than rely on the methodological positivism inspired by experimental research procedures to guide archival analysis. A prime example is Isaac Reed’s (2016) comparison of the Salem Witch Trials and the Whiskey Rebellion. Despite their differences—a witch hunt is not a rebellion—both, Reed argues, are examples of cases where actors struggled to make sense of crisis. The comparison sheds light on knowledge production in times of uncertainty.

In Western PA, the breakdown of sovereign order coupled with Hamilton’s attempts to impose an excise tax on whiskey led to violent rebellion. But what did the rebellion signify? Four muddled interpretations emerged, creating a “thematization” of the conflict whereby interpretations of the rebellion were as confusing as the crisis that caused it. Ultimately, however, the “Philadelphia Interpretation” won (Reed explains why) and directed the state’s action in response. Salem, however, was different: coherent ideological responses to political, legal, and religious uncertainty “fetishized” the crisis rather quickly, by displacing the population’s anxieties onto women as scapegoats. The result was “‘the crisis’ became ‘the witch crisis’” (154; emphasis mine). Reed’s analysis reveals how actors’ interpretations of events were cognized as they were happening, how these cognitions shifted over time and why, and how they ultimately shaped action. Interpretive explanation, not yes/no outcomes, guide his analysis.

2. Replication and Reflexivity
Scholars studying the past necessarily introduce their audiences to their data sources. Increasingly, political scientists and sociologists not only present the “what” but also the “why”—which sources have been used in which ways? What biases influence the construction and function of these sources? How has the scholar’s positionality affected their choice of, access to, and interpretation of these sources?

In the first endeavor, political scientists are more tidily systematic. A strict division between theory and evidence simplifies things, with certain sources employed as theoretical starting-points and others as evidence to adjudicate among competing explanations. Historical sociologists tend to blur such distinctions and are relatively unlikely to discuss the specifics of their methodological practices. Yet as Damon Mayrl and Nicholas Hoover Wilson (2018) note in their analysis of 15,256 in-text citations from 37 award-winning publications in comparative-historical sociology, most historical sociologists use their sources as both theory and evidence, and both constructively and critically, though in different ways—what they call “methodological architectures.”

For example, the methodological architecture called “The Theoretical Frontier” tends to

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5 Ivan Ermakoff (2019) extends the argument further and suggests that variable-centered studies are problematic not only because they assume that each empirical category has the same meaning across cases, but also because they assume that the empirical categories used to frame them a priori have explanatory relevance.
privilege the constructive use of theoretical citations, which are then pragmatically combined with secondary historical sources to build a case. In contrast, the methodological architecture termed “The Sociologist as Historian” tends to rely on extensive and detailed primary archival research, which more often than not results in findings that emphasize historical complexity rather than grand, sweeping arguments. The two other strategies are “Macro-Causal Analysis” and “Data-driven Theorizing.” Political scientists, I find, trend towards the latter two approaches, and with data-driven theorizing in particular, they often engage in explicit discussion regarding data collection and methodology. Historical sociologists are much less likely to do so regardless of architectural strategy (Mayrl and Wilson 2018, 14). The result is it can be hard to trace how historical sociologists toggle between primary and secondary evidence and theory—a dilemma made more difficult when the same author uses the same source in more than one way in any given work, for example as corroborating evidence for an argument at one point but critiqued as theoretically flawed at another.⁶

There is, of course, nothing wrong with citing the same source for its evidence as well as for its theoretical argument, nor to argue in support of one while challenging the other. Sociologists and political scientists adjudicate among competing theories using the same data all the time. We critique data as flawed yet also useful. And, despite historical political science’s tendency to draw stronger distinctions, such scholars certainly conflate theory and evidence as needed.

Still, the greater quantification we find in political science has led to more explicit discussions in historical work of data collection and methodology and sociologists would do well to hew to this trend. Replication is the very essence of science (political, social, or physical), it hinges on transparency, and it should be possible for social scientists of any discipline to visit the same archives and read the same texts, and clearly determine how a given scholar arrived at their theory. Where there is disagreement, it should be straightforward to untangle another scholar’s evidence and logic. These informed arguments can be nothing but good for research as a whole, and I believe sociology has a great deal to learn from political science in this regard.

On the other hand, sociologists are developing two practices that should be adopted by our fellow travelers in other disciplines. The first involves scholars’ responsibilities to interrogate the political construction and symbolic implications of archives, and the second serious discussion of scholars’ positionality when conducting historical research. Below, I briefly summarize two emerging developments from these efforts.

The institutional field of archives includes archivists, curators, users, and professionals who keep them going, but it also extends to more elusive actors such as philanthropists, donors, NGOs, governments and other political authorities. These actors have interests, beliefs, and ideas, and the archives they leave are politically built. We must ask whose history it is organized to preserve, whose boundaries are enforced by this body of records, and whose history has been excluded. Going further, we can ask who first envisioned the archive, who funded it, why it was sited in one place and not another, and who serves as its gatekeeper.⁷ These questions are unending—and important. The political construction of the archive shapes how history is gathered and contained, then quantified over time.

Relatedly, although archives are often thought of as neutral sites that contain objective

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⁶ A related dilemma is the potential for mismatch between data collected and theoretical strategy employed. For an example of this critique applied to recent historical research in sociology, see Elizabeth Popp Berman (2019).

⁷ I thank my colleague Karida Brown for her insights on this point.
evidence about time-periods passed, symbolic decisions of categorization and classification are embedded in the very production of the documents contained in the archive in the first place. As the archive collects and accumulates documents portending to portray history as it occurred, it simultaneously chooses to include some voices as representative of the past while excluding, and therefore erasing from history, the voices of others. Sometimes, decisions to gather evidence from some kinds of people and not others are intentional—these voices are valid and count for the history we want to tell here, these voices do not. Yet other times, decisions to gather evidence from some kinds of people and not others are unintentional and reflect ways of seeing and dividing the world at particular moments in time. In both circumstances, sociologists suggest that scholars must consider how the documents contained in archives always reflect inequalities in who gets to tell their story by having their words and images institutionally preserved.

Understanding that archives are never neutral forces introspection about the scholar. Hence, sociologists are increasingly reflecting on how their own positionality shapes the collection and interpretation of archival data. Archival access, as with access to any kind of evidence, depends crucially on social, cultural, and economic capital. And, as a wealth of social scientific research shows, people with more capital in particular fields are more likely to successfully navigate, benefit from, and succeed in related others. This applies to archival research too. It is not enough to simply know one’s case and the relevant language: one must also possess the right social and cultural characteristics, connections, and resources to access an archive and its contents.

Finally, when it comes to archival analysis, the interpretation of evidence is also shaped by positionality. Upon entering an archive, only sometimes is it clear precisely which documents will help answer a question and, more often, the researcher is faced with a large body of documents containing information on various, and sometimes conflicting, behaviors, correspondences, interactions, claims, and value statements. It is difficult to know what documents best answer a question of interest or most accurately reflect the “truth” of what caused a particular phenomenon. Inevitably, then, our social positions shape what we do or do not notice in the materials—what voices, perspectives, and stories are or are not included—as well as how we weigh conflicting evidence in order to develop theoretical arguments. Critical reflection on one’s own position in relation to the archive is thus necessary for any serious discussion of historical research methods and analysis.

To give three examples based on the texts mentioned earlier, Balcell’s (2017) book is powerful in part due to her emphasis on politics and emotions as significant for explaining violence against noncombatants in civil wars. She is able to emphasize these aspects of conflict due to the kinds of historical data she collected—Spanish national and local archives and memoirs, which provide qualitative evidence in support of her argument that rivalry drives violence early in civil war, while revenge explains violence later.

Yet her comparison of Spain with the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire relies mainly on secondary sources: to examine direct violence against civilians, Balcells builds a dataset that combines various human rights organization reports (Balcells 2017, 165). This in and of itself is not problematic—scholars, especially those who study violence, frequently use such evidence to examine patterns in conflict. But as Balcells herself mentions in a special issue on conflict archives with Christopher M. Sullivan, these sources tend to privilege easily observable acts of violence, leading us to know significantly more about the urban core of conflicts and visible acts of violence than about conflicts on the periphery and clandestine operations throughout war (Balcells and Sullivan 2018).
On the other hand, conflict archives can be subject to their own biases, including with regards to their availability as evidence of violence can be hidden, destroyed, or otherwise manipulated by conflict’s victors, or strategically released for political purposes (more on this below). Given Balcells’ sensitivity to these concerns, it would have been helpful to read about the promises and pitfalls of comparing Spain and Côte d’Ivoire—two very different cases—with two very different kinds of data. I suspect the insights garnered from a comparison not just of the cases but of the data used to examine them, including how the evidence in each case was originally collected and organized and how this might have shaped the results, would be insightful for future scholars of violence.

Finkel (2017) is a rare exemplar in that he provides an extensive appendix wherein he discusses the construction of his various sources, including the different political contexts that may have shaped the kinds of information provided in the oral testimonies that undergird part of his analysis (Finkel 2017, 199-207). He is also upfront about his personal connection to the history he analyzes (Finkel 2017, 18-20). Two aspects of the study that I keep thinking about, however, relate to my own struggles researching the Holocaust as a grandchild of survivors. First, how does he think his biography shaped the kinds of questions he asked and attended to in his research, and what kinds of issues might he have overlooked as a result? Second, given that he constructed the largest existing dataset on Jewish ghettos in interwar Poland using previously unseen documents from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, how does he think his positionality influenced his ability to access these documents and how might future scholars interested in doing original research on the Holocaust (or on other instances of violence for that matter), but perhaps without the same social connections, be able to access such sources?

Finally, Blaydes (2018) examines Ba’ath Party Archives captured by the U.S. Military during the 2003 Iraq Invasion. Numerous archivists have written on the troubling ethical dilemmas involved in collecting and disseminating these documents (e.g., Caswell 2011; Cox 2011; Montgomery 2012). Blaydes also relies on documents and first-hand testimonies produced by the Iraq Memory Foundation between 2003-2008, the latter of which aired on the al-‘Iraqiya public television network. This evidence is troubling from an empirically practical as well as an ethical perspective: Iraqi exile Kanan Makiya who formed the Iraq Memory Foundation collaborated with President George W. Bush’s administration to produce and disseminate these testimonies, as well as other evidence of Saddam Hussein’s violence against Iraqis, to justify the Iraq War to Americans and to Iraqis themselves. The goal of the Iraq Memory Foundation archive, then, was to “powerfully impart the brutalities of the former regime to the public and scholars” (in Alshaibi 2019:292). Blaydes does not discuss the potential problems involved in working with these sources and whether, as a result, there might be significant social and political biases in her findings. She asserts that the data she relies on for her analysis “are not attitudinal, but based on...actions of individuals, as collected or documented by the regime’s single party,” but this does not, in my estimation, adequately account for the fact that the archives were intentionally constructed to justify US military intervention in Iraq (Blaydes 2018, 12). The data may reflect observations of actions, but the data themselves were organized and compiled for violent and controversial political purposes. This merits further discussion.

**Conclusion**

Sociologists’ lives may be impoverished if they leave their historian peers behind but, as I hope this essay demonstrates, we have much to gain by attending to our peers’ historical research in political science and vice versa, as well. The emphasis on puzzling outcomes that drives
much of political science has resulted in some of the most exciting and innovative work in recent years. But, sociologists caution, desires for methodological positivism must not cause us to lose sight of the significance of meaning and interpretation. Among other reasons, this is because the search for empirical patterns across cases can elide the important fact that behind any outcome, multiple mechanisms are possible.

Likewise, attention to heuristics should compel even more methodological precision concerning historical data collection practices. The messy reality of theorization—especially when toggling between archival data and analysis—can make replication especially difficult compared with tidy variables-and-outcomes-based designs. Subsequently, the process of creating, preserving, archiving, and accessing evidence should be central to methodological discussions rather than ignored, and issues of potential bias should be emphasized rather than elided. Each of these lessons emerges when considering our disciplines’ similarities and differences, and each suggests potentially innovative approaches to historical social science moving forward.

References


Recently Published

Above the Fray: The Red Cross and the Making of the Humanitarian NGO Sector
Shai M. Dromi
University of Chicago Press, 2019

From Lake Chad to Iraq, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide relief around the globe, and their scope is growing every year. Policymakers and activists often assume that humanitarian aid is best provided by these organizations, which are generally seen as impartial and neutral. In *Above the Fray*, Shai M. Dromi investigates why the international community overwhelmingly trusts humanitarian NGOs by looking at the historical development of their culture. With a particular focus on the Red Cross, Dromi reveals that NGOs arose because of the efforts of orthodox Calvinists, demonstrating for the first time the origins of the unusual moral culture that has supported NGOs for the past 150 years.

Drawing on archival research, Dromi traces the genesis of the Red Cross to a Calvinist movement working in mid-nineteenth-century Geneva. He shows how global humanitarian policies emerged from the Red Cross founding members’ faith that an international volunteer program not beholden to the state was the only ethical way to provide relief to victims of armed conflict. By illustrating how Calvinism shaped the humanitarian field, Dromi argues for the key role belief systems play in establishing social fields and institutions. Ultimately, Dromi shows the immeasurable social good that NGOs have achieved, but also points to their limitations and suggests that alternative models of humanitarian relief need to be considered.

*Michele Lamont, Harvard University*

“*Above the Fray* is a major effort to analyze the development of a distinct humanitarian field animated by the religious worldview of the nineteenth Calvinist milieu of Geneva, which connects a network of philanthropists, pacific activists, and religious actors concerned with addressing human tragedies. In telling the story of the emergence of this institutional field, Dromi innovates by bringing meaning-making into Bourdieusian field analysis in a non-reductivist fashion. Thus, he makes a brilliant contribution to historical sociology, and offers a much-needed addition to the sociological theory of fields. His book will be a crucial point of reference for several fields of research in the years to come.”

*Craig Calhoun, Arizona State University*

“Humanitarianism is not just an ethical orientation, but a whole sector of social institutions and practical actions. Dromi’s *Above the Fray* superbly illuminates both the history of this field since the founding of the Red Cross and its increasingly difficult challenges today.”