Trajectories

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The Future of CHS

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Last fall, during the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association being held in Chicago, Julia Adams and Ann Orloff convened an informal gathering of comparative-historical sociologists to discuss the state and future of the subfield—and to think through some collective steps we might consider taking to help it continue developing and flourishing. The meeting was held at the American Bar Foundation off Lakeshore Drive, and more than three score people attended from a range of institutions and career stages. The conversation was lively, and it traversed a vital range of questions.

How is comparative-historical sociology seen by the larger field of sociology? Have the intellectual changes that have transformed our subfield since the 1970s been registered in the mainstream of the discipline? Does comparative-historical sociology cohere as an intellectual enterprise? If so, how? If not, why? What is the value proposition of comparative-historical sociology for the discipline? What are the perils and opportunities that face our subfield intellectually, and how should we consider addressing them going forward? What kinds of steps might comparative-

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historical sociologists take to strengthen our place in the profession?

What follows in this issue of *Trajectories* is a special feature that is intended to expand this crucially important conversation to a wider set of participants that includes members of the ASA CHS Section. This special feature takes the form of several essays.

Julia Adams and **Ann Orloff** provide a broad overview of the Chicago discussion, and they outline some promising initiatives that are intended to keep the discussion going and promote the further development of the subfield.

This overview followed by a selection of reaction essays by comparative-historical sociologists who attended the Chicago discussion. In his reaction essay, **Robert Braun** argues that certain intellectual proclivities of comparative-historical sociology make it uniquely capable of leveraging "creative marginality," or the idea that scholarly innovation tends to occur in "interstitial areas" where people from different countries and disciplines meet. **Stephanie Mudge** picks up on the theme of institution-building and stresses the importance of establishing a broader set of CHS-centered institutions beyond the SSHA and the ASA CHS Section. Drawing on her experience giving a talk at the Society for Classical Learning conference earlier this summer, **Angel Adams Parham** urges comparative-historical sociologists to engage the broader, non-academic public and expand the audience for our scholarship, and she lays out three specific proposals for doing so. **Nicholas Hoover Wilson** and **Damon Mayrl** explore a number of different ways that comparative-historical sociology can be seen as cohering, and they caution against seeing any one of them as more essential than the others.

For perspective, one final reaction essay is contributed by comparative-historical sociologist who did not attend the Chicago meetings. **Dorit Geva** situates the conversation initiated by Adams and Orloff in broader epistemic and international context, and she lays out three specific ideas for courses that would enable CHS to constructively intervene on three of the different "epistemic fronts" where it currently finds itself.

The essays read together form a fascinating dialogue, and I think they suggests something of the intellectual vitality of our subfield at the present moment. For anyone finishing the special feature and wanting to get involved in charting the path forward, I suggest that you contact any of the authors with your ideas or consulting the list of ongoing initiatives at the end of Adam and Orloff's initial essay. Onward!

CHS at a Crossroads? Envisioning New Scholarly Directions

Julia Adams
Yale University
Ann Shola Orloff
Northwestern University

We – Ann and Julia – write from a place that was unimaginable when the discussion on the future of comparative historical sociology that we are about to describe took place, last November during the annual meeting of the SSHA in Chicago. Concatenated crises have intervened and continue to disrupt and to challenge settled arrangements and understandings. And with them, a series of protests the likes of which have not been seen in the United States since the 1960s: Women's Marches; youth against gun violence, and, most dramatically, Black Lives Matter and the ongoing protests against racial injustice and police brutality.

The worldwide suffering unleashed by COVID-19, overdetermined in the United States by a malevolent, anti-scientific administration that could not have been any less prepared to lead. The long tail of the 2007-9 global financial crisis. The thoroughly reactionary political

program of 'anti- Obama' and 'never-Hillary', the chief proponent of which still resides in the White House.

While the events of the day preoccupy all of us, we also hope that there will be a better future – including for universities, faculties and students, in which the historicizing projects of comparative and historical sociology might continue to make contributions to the knowledge that will help us better understand both crises and counter-projects to the reigning elite political programs. The present moment, globally, is a fraught one – closer to a 'state of emergency' than many previously proclaimed moments. Are comparative historical sociologists, the part of the discipline most closely attuned to this, stepping up as they should? How might they – we – do better?

Recently, a number of comparative historical sociologists came together to discuss the future of the subdiscipline. We met during the 2019 annual conference of the Social Science History Association, which alongside the ASA's CHS section serves as an intellectual home for many CHS-ers. For our tastes, we don't often enough get to discuss the collective intellectual life and themes that animate CHS, and the important issues of survival in a turbulent polity and system of higher education; publishing and relevant organizational forms, including how to get comparative and historical work out to the world. So we decided to call on some of the resources available from ongoing CHS-themed (interdisciplinary) workshops at Northwestern and Yale to organize an occasion to do just that, and encouraged CHS colleagues attending SSHA in Chicago to join in a wide-ranging discussion on intellectual and organizational issues facing the subdiscipline.

Why meet? A bit of background: Since 2005, the third wave identified in *Remaking Modernity* and fostered by other important interventions (such as the 2003 Mahoney-Rueschemeyer volume) has poured into a veritable river delta of CHS scholarship touching on many aspects of modernity, including: gendered and racialized capitalisms; empire and race; religion; states and other forms of governance; interpersonal violence; sciences, technology and education, etc. (e.g., Go & Lawson's 2017 edited volume on global historical sociology). As topical foci widened, CHS-ers also moved into a more plural space with respect to methods and epistemologies (as Mayrl & Wilson report in their 2020 article). In general, as a community, we have continued to celebrate this dispersion, particularly as it has broadened our empirical foci, spatially and temporally. No more is CHS seen as 'about the French Revolution and the New Deal' alone! (Not that that was ever accurate…)

One reading of what has happened over the years since the subfield rebaptized itself in the '70s is that core objects of analysis have broadened from capitalism and states to modernity itself, incorporating its repressed and excluded subjects, aspects, and struggles. However, comparative historical scholars have not made this expanded focus entirely legible to the broader discipline of sociology, nor translated it into the simpler expressions and economical forms of shorthand that would make that possible. Some of us are quite concerned about this, while others are not, deeming the general discipline too dispersed or internally at odds itself for such an intervention to be useful.

But among those who do care, some point out that the leading concepts of concern in CHS are still too often seen to relate only to certain core topics, understood on the broad scale: states, nationalisms, modernity, contentious politics, empires, capitalisms, etc. This presents problems insofar as it fails to do justice to topics that mainstream sociology and political science (in particular) do not typically or immediately associate with CHS, including, for example, work on sciences, technologies, academic disciplines, health/medicine, bodies, and the environment. It may also undermine efforts to persuade the natural allies among non-

CHS disciplinary colleagues to transcend their almost exclusively presentist bent. And it gives rise to many less lofty questions about the organizational aspects of the subfield, including how the publishing landscape presents opportunities and barriers for CHS scholars.

The event: Over 75 people from across the US – and even a few from much farther away -- attended the dinner, ranging from graduate students to new assistant professors, recently-tenured folks, and senior colleagues who've been in the CHS trenches for many decades, hailing from a wide range of institutions. Most were incredibly energized by both the discussion and the participation of so many fantastic colleagues, a cross-generational group diverse in many ways. It was unprecedented to meet in an interdisciplinary space – but comparative historical sociologists have always needed both interdisciplinary (and international) ties and organizations like SSHA, and disciplinary formations to forward collective projects. CHS-ers are eager to cooperate with others in the social sciences and humanities who want to understand large-scale transformations and historically contextualized analysis. The discussion of what unites (and divides) us was wide-ranging and free-wheeling – it was exhilarating to hear so many different takes on who and what we are, how we should be facing the future, and what is the nature of the crises and opportunities that confront scholars today. It is a challenge to summarize, but we offer here what we can make out from notes scribbled on napkins, then share some of the action items that emerged in the general conversation and in some follow-up discussions.

Most present expressed a sense of hopefulness about the grouping, if only on the intellectual level: there is wonderful ongoing work of many kinds, about many times and places, as well as histories of the present. Many also spoke up about facing practical challenges of all sorts: jobs, publications, especially viewed against the backdrop of a discipline and universities already experiencing crises that began before COVID-19 – adjunctification, increasing stratification in higher education, austerity, ongoing instances of racial injustice. Several people mentioned open opportunities as well, however, including public interest in the historical origins of many present-day problems, such as incarceration, intensifying social inequalities, and the burden of debt.

The original impetus for the meeting stemmed in part from concerns voiced by many students and faculty colleagues that the academic landscape for doing comparative historical sociology is challenging at the moment, perhaps more so than in earlier generations. It also stemmed from fissile tendencies in the discipline of sociology. Agree with it or not – and CHS-ers are divided – James House's 2019 *Annual Review* article on "the culminating crisis of American sociology" articulates widening lines of division in the discipline that have implications for stances within comparative historical sociology, as well as highlighting signs of what might be decline in our discipline, including ASA membership numbers and degrees granted. These tensions are overdetermined by the regrettable abdication of interest in real-world problems and processes by some sister social science disciplines and the institutional threats to academic history occasioned in part by student withdrawal of interest.

We didn't agree on exactly what it is that unites us, and nor did we expect to do so over the course of one meeting. Some forward the idea that we in CHS work under the umbrella of a remaking modernity project, encompassing states, capitalism, racialization, empire, gender – modernity/ies with their constitutive undersides. More people voiced the idea that we share a style of work – asking big questions and writing books, focusing on processes and temporality (critical junctures, sequence, tempo, etc.), concern with cases rather than variables, examining structured agency or structuration, understanding emergence and development.

Some see an anti-establishment frame of mind: against presentism, for a history of the present and deeper historicization. But there was also a defense of historical sociological inquiry that doesn't immediately offer lessons from the past for the present. Some see methods – a logic of inquiry, ways of asking questions – as the unifying thread. Others say it is epistemology, which implies a family of particular methodologies, and a Brechtian edict: "always historicize!" Still others believe that what used to unite us, classically-theoretically, is now in abeyance and that we need far more pointed discussion and debate to regenerate a shared theoretical agenda. Finally, there's an argument that the appeal of CHS is in countering the provincialism of American sociology: by allowing for the study of regions outside the US in particular, as well as time-periods prior to its constitution, and by valuing dialogues outside the borders of sociology, as well as outside of the optics determined by the US present.

Throughout the discussion, the breadth of substantive inquiries, while challenging for formulating tight debates, stood, for almost all present, as a strength – generative rather than problematic. We do still take on the questions of social and political transformation that cannot be understood from the individual level alone, or by focusing only on the US present; people mentioned: states, empires and colonialism, taxation, slavery and its afterlives, gender and race, religion, science, climate, changing patterns of inequality, groups struggling over meanings. We can and should open ourselves to new questions. This was to some extent counterposed to unification around generalizable theory or specific theoretical debates, though some argued strongly, and persuasively, that the sprawling CHS formation would benefit from putting more effort into shared theoretical conversations and/or organizational unity.

Next steps: A number of practical initiatives were suggested at the meeting. Some are already underway, and where this is the case, we've added the contact information. We hope that all interested CHS-ers will choose to pursue what concerns them the most, and to add other ideas, links, and contacts. Note, too, that the section itself is coordinating some of these activities. Bottom-up initiatives like the regional meetings described below represent activities that complement the work the section is doing.

*** Regional meetings (continuing the conversations):**
One suggestion about which virtually all seemed excited involved convening further discussions of shared concerns, be they theoretical; substantive (modernity, remade?); methodological (logic of inquiry?), or political-tactical. The group – or rather loose formation – actually did get a few regional meetings organized, only to be overtaken by the COVID-19 crisis. But something like this remains completely doable over Zoom or some analogue. This part of the initiative flowed from the widespread feeling that it would be useful to have more local and regional on-the-ground meetings to keep CHS energies engaged, especially for colleagues at institutions without a critical mass of CHS scholars. Should these conversations self-organize into debates, the Section could explore ways for us to facilitate this between annual meetings via a tool like Twist, which combines a bulletin board with a more active, organized "threaded" set of conversations. At present, colleagues have made a start on coordinating regional meetings (virtual for the moment) in four areas, and we hope more people will take this up -- we know that there are a lot of powerfully organized CHS regions out there! (Ann is happy to talk with anyone who wants to work on this: a-orloff@northwestern.edu)

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* **Teaching**: CHS-ers could engage with pedagogy more explicitly than they typically do. In any case, CHS-ers should be sure that their syllabi are widely available, whether via the Section or other mechanisms. CHS scholars are also the ones who mainly teach both college and university courses on social change – which some of us see as a virtual mandate for departments' hiring people working in CHS traditions. Where possible, it's also important that CHS scholars remain as embedded as they have been in international studies centers and language training institutes. Finally, CHS teaching should serve as one source of "on-ramps" for undergraduates into the sub- and trans-discipline (see below, on outreach).

Robert Braun and Damon Mayrl are developing a teaching initiative for the section (see their article in this newsletter).

* **Publications**: Interest in issues related to publication broadly speaking is strong – not surprising, given that this is the currency comparative historical sociologists must amass to success. A number of people at the meeting supported the idea of having the Section sponsor a specialty journal in CHS. Although the Section missed this year's ASA deadline for a proposal (as have other sections, amid COVID-19), next year is a doable and potentially energizing target. In the meantime, everyone would like to see more CHS scholarship published in mainstream journals, too. A few years ago, *ASR* published formal guidelines for reviewing CHS manuscript submissions and what the journal is looking for in such submissions (co-drafted by some of our colleagues present at this very meeting). Did this have any impact? Has it enabled more CHS work in the flagship disciplinary journals? And elsewhere? A committee to explore the possibility of starting a specialty journal was appointed by the section; they have surveyed the section membership, and will be reporting to the next annual meeting of the section.

* **Outreach**: Many would like to attract more undergraduate and graduate students to historical sociology, especially as that enables students in non-elite programs to attend SSHA, ASA-CHS and other relevant meetings. It is also important to develop the relationship of North American and non-NA-based sociologies to engage with the world; perhaps this could occur through the International Sociological Association, and/or through area/international studies centers and language training institutes across campuses. It seems close to the Section's mandate that it should also be developing and maintaining contacts with individual CHS-ers abroad. Related ideas voiced by meeting participants included encouraging cooperation among people developing new methodologies (e.g., computational methods) and historicizing inquiries, and getting an account of CHS that adequately foregrounds race, gender and class into the public materials of the History of Sociology section. And, finally, many of the questions that CHS scholars ask and answer have profound implications for the public interest and for public affairs writ large. Could we better highlight the variety of ways that CHS scholars speak to broader non-academic publics – including via social media – and could these forms of intervention be linked in some productive collective mix? How can CHS scholars become more effectively "public-facing" in ways that allow rigorous scholarship to enter public discussion on key social and political issues? Shouldn't the CHS section

have a wide-ranging, fearless, and democratic Twitter account, for example?

*** Supporting the next generations:** We could raise money and increase publicity for grad and advanced undergrad student participation in ASA, SSHA and other relevant meetings. This is a broader demand than just coming up with money, especially as the challenges of doing CHS work (e.g., languages, gaining literacy across fields and disciplines) are made more difficult by increasing demands for publication (when the 8000-word limit of some journals is problematic) and by university mandates for finishing just about everything in fewer years. Senior scholars can take the fight for CHS research to the university and broader academic landscape, working to challenge standards that don't suit CHS work, and developing better standards by which it is assessed. The work the section does in cross-institutional graduate student mentoring at the annual meeting is a fine example of this kind of support; perhaps it can be expanded to include junior scholars. And we must be mindful that CHS scholars are trying to promote their work in the midst of challenges to Sociology, its disciplinary home. CHS represents one of the oldest and strongest of sociological traditions, and developing CHS scholarship while expanding the canon to embrace all aspects of modernity – including the long legacies of slavery. patriarchy, and capitalism – can help in sustaining the overall sociological project in this crisis-ridden moment. Given that some universities are encouraging ambitious, big thinking interdisciplinary work even now, we see further avenues for developing CHS in alliance with initiatives in digital humanities, network analysis, political economy and the like.

*** Edited volumes and handbooks:** In addition to journal publications, some underlined the importance of CHS scholars' taking a leadership role regarding handbooks; the most recent handbook on historical sociology is from 2003, and Oxford's and other big-publisher handbooks are a useful and accessible resource, especially for scholars in the Global South. This is a crucial but often disciplinarily under-rewarded task, and if anyone has imaginative ideas for how to lighten the burden on the editors, with the consent of publishers, please step up! (There would be an enthusiastic audience … and everyone should know that if they involve themselves, their citation counts would benefit!) People should also consider edited volumes on specific sub-themes – e.g., historicizing approaches to inequality.

David McCourt dmmccourt@ucdavis.edu would like to talk with colleagues who are interested in exploring this possibility.

Perhaps the most important and exciting area of all concerns generative intellectual agendas and theoretical debates. Those arise organically from the work that all comparative historical sociologists worldwide are doing. In an era of intellectual dispersion, a condition enhanced by the pandemic, one of the reasons to deepen internal conversations is that it encourages external recruitment… a delightful Simmelian paradox. In complementary fashion, those at the meeting encouraged the formation of networks of scholars working on convergent questions and topics. These groupings would also compose pods of engaged reviewers needed to make review processes work adequately (which they aren't doing at present – just ask our journal editors!), which in turn drives discussion and debate. Ideally this would make more visible all matters that animate comparative historical sociologists, while helping to shape and expand a CHS canon to include scholars from outside the Global North, especially. Together – at ASA, SSHA, regional meetings, universities, and in our own studies – we are more able to take account of empire, racialization, gender, sexualities, emergent patterns of economic change, and new and alternative political futures.

Creative Marginality[1]

Robert Braun
UC Berkeley

Last November, I attended a meeting of comparative historical sociologists organized by Julia Adams and Ann Orloff about the future of Comparative Historical Sociology (CHS). Although the conversation was wide ranging, two questions returned repeatedly. What are the unique strengths at the core of our subfield? And how will a further development of these strengths enable us to improve our position in the discipline and academy? An impressive list of CHS-selling points emerged: its unique focus on explaining social change, its remarkable ability to contextualize the present, its development of innovative methodologies that move beyond the stale variable-based regression techniques that keep us hostage and last but not least its emphasis on ambitious and BIG questions. As a variable based researcher who does not explicitly study social change, I was starting to get worried. What was I doing here? Why was I attracted to the CHS-subfield?

It made me think of Mattei Dogan. Dogan was a Romanian born French social scientist who taught in Russia, Italy, France, and different parts of the US. He often struggled to fit in and referred to himself as a hyphenated-political-scientist, someone interested the intersection of politics and other social sciences. In 1990 he co-authored a book with fellow hyphenated-political-scientist Robert Pahre titled *Creative Marginality*. The book aimed to shed light on creativity and advanced two interrelated claims. First, academic specialization fragments the social sciences into subdisciplines which are organized around tight borders. Second, once specialization reaches its natural limits, creativity emerges where fragments are recombined into hybrid fields. As a result, innovation is located at disciplinary margins and one can find the most exciting new work by walking astride disciplinary and subfield boundaries. Because of his international background Dogan soon realized that the same idea could also be applied to national academic cultures. Creativity is most likely to appear, he concluded, in interstitial areas where academics from different national communities meet. He brought his ideas into practice by playing an important role in the development of the International Sociological Association (ISA) and establishing a foundation that stimulated comparative and inter-disciplinary research.

If Dogan was right, we should not only worry about the CHS's core but pay equal attention to its borders since this is where creativity often takes place. In many ways, it seems the subfield is uniquely positioned to transform itself from an exclusive Prada bag into an inclusive hybrid that sparks innovation and counters the rising provincialism and centripetal forces shaping American Sociology. This is the case because CHS features porous and transnational borders that touch many if not all of the social science subfields.

At least three interrelated processes make CHS conducive to creative marginality. First, and most obviously its comparative focus forces us to think about the study of countries outside the US. As American Sociology focused on pressing questions in the United States – as pressing as they may be – CHS scholarship revealed that we should not lose sight of the insights we can gain into on-going scholarly debates over race, gender and inequality by putting the United States in comparative perspective. Second, all research themes housed in different subfields can be denaturalized through historical study, making border crossing inevitable. After all, everything is embedded in history. Third, CHS members have never obsessively policed its borders. Its early founders, from Harvard's Theda Skocpol to Berkeley's Peter Evans, have always valued dialogues across the borders of sociology and its neighbors. This disregard for disciplinary boundaries is still visible today as many card-carrying CHS-members are not trained as

[1] I would like to thank Tony Chen for excellent comments on an earlier version.

sociologists (myself included). All three of these interstitial processes came together in 2016 when the section's best book award co-winner was Prerna Singh, a political scientist working on development and stratification in India. Indeed, it was exactly this porosity in CHS's borders that drew me to the subfield.

However, there is still a lot that can to be done. Despite its international research focus, CHS membership is still overwhelmingly Northern American. The section could perhaps produce more creative marginality by forging connection with other international associations such as the ESA and, of course, Dogan's beloved ISA. In times that the American academy, government and society become more inward looking, CHS should move in the opposite direction to maintain and improve its unique status in the field.

Calling all Institution-Builders: A Comment on Ann Orloff's and Julia Adams' Open Letter

Stephanie Mudge
UC Davis

It takes bravery to initiate an academic stock-taking conversation. Such initiatives tend to dredge up sensitive matters of esteem and inclusion, not to mention epistemological tensions that perennially lurk beneath sociology's surface. But there are times when a reflexive pause is necessary and overdue, and I heartily agree with Ann and Julia that this is one of them. I am grateful to them for getting the ball rolling.

In this crisis-laden time, Ann and Julia raise a series of thoughtful questions about the present and possible futures of comparative and historical sociology (hereafter CHS). They call on us to consider how historical sociologists might better rise to the demands of the moment, whether CHS' disciplinary profile and presence are what they should be, and how we can think strategically about its possible futures. They also ask important practical questions about how CHS can build and fortify scholarly networks, make itself more legible beyond the discipline, and support and promote next generations. All of these questions should be placed in a broader context: CHS is ambiguously located at the heart and yet also (I would argue) at the margins of an academic discipline that is neither resource-rich nor endowed with an abundance of public prestige, at a time when academics and experts are politicized and mistrusted, the institution of the university is under threat, and the world is entering into a new era of geopolitical, domestic and climatic trouble. CHS has much to offer, but it is not the master of its own fate. Navigating the many pressures bearing down on it will require institution-*building*, and institution-*builders.*

Beginning with the matter of disciplinary profile and presence, in my view CHS is strong, vibrant, and rich with past accomplishments and future potential—but it is not where it should be. Here I suppose I am sympathetic to the position of those who see the core of CHS in terms of a frame of mind: historical sociologists agree that the social world is an ongoing historical accomplishment (a premise that has the virtue of being true), the analysis of which requires both historical knowledge and temporally-attuned analytical sensibilities. But CHSers could be more ambitious in their efforts to bring this message to the rest of the discipline, and incorporating it practically into the structure of both undergraduate and graduate education.

Indeed, there is a case to be made that historical sensibilities are among the essential skills all sociologists should have. If so, then historical sociology is not a subfield or a method—it is much more than that. It is the stuff of basic training, foundational not just for specifically archival projects but for all modes of sociological work. Historical sensibilities aid the formulation of research topics, enrich statistical and network analyses, facilitate conceptual development, foster epistemological

insight, and strengthen the execution of all forms of fieldwork. It is a means and a complement to all methodologies.

CHSers can and should make a better case along these lines, providing needed backing to historically-minded faculty and graduate students who are willing to carry the message forward in their departments and institutions. I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that CHSers should pursue some sort of method war—far from it. Historical sociology now exhibits such a rich combination of inductive and deductive, quantitative and qualitative techniques that its disciplinary mainstreaming would push against inclinations to descend into fruitless squabbles over the superiority or inferiority of particular methods.

The success of this kind of mainstreaming project hinges partly on how successfully self-identified CHSers are in communicating their work to the discipline and the public; it also may require critical reflection on how, and by whom, the boundary of historical sociology is drawn. Do all, or even most, sociologists with historical sensibilities understand themselves as historical sociologists, identifying and connecting with each other on that basis? Probably not. And if not, then we have much to do.

We're sociologists; we know how this works. A "we" is built on a sense of common interest, collective endeavor and mutual support. This, in turn, requires institution-building and institution-builders—people who are willing, like Ann and Julia, to facilitate critical self-reflection and cultivate sites of professional activity and intellectual cross-pollination. Those who do understand themselves as historical sociologists need time, space and energy to reach out to scholars at all career stages who do historically-sensitive work (or would like to) and do what's necessary to build a sense of membership in a shared enterprise. This requires platforms: sites of exchange that make mentoring, research development, publication and communication possible, and that create professional pathways.

The Social Science History Association (SSHA) is one such institution, as is the ASA's Comparative and Historical Sociology Section—but I fear that they may not be up to the task. Aside from the question of whether these institutions may draw the boundary between historical and not-historical sociology too starkly, I wonder about the sustainability of fee- and conference-driven professional associations in a world in which even those with secure tenure-track positions receive diminishing institutional support for professional activities, and the price of association membership, travel and accommodations—assuming at some point we step into a post-COVID-19 world—strains the budgets of faculty and grad students alike. CHSers are ill-equipped to confront these kinds of systemic constraints, much less innovate institutional workarounds—but they need to try, nonetheless.

Ann and Julia have offered very useful suggestions in this direction. Developing regional networks, working to establish a new journal, and getting a handbook together are time-tested strategies. Tony Chen and I are also hoping to get a new book series in historical sociology off the ground (fingers crossed!). And there are nuts-and-bolts tasks to take on, like building sources of funding and support to ensure that institutions like SSHA and ASA-CHS remain accessible and enriching professional arenas. Last but not least, perhaps through regional networks, a series of strategic conversations about how to cultivate historical sociological sensibilities in both graduate and undergraduate programs, expand the CHS fold, and more effectively communicate the work of historical (and historically-minded) sociologists to broader audiences are all in order.

The Persistence of Ahistorical Thinking: Some Thoughts on Addressing Our Crisis

Angel Adams Parham
Loyola University

** What does it mean to be a free citizen rather than an oppressed subject?*

** Under what conditions should or even must an individual challenge their ruler or government?*

** What, in its essence, is the American project, and is that project capacious enough to extend full equality and dignity to all people who are counted as members?*

These are some of the questions I posed to a workshop audience of 150-200 persons attending my session as part of the Society for Classical Learning (SCL) conference in June earlier this summer.[2] I posed the questions as an entrée to a talk about the crucial importance of historical thinking and the value of reading or re-reading classic texts that can guide and help us in making sense of thorny issues and problems we confront today. By my definition, classic texts include everything from Aristotle's *Politics*, to Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, the Declaration of Independence, and voices from the Black intellectual tradition such as W.E.B. DuBois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Frederick Douglass—among others.

During that talk I emphasized that, although the past few months of protests have roiled us all, they have parallels in events of the 1860s[3], 1890s[4], and 1960s[5]. For oppressed peoples—especially for African Americans—although the specific issues, struggles, and platforms differ in their details—at their essence are core questions that run along the lines of those I've highlighted above. These are not the only questions at issue, to be sure, but they express frustrations and cries for justice that have stirred activists, theorists and writers in each of these periods of U.S. history.

In that talk I went on to cite the writings and debates of Black intellectuals of the nineteenth century who speak to some aspects of what we are struggling with now. One of these intellectuals was Frederick Douglass, and the question I focused on in my discussion of his work was: What, in its essence, is the American project, and is that project capacious enough to extend full equality and dignity to all American

[2] The Society for Classical Learning is dedicated to K-12 education, but many professors speak at their conferences. The full talk is available at the following link until October 2020. https://sclconference.com/drawing-from-the-black-intellectual-tradition-in-our-classical-curricula/

[3] The 1860s featured an often-neglected civil rights movement among Blacks in Louisiana—many of them French-speaking. They founded Black daily newspapers and though many of them were free people of color, fought for the freedom and rights of all Black people. For more on this 1860s movement see: Bell, Caryn Cossé. 1997. *Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana 1718-1868.* Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. And Bruce, Clint. 2020. *Afro-Creole Poetry in French from Louisiana's Radical Civil War-Era Newspapers: A Bilingual Edition*. New Orleans, LA: Historic New Orleans Collection.

[4] The 1890s in New Orleans were equally militant, with groups launching legal attacks against racial segregation, culminating in the Plessy case which was decided in 1896. In a sign of how lamentable our historical education is in the U.S., very few of my native New Orleanian students realize that this pre-cursor of the 1950s and 60s movement—complete with its own transportation trial cases similar to that of Rosa Parks—occurred in New Orleans in the historic community of Tremé. For more on this see: Medley, Keith Weldon. 2003. *We as Freemen:Plessy v. Ferguson*. New Orleans, LA: Pelican Press. And Kelley, Blair L.M. 2010. Right to Ride:Street Car Boycotts and African American Citizenship in the Era of Plessy v. Ferguson. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Medley is a local New Orleans historian and his work is important in that it provides a New Orleans-centric account of the movement that provides a strong grounding in local culture and experience that are not as well communicated in standard scholarly accounts. The Kelley book places the Plessy case into dialogue with organizing that was occurring at the same time in other parts of the country.

[5] The 1960s movement needs, I am sure, no additional context as it is reasonably well-known in the U.S. and has acquired international renown that has inspired similar movements across the world.

people? During the nineteenth century a variant of this question was an issue of vibrant debate among writers and activists fighting for the emancipation and full equality of Black people. That variant was: *Are the foundations of the United States inherently oppressive to and exclusionary of Black people, or are they robust enough to include everyone?*

Douglass changed his view on how to answer this question across the course of his long, esteemed life as an orator and writer. He began by answering with a firm "yes"—the very foundations of the U.S. are inherently oppressive to and exclusionary of Black people—but in 1851 made a very public change to claim that, although the full fruits of the American project had not yet become available to Black people, the American project *itself*—as expressed in its founding documents, rather than in the practices and motivations of the document writers—is capacious enough to include everyone on equal terms of dignity, respect, and equality.

I concluded the first half of the SCL talk by referencing the 1619 Project of the *New York Times* and advising that attendees consult this work while at the same time consulting the writings of an opposing group of Black intellectuals who have formed the 1776 Unites project in answer to the 1619 Project. This debate, barely a year old, is a reprise of the debate that Douglass and others were involved in more than one hundred fifty years ago.

Not surprisingly for the historically-minded among us, some of our current debates and dissensions have quite direct links to material objects erected in the past. Here I have in mind the controversy surrounding the Emancipation Memorials in Washington D.C. and Boston.[6] These memorials show a kneeling/rising enslaved man crouched in front of Abraham Lincoln who is positioned as his emancipator. Funds for the original memorial in Washington D.C. were raised by recently emancipated Blacks and Frederick Douglass delivered the keynote oration for the event of its unveiling. It had been reported by others that Douglass did not like the subservient bearing of the emancipated man, but just this summer, while reflecting on the current controversy, two historians unearthed an 1876 news article written by Douglass himself just days after the unveiling.[7] In it, he directly expresses his concerns and argues that the memorial space should include other visual representations in order to more fully tell the story of emancipation and the active role Black people took in that struggle.

In this, and many other ways, the frustration, anger, and cries for justice we hear today, and the often acrimonious debates that go along with them, are echoes of these earlier questions and debates that have remained unresolved. But how many of us, how many of our students, are aware of these past debates? How many of our students have had an education that encourages and equips them to routinely read, consider, and discuss historical texts and ideas that are important to understand in and of themselves but that are also crucial to forming a foundation for thinking carefully and conscientiously about what ails us today? I don't believe that I am far off in supposing that very few of our students—and very few of the faculty who teach them, outside, of course, of committed CHS faculty—have made a practice of engaging in such careful, systematic reading and discussion of historical texts and classic debates that form the foundations—for good and ill—of U.S. society.

I engage in this lengthy introduction to my discussion of CHS and its possible futures as a

[6] Boston leaders have decided to remove their copy of the monument while the future of the D.C. monument is still under consideration as of this writing.

[7] See Jonathan White and Scott Sandage's piece, "What Frederick Douglass Had to Say About Monuments": https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-frederick-douglass-had-say-about-monuments-180975225/, Retrieved July 13, 2020.

way of concretely illustrating why our work is so important and how it can touch and mobilize our students and everyday people beyond the academy when framed in a way that is relevant and engaging. I also begin with this opening because the very event I was speaking at—the Society for Classical Learning—provides just one example of many opportunities for enlarging the audience for CHS work and modes of thinking. I was thrilled to see how many people attended that session, and the discussion afterward was quite energizing. Many were hungry to hear of the writings of Black intellectuals and to connect the relevance of their pioneering work to the events we are grappling with in the present. The audience grew even more once the talk was posted to social media, and again I was surprised by how closely diverse listeners engaged with the ideas and how thirsty they seemed to be for them. I have to say, it was personally very encouraging, and a far cry from the sometimes moribund academic "audiences" I have had at professional conferences where I would be unusually lucky to have thirty somewhat interested attendees. There is something energizing and mobilizing about reaching non-academic audiences that are excited to engage with history and ideas that have the power to help us think and see in new ways.

This leads me to some concrete proposals I think we should consider for expanding CHS audiences and scholarship.

1) Encourage the re-vamping of one or two core sociology courses in the major and minor that take a "history of the present" approach to understanding current social issues and problems. Such a course would also be ideal to fulfill general education requirements in social science for universities that have such a requirement. In fact, it would be ideal to offer such courses both to majors and non-majors in order to spread exposure to a "history of the present" approach. This re-vamping could be done with a Social Problems class, with an introductory class on race, or gender, and so on. Just as "writing intensive" course sections have long been an option for core courses, whether in or outside of the English department, we can establish CHS-inflected core courses within the sociology major and minor that are either voluntary or required. Such courses will be compelling to the extent that they do an outstanding job of framing the issues and showing the personal and intellectual value of exploring the deep historical roots and echoes of many current issues.

2) Create training and mentoring programs for our most promising undergraduate and graduate students, whatever their current intellectual interests, that invite them to incorporate CHS into their study and their way of thinking about the world. Here is an outline of what I have in mind:

*** Let students know** that they can apply to become part of a mentoring program that will deepen their scholarship, provide professional networks, provide travel support to conferences, and encourage them with publication. Some of these students should be advanced undergraduates and others should be graduate students in their first couple of years who still have room to shift or historically deepen their research focus.

*** Students accepted into the program** would do and receive the following:

- For those not currently engaged in CHS research, they agree to explore some aspect of the historical dimension of their research project. So if, for example, the student is currently doing research on the children of single parent families, they could develop a piece of their research which compares today's discourses, programs and policies regarding children of single parent families with those from an earlier historical period as a way of exploring continuity and change on this issue. Similarly, if they're doing work on mass incarceration, they could add a historical component to the research that

allows for meaningful comparison. This invites students who are not currently doing CHS to explore the benefits of developing a historical dimension in their research. Participating faculty would advise them on the best ways to develop this historical dimension. Even if these students don't end up focusing their research on CHS in the future, they will hopefully have developed a deep appreciation for historical work and if they go on to become faculty they should be CHS friendly. Having more CHS friendly faculty is just about as important as developing more CHS scholars.

- For those students already engaged in CHS, entry to the mentoring program will support the work they are already doing.
- Participating students would attend regular meetings with other students and faculty doing work in CHS . This could be a weekly or bi-weekly brownbag or some other kind of forum.
- They would be expected to submit to ASA and/or SSHA and would receive travel support to attend. Ideally, there would be a few different universities implementing this kind of program at the same time, and their participating students would all gather together at SSHA for a special dinner or reception for networking with other participating students and faculty from across the country (and other countries, potentially). This is similar to the 2019 gathering at SSHA organized by Ann Orloff and Julia Adams, but with students and their faculty mentors.
- Faculty mentors would help students develop their papers into publishable form and guide them with advice about where to submit for publication. Or, in order to help spread out the work, faculty like me who are in small liberal arts colleges unable to afford such a program, can also be part of a larger network of CHS faculty that help to mentor students and read and provide feedback on their papers. Rough and edited drafts of conference papers and article submissions would be regularly presented and critiqued at the brown bag meetings. Again, further-flung faculty mentors can also be part of such gatherings via Zoom or other web services during and even after the COVID-19 distancing measures.

The general idea is to provide the students with the methodological skills, professional networks, mentoring, and financial support that would make it easy and attractive to become part of CHS. Special effort should be devoted to attracting the best students from diverse backgrounds and research interests. This kind of program would provide ready-made networks with faculty, both within and outside of their own institutions and social support with peers at their own university and beyond.

3) Expand our imagination about the audience for CHS work. As I outlined above, the SCL conference turned out to be a fantastic outlet for a CHS-inflected talk, and I reached so many more people than I typically reach through a professional academic talk. The Society for Classical Learning is a natural audience for me because I have been involved in some aspect of classical education for nearly ten years. Other CHSers will have their own natural non-professional audiences with whom they can engage through relevant writing and talks that help to cultivate historical consciousness outside of academia.

It is my fervent hope that we invest in each of these kinds of initiatives. The first and the third are poised to reach the greatest number of people, but the second is crucial for the creation of new generations of scholars with the expertise to do CHS scholarship characterized by the excellence, dedication, and passion that will spur even more people—in and outside of the academy—to cultivate and exercise historical consciousness that aids us in understanding our past, informing our present, and helping to shape our future.

Organized Confusion, Or, How To Knit a Quilt

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It is an honor to respond to Julia Adams and Ann Shola Orloff's "CHS at a Crossroads?" This is not only because we participated in the dinner at SSHA in 2019 they describe, or because our own work (Mayrl and Wilson 2020, 2016) focuses on the question of what comparative-historical sociology is or could be, but also simply because both of our intellectual careers have matured under the aegis of *Remaking Modernity* (2005).

One of the things that distinguished *Remaking Modernity* from other noteworthy and useful volumes (Bonnell and Hunt 1999; and Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) of the same era was its steadfast refusal to offer the kind of tightly bound, definitive program that both other volumes (each in their own way) offered. Instead, as now, they insist on a radical pluralism, to the point that "we [don't] agree on exactly what unites us" (p. 4 above).

With Adams and Orloff, we take that disagreement as a fundamentally good thing. We are at a moment of renewal, and deep conversations about our collective enterprise as CHS' self-imposed intellectual duopoly of "the state" and "capitalism" has eroded can only be salutary. In this essay, we seek to supplement Adams and Orloff's outline, with a special focus on various structures of coherence that could potentially provide a shared basis for comparative-historical work. But we also stress two notes of caution somewhat more strongly than Adams and Orloff do. First, a running theme in our discussion is the regrettable decay of the academic political economy that sustains comparative-historical work. To put it bluntly (and to echo the evocative metaphor introduced in *Remaking Modernity* and amplified by Monica Prasad's essay years ago), in times of belt-tightening, few departments can afford Panerai watches or Prada bags (i.e., comparative-historical scholars), and we ought to be aware of that emerging scarcity. Second, we also emphasize how each potential structure of coherence introduces a set of interlocking trade-offs. In other words, if opportunities in comparative-historical may be shrinking in some respects, in others it suffers from "problems of excess" (Abbott 2014) of which we need to be mindful.

Substantive Coherence, Or, What's Modernity, Again?

One promising structure of coherence for comparative-historical is substantive: we could choose to focus on one *thing* and approach it from a wide variety of methods, theories, and causal accounts. There are few more capacious concepts in sociology than "modernity", and Adams and Orloff correctly note that it continues to be an organizing "umbrella" for many CHS-ers.

We both substantively focus on facets of modernity (corruption and empire, and secularization, respectively), so our note of caution is not aimed at the choice of phenomenon *per se*. Rather, we simply note that orienting ourselves around a phenomenon in the first place implies a choice: either expand our definition of the phenomenon until it is so inclusive as to be ambiguous; or impose stricter boundaries on it at the inevitable cost of excluding excellent work.

Canonical Coherence, Or, Is [Insert Your Pick Here] A Historical Sociologist?

One (perhaps dubious) virtue of comparative-historical sociology in the immediate aftermath of its 1970s rebaptism is that it depended on a relatively limited theoretical canon–it was more or less explicitly a synthesis of Marx and Weber, and shortly supplied "new classics" that were then targets of (and cited in) fierce empirical, methodological, and theoretical debates in the field (think of Skocpol 1979; and Tilly 1992). And, as Adams and Orloff correctly note (and as *Remaking Modernity*

helped recognize and celebrate), the story of the 1990s and 2000s in historical sociology is partly the "return of the repressed" members of the canon. Indeed, admirable projects are in the midst of broadening the canon still further to include neglected scholars like W.E.B. DuBois, Orlando Patterson, and Ibn Khaldun.

But the problem of excess presents itself: as the canon expands, it eventually reaches a breaking point, in which the sheer scope of problems discussed, arguments made, and evidence invoked risks swamping even the fastest intellectual digestion. And similarly, as the size of the canon grows, so too does the burden of creating a dialogue among the alternative paradigms, methods, and intellectual styles it expresses.

Analytic Architectures, Or, Why Didn't They Buy My Argument?

If modernity provides a potential substance, and an intellectual canon (of whatever structure) supplies an intelligible background, just how are those elements invoked in a given project? Here there is (we think; see Mayrl and Wilson 2020) a neglected dimension: analytic architectures, which are styles by which authors bring theory, evidence, and argument together to make them intelligible to a given audience (anticipated or actual). These architectures aren't reducible to either "method" or "rhetorical polish" but instead supply a crucial framework through which authors construct their arguments, and by which readers may make sense of them. (See our other piece in this issue of *Trajectories*.)

But, as with the option of centering a specific phenomenon or delimiting a canon, attempting to organize comparative-historical sociology around an analytic architecture would produce tensions. This is not only because in contemporary comparative historical, there are at least four of them (and to eliminate some or most would be the equivalent of intellectual self-amputation!) but also because to organize around a single style of intellectual organization would be to invite sclerosis. Breakthroughs, after all, come from testing boundaries.

Invisible Colleges, Or, Chatting over Cheese in a Hotel Ballroom

Fourth, comparative-historical sociology could be bound together less by a central phenomenon, a theoretical canon, or a style of intellectual presentation, but instead by the fact that we're all wonderful people who are a joy to be around. Indeed, a long tradition in the sociology of science emphasizes concrete "invisible colleges" (Price 1965; Crane 1972) of colleagues reading each other's work, setting intellectual agendas, and mentoring and developing new generations of scholarly talent. Happily, comparative-historical sociologists have put extraordinary work into this dimension over the last several years, to the point that there is an increasingly robust and self-conscious mentoring and intellectual-exchange network forming in the field.

Yet this too comes with pitfalls to be mindful of. For one thing, whether by sheer happenstance (for instance, within national sociologies or because certain phenomena are emphasized for study over others), or by formal or informal exclusion (for instance, through racial or religious biases embedded in the structures of academia) some scholars who would potentially be brilliant contributors to comparative-historical sociology might be left out in the cold. An invisible college approach demands that we take affirmative steps to make a "big tent" real by reaching out to scholars doing comparative-historical work who may not currently identify, or be identified by us, as doing "comparative-historical" work. Second, relying on an invisible college makes it even more incumbent upon comparative-historical sociologists to be as open and inclusive as possible, since different backgrounds beget different levels of comfort in concrete interactions. (In other words, it can be much less awkward to stand in that hotel ballroom as a white man than as a person of color if most other people in that room are also white!) Third,

establishing the kinds of concrete connections that constitute the invisible college are time-consuming and expensive; unless comparative-historical sociology is to become a strictly elite enterprise, we would do well to mitigate such risks.

Pregnant Concepts, Or, "Come Up With A Name For It"

A final structure of coherence in comparative-historical sociology is its concepts. One (often neglected) dimension of what gave comparative-historical sociology its energy during its renaissance was the proliferation of empirically productive concepts. Witness the state's "Janus Face" (Skocpol 1985), thinking of state formation as "organized crime" (Tilly 1985), or invoking the effects of culture and meaning in explanation (Sewell 1992). While none of these were quite theories themselves, they nevertheless supplied, on the one hand, enormous analytic leverage to make new and interesting arguments, and, on the other, a ligature to create unexpected scholarly dialog. (Indeed, one could read the "modernity" in *Remaking Modernity* less as a call to organize around the *substance* of modernity and more around the *concept*.)

Of course, there be dragons here, too. Any effort to create a small inventory of such concepts as an organizing groundwork for historical sociology risks unintentionally sloughing off useful, even critical, concepts to the dust heap. But more importantly, the concepts themselves would have to be calibrated to be useful "buzzwords" (Davis 2008) that provide empirical productivity *and* enough conceptual elasticity to create scholarly dialog *without* stretching out beyond intellectual use.

Discussion, Or, We Don't Have A Good Answer, Either

As this whirlwind tour through comparative-historical sociology's structures of coherence might suggest, we stand today at less of a crossroads, than on a variety of islands, separated from other small communities but still seeking to federate into something larger. Our point in the discussion here is not to emphasize the downsides of any given approach to providing coherence to the field, but instead to stress that choices made about one structure of coherence have implications for the others. For instance, choosing to include or exclude one work from comparative-historical's canon might invite or alienate a group of scholars from our intellectual dialog, might supply or exclude important concepts, might centralize or marginalize phenomena, and so on.

While we do not have any programmatic recommendation of what to do, we do have two closing thoughts. First, as simple prophylaxis, it seems better for any discussion about comparative-historical sociology's future to take place with an eye towards these structures of coherence; it is better as scholars to be as reflexive as we can along as many dimensions as possible than not. Second, as we move forward, we should keep in mind that comparative-historical has no essential "essence" and there is good reason for thinking that any such search for one is futile; as Richard Rorty wrote of a pragmatist approach to ethics, improving comparative-historical is likely to be more like sewing together a very large, elaborate, polychrome quilt, than like getting a clearer vision of something true and deep (Rorty 1999, 86).

For us, the richness of the quilt that emerges from this process depends on the variety of materials available at the start. We suggest including as many as possible.

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CHS Between Three Epistemic Fronts

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The crisis Ann Orloff and Julia Adams have presciently identified in Comparative and Historical Sociology is, I believe, the product of a broader set of crises in the social sciences. I would like to take their cue and consider how CHS is being buffeted from multiple sides by several shifting epistemic fronts, and to consider how we can rethink the CHS syllabus in order to grapple with some of these shifts.

First, I think it could be helpful to revisit the "waves" of historical sociology identified in *Remaking Modernity* (2005) – a book which remains a central point of reference in the field – and to consider the epistemic politics of the first, second and third waves to help us diagnose where the field is now.

One reading of the "waves" is that CHS has long struggled with its relationship to epistemic politics, with political-epistemic shifts resulting in the production of new waves. Relatedly, the waves reflect different phases of a distinctly American subfield which has also been hitched

to the rise, transformations, and now arguably decline of American world hegemony.

The importation of Max Weber as a "classical" theorist (see Connell 1997, and Burawoy 2016, for critical histories) enabled a first-wave CHS figure like Barrington Moore Jr. to identify positivist rules of causation, balancing the specificity of historical conjunctures with broader generalizations about historical process. Yet these generalizations and rules of causation were hitched to the ideological project of US Cold War dominance. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* was penned at the height of US power, with its central variables and correlations focusing on the rise of capitalism, democracy, and authoritarianism. The book traces the path to the good (capitalist and democratic) life versus the path to unfreedom.

The second wave, as argued in the expansive introduction to *Remaking Modernity* (RM), was undoubtedly more critical of US hegemony and world capitalism. This was the product, in the words of Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Orloff, of a "rebellious" generation determined to infuse Marxist analysis into CHS, but one which had difficulty acknowledging other socio-political processes and theoretical-political movements like feminism, queer studies, and critical race studies – all of which were defining features of 1968 and its aftermath. Taking Charles Tilly as a paradigmatic figure, by the 1980s, some of the second wave had escaped back into scientism, with an emphasis on "big" structures and processes, returning to a Weberian ambivalence, or putatively neutral, engagement with politics.

The first and second waves of CHS had historically insisted on the field's positivism to stake out its place in sociology, and to stake out its distinction from the discipline of history, but also its relational kindred-ness with the positivist turn in political science. This political aloofness is perhaps what has lent the field the aura of being an elite or niche subfield, a rarified wine appreciated by those with the carefully trained pallet. It has also made CHS hard to teach at the undergraduate level, a longstanding weakness of the field.

By the time RM was published in 2005, an epistemological and political shift had occurred in the American university, and the "third wave" of CHS reflected this shift. Taking seriously the political and intellectual challenges of feminism, queer studies, postcolonial critique, and critical race studies, RM pointed to the intellectual flourishing, but also dispersion of, the third wave.

These intellectual and political currents unleashed yet another crisis, of concern to Ann Orloff and Julia Adams in their current call to arms. Here I will try to continue the genealogy of CHS from where RM left off, although the editors already had a strong premonition in 2005 of the trends to follow. My Central European University colleague, Jean-Louis Fabiani, argues that the rise of "studies" has severely challenged, if not undermined, the social sciences (see Monteil and Romerio, 2017, for a review). The studies have entailed an intellectual and political revolution in the organization of the social sciences and humanities. Gender studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, and critical race studies, are structured, by definition, by their proximity to political projects and social movements. But, they are methodologically and epistemologically chaotic, and have an almost imperial ability to infiltrate the disciplines. They move quickly, sometimes assess the author as moral actor as much as the content and quality of her scholarship, and are highly internally contentious.

Some sub-waves of CHS have emigrated from the types of vocational commitments outlined by Michael Burawoy in his 2004 ASA presidential address (see Burawoy 2005), shifting from a professional to a critical orientation enriched by the studies. To

somewhat overstate the trajectory of CHS waves, CHS traveled from its putatively apolitical, but US-hegemonic, social-scientific historicism to a third wave which wrestles more explicitly with balancing political commitments, insists on a sustained critique of power, while still trying to uphold some positivist principles of social scientific research. This third wave should have finally aligned CHS with other subfields in sociology - and to some degree it has. And yet this move has come as a consequence of, and with all the consequences of, the infiltration of studies into the social sciences, further fragmenting CHS and some other sociological subfields positioned at a frontier trading zone with the textual humanities.

On the other end of the political spectrum, these transformations have come at a time when these very studies have come under attack by conservative and radical rightwing movements, and at a time when the standing of the university, broadly speaking, is being contested. In Europe, for example, there has been a full-scale backlash against "gender theory" (see Geva 2019). The Trump administration's inattention in the US to sustaining university and research-life, and even frontal attacks on American universities in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis point to the declining position of the university as part and parcel of the projection of American world power. There probably can be no more Seymour Martin Lipsets, but also no new Immanuel Wallersteins and Theda Skocpols, in this new configuration. The Cold War, and the social scientist's place in it, is over. Ann Orloff and Julia Adams have brought our attention to the fact that CHS is at a crossroads at a moment of broad political-epistemic crisis, a crisis which is far from over and which is playing out on a world stage.

This has occurred alongside yet a third epistemic transformation underway by 2005, which is the generation of masses of information and data, which many social scientists are now mining to produce knowledge which moves quickly but is sociologically thin. Facebook or Twitter are information landscapes with a flattened but technicolour social space. They tell us little about some of the classic "slow thinking" concerns of CHS, such as the social composition of fascist movements, or the conditions that give rise to patrimonial state-making and political alliances (see Charrad and Adams 2011).

Teaching as Theory and Practice?

Some might respond that these problems are bigger than any single subfield or group of scholars could overcome. But Ann Orloff and Julia Adams have called for action, and I doubt that any reader of this forum thinks CHS scholars should raise their hands and give up.

One response could be that that CHS should mine its first- and second-wave legacy and return to big structures, abstract processes, and focus on causality. But, in my view, CHS then does not pass a basic test with which it has long struggled, which is relevance to undergraduate teaching, and our link to the broader sociological project which is also Marxian, DuBoisian, and I would add Luxemburgian - that is, one that furnishes critical tools to imagine the good society.

Michael Burawoy insisted in his 2016 essay in *Contemporary Sociology* that the classroom is a public. Buroway's primary concern stems from the marketization of the university, and the danger of a Weberian political neutrality and an associated escape into deep social-scientism, which would only contribute to the threat to the university by raising the white flag and insisting on scientific neutrality. Our problems, meanwhile, have only grown. The very legitimacy of the social sciences is at risk by more than market fundamentalism. Having weathered Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's attack on Central European University, a university specializing in the social sciences, and a university which is therefore in the midst of moving from Budapest to Vienna, I worry a good deal about the future of the social

sciences. Orbán did not only target the CEU, but has sought to destroy the social sciences and humanities in Hungary by vastly increasing tuition fees and requiring research institutes to prove economic contribution and technological innovation to merit state funding. This is marketization as a means to another end, marketization mobilized to destroy critical social sciences and consolidate a new hegemony.

There are many implications to this, but for the sake of brevity, and for the sake of proposing some immediately feasible responses, I will focus on teaching as one line of action. It is the least prestige-producing of the strategies, but one which is crucial for sustaining the social, intellectual, and generational relevance of the field. If we accept Burawoy's premise that our classroom is a public, it's a start.

I propose three courses, each operating at a different level of epistemic struggle. The first two courses I am proposing do not precisely focus on comparative and historical sociology, but would invite non-specialist students to think historically as sociologists. The third course proposal is a modified version of how to teach specialized comparative and historical sociology to advanced PhD students.

1. At the undergraduate level: I propose a course which would be clumsily called something like, "How to Think Slowly as a Sociologist." This could survey central axes of sociological concern, such as class, race, capitalism, gender, sexuality, labour, the state, and so on, and which would not focus on the tools of CHS, nor debates within CHS, but rather would pair presentist sociological readings, or popular magazine essays or news articles, with CHS scholarship.

For example, pairing a news article on political polarization on Twitter or TikTok, with Mabel Berezin's or Dylan Riley's scholarship on interwar fascism, could have a powerful cumulative effect by transmitting to undergraduate students that there are deep socio-historical processes at play in the present moment, and it is not sufficient to examine quick sources of data or social media debates to comprehend the depths of current events. A somewhat more challenging strategy for a more advanced undergraduate course could be to also pair readings from the textual humanities with CHS scholarship, such as excerpts from Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*, with a reading like Vrushali Patil's work on heterosexuality and imperialism. The goal is not to teach CHS as a field, but teach the value of slow thinking by reading historical-sociological analysis.

2. "Historical Thinking" as a graduate course for non-specialist students: Here I am directly inspired by Jean-Louis Fabiani, my above-mentioned colleague at CEU. When I was a Department Chair at CEU, I realized that graduate students in my department have little interest in a course which explicitly focuses on historical sociology. The reasons for this are complex and would merit an essay in itself, but in sum, there is little historical sociology in Europe. I decided to experiment with our curriculum, and proposed to Jean-Louis Fabiani that he teach a course called "Historical Thinking" as a graduate course which advances the argument that all social sciences, including sociology, are historical. Causation, verstehen, comparison, understanding process and change, and all forms of contextualization must draw from some conception of history in order to transcend mere snapshot description. The course is considered challenging, but has been a great success, and also draws students from other departments. Fabiani's course argues for a coherence to the social sciences through its alliance to history. It is not a typical CHS course, but mines the foundations of sociology as a discipline that was always closely aligned with history, not just through the figure of Max Weber, but tracing other lineages such as from Durkheim to Bourdieu. We could certainly add or create lineages, such as from Rosa Luxemburg to Simone de Beauvoir to Ann Orloff's corpus. Such a course could convey an

engagement with post-1968 epistemic shifts, while also insisting on an overarching historical episteme that undergirds the best of sociology.

3. Rethinking the advanced, specialized CHS syllabus: I advocate teaching PhD students specializing in CHS to consider the history of its wave-formations within the broader epistemic politics which produced each wave, and which the waves have reproduced or challenged. As a student close to completing her comparative and historical PhD dissertation when RM was published in 2005, the waves thesis of RM was deeply illuminating, but, in retrospect, I came to take for granted the fact of a field with a wave-like configuration. Yet, the waves are an extraordinary feature of a robust field which is capable of change and self-reflection. We should not teach the waves as a chronology of events coming and going, but teach them as good comparative and historical sociologists ought to, considering the conditions that give rise to their emergence and transformation. Students seeking advanced specialization should understand that they are part of not just of an academic career project, but of a political and epistemic project. This, I believe, is one of the unique qualities of CHS, parts of which have dramatically shifted from a comfy gentleman's club nestled in the elite American university at the height of US hegemony, to a sociologically diverse and politically engaged field during a period when the American university is embattled.

CHS cannot generate a vision of what is next without thinking about the epistemic politics that have always shaped it, and without considering the epistemic politics in which the field is currently embedded. Perhaps CHS can forge a fourth wave under new conditions, positioned now between at least three epistemic zones, if not three fronts.

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Essay

Black Lives Matter, CHS, and the Current Moment

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For many Black people in the United States, George Floyd's killing by a Minneapolis police officer on a Monday evening in late May must have sparked feelings of deep and genuine outrage.

But such feelings could hardly have been new, and they must have been accompanied by a wearying sense of *déjà vu*. Scores of unarmed Black men and women had been slain by police officers and would-be vigilantes since 2013, when a Florida jury's refusal to convict Trayvon Martin's killer of second-degree murder or manslaughter fueled the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. In the eyes of many Black people, Floyd's killing must have seemed like the latest entry in a lengthy catalog of indignities, atrocities, and tragedies that together formed only the most obvious manifestations of anti-Blackness in American society.

As much as it was a source of outrage for many Black people, Floyd's killing also surely evoked unsettling memories of their own troubling encounters with the police, and it must have served as a reminder of pained conversations that many of them have had about how to behave around police officers—conversations with their sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, aunts and uncles, cousins and friends.

George Floyd's killing held a different significance for many non-Black people in the United States—and especially for many White people.

It could hardly have been a visceral *reminder* of police brutality to millions of non-Black Americans. The problem had barely registered in their awareness of the world. For many of them, it functioned more like a graphic *introduction* to police brutality and a primer on how senseless, cruel, and infuriating it could be. One of their first lessons concerned the drastic way that official accounts could differ from what body-camera footage or bystander videos might later show.

An early statement from the Minneapolis police claimed that Floyd had "physically resisted officers" and was "suffering medical distress." But a bystander video posted to Facebook conspicuously diverged from the official account, which made no mention of the fact that a White police officer had been casually kneeling on Floyd's neck for several minutes as he gasped repeatedly, "I can't breathe." The officer did not stop even after it was clear that Floyd had been subdued. Shortly before he lost consciousness, Floyd called out for his mother. Not long after, he was dead.[8]

The video's revelations were a clap of thunder for many non-Black people, and consciences that had slumbered through the deaths of Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, John Crawford III, Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Sandra Brown, Philando Castile, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and dozens of others, now found themselves jolted awake.

Beyond the unusually shocking nature of the cellphone footage, there are many reasons why George Floyd's killing might have mattered to a new majority of Americans when all of the killings that went before it did not.

In the *New York Times Magazine*, Nikole Hannah-Jones notes that years of "unrelenting organizing by the Black Lives Matter movement" were a major reason why. Indeed, from the moment in 2012 when Marcus Anthony Hunter devised the hashtag *#BlackLivesMatter*, to the subsequent year when Alicia Garza posted her "love letter to black folks" on Facebook, to the acts of protest and disobedience that gripped Ferguson, Missouri and then New York City in 2014, to the surprising 2016 declaration of Rahm Emanuel's Police Accountability Task Force that the Chicago Police Department's "own data gives validity to the widely held belief the police have no regard for the sanctity of life when it comes to people of color," Black Lives Matters has led the way.[9]

BLM has been far from the only voice calling for the dignity and humanity of Black people to receive full recognition. There have been other actors who have also demanded a transformation of the justice system. But it is hard to deny that BLM has played a key role in touching off a cascade of interrelated changes in various dimensions of our culture, politics, and society. I would argue that it has made police brutality a policy issue among political elites, and that it has forced elected officials at all levels of government to take a stance. I would further argue that at the level of the mass public it has kept the issue in the forefront of the public imagination at a time when our attention

[8] On the circumstances of Floyd's killing, see Audra D.S. Burch and John Eligon, "Bystander Videos of George Floyd and Others Are Policing the Police," *New York Times*, May 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/george-floyd-minneapolis-police.html (accessed July 15, 2020). See also "Video shows man dying under officer's knee," *Minneapolis StarTribune*, May 26, 2020, https://video.startribune.com/video-shows-man-dying-under-officer-s-knee/570780382/ (accessed July 15, 2020).

[9] Nikole Hannah-Jones, "What is Owed," *New York Times Magazine*, June 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparations-slavery.html (accessed July 9, 2020); Marcus Anthony Hunter, "How does L.A.'s racial past resonate now?" *Los Angeles Times*, June 8, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/books/story/2020-06-08/six-writers-on-l-a-and-black-lives-matter (accessed July 9, 2020); Jamilab King, "#blacklivesmatter: How three friends turned a spontaneous Facebook post into a global phenomenon," *California Sunday Magazine*, March 2015, https://stories.californiasunday.com/2015-03-01/black-lives-matter/ (accessed July 9, 2020); Chicago Police Accountability Task Force, Recommendations for Reform – Executive Summary (April 2016), p. 8, https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_Executive_Summary_4_13_16-1.pdf (accessed July 9, 2020), cited in Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, "Five Years Later, Do Black Lives Matter?" *Jacobin*, September 30, 2019, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/black-lives-matter-laquan-mcdonald-mike-brown-eric-garner (accessed on July 9, 2020).

itself has become more of a commodity than ever.

Perhaps most profoundly, however, BLM-led activism around the country may have contributed vitally to the beginnings of a fundamental change in the consciousness and attitudes of many non-Black people. The change was revealed by the May and June protests in such a way that some Black people who I know have reported the feeling of being seen, heard, and understood for the first time in a long time. This feeling, in turn, comes not from a change in Black people but from a growing capacity of many non-Black people to identify with Black people—not just Black athletes and Black rappers but "normal," non-celebrity Black people. In ever greater numbers, non-Black people and especially White people look at the killing of a *Black man* like George Floyd and ask themselves questions that had simply not occurred to ask in the past. What would I have felt in the last moments of my life if I were him? How would I feel about what happened to him if he were my brother, son, or father? What must it be like to worry every time someone I love sets foot outside that an encounter between them and the police could go fatally off the rails? In a sense, what BLM's activism has done is help to precipitate a *moment of disenchantment with the racial status quo* among growing numbers of non-Black Americans. It gradually seeded skepticism of the odious notion that the violence perpetrated by the police against Black people was simply a case of just deserts. At the same time, it rendered increasingly legible the myriad ways in which police brutality and other expressions of anti-Blackness were actually the consequence of our collective political choices. To borrow the words of Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, BLM's mobilization over time has led to a piercing of the "prevailing common sense about our society."[10]

There can be little denying that the outbreak of COVID-19 formed an indispensable context in which the innumerable changes wrought by BLM could potentially take effect. If it makes sense to think of BLM's mobilization over time as gradually potentiating the possibility of a sea change in public concern about police brutality and anti-Blackness, then the onset of the pandemic was the final ingredient that made the social situation in many parts of the country ripe for a triggering event.

The pandemic has mattered in myriad ways.

Hannah-Jones observes that millions of Americans had been suddenly and unexpectedly thrown into a state of precarity and hardship, and the scales fell from their eyes. Only during a time of pandemic did it dawn on many non-Black people on lockdown at home that delivery drivers, grocery clerks, and many other "essential," low-wage workers were Black and Latinx. Only during a time of pandemic did many Americans become keenly tuned into the behavior of the police, who they witnessed "beating up white women, pushing down an elderly white man and throwing tear gas and shooting rubber bullets at demonstrators exercising their democratic right to peacefully protest." If they would unapologetically perpetrate such blatant abuses against White people in the presence of a thousand iPhones, what were they doing to Black people when there were no phones around?[11]

Opal Tometi, who co-founded the Black Lives Matter movement with Alicia Garza and Patrisse Cullors, offers a concurring judgment in an interview recently featured in *The New Yorker*. Tometi highlights the sociology of emotion behind the shift. For weeks, "we have been sitting in our homes, navigating the pandemic, dealing with loved ones being sick, dealing with a great of fear and concern about what they day and the future will hold." In more settled times, feelings of empathy and concerns

[10] Taylor, "Five Years Later."

[11] Nikole Hannah-Jones, "What is Owed."

about fairness might have been successfully kept at arm's length, but such sentiments were now close to the surface and hard to ignore. The collective ordeal brought on by the pandemic has made many of us "more tender or sensitive to what is going on." Tometi also offers a more practical reason. The pandemic has given people the opportunity to act on their newfound feelings. Many people who would have been at work "now have time to go to a protest or rally."[12]

It mattered especially that the pandemic happened more than three years into the presidency of Donald J. Trump. Has there been a modern American president whose electoral success has been more centrally and explicitly predicated on the status anxieties of downwardly mobile white Americans than Trump? Has there been a modern American president who has more eagerly stoked the very anxieties that got him elected in the first place? Has there been a period in modern American political history when ideas about race have so sharply differentiated the electoral coalitions of the two major parties?[13]

To a degree that is exceptional in modern times, race is front and center in American politics, and Trump's openly racist appeals and bald prejudice have led significant numbers of non-Black people to see that anti-Black and anti-Brown racism of the most explicit kind is not some dying atavism of a bygone time or a figment of the liberal imagination. As anticipated by Christopher S. Parker in a 2016 article in *The American Prospect* and recently highlighted by Dana Milbank, Trump's "clear bigotry" has rendered it "impossible" for a non-trivial subset of "whites to deny the existence of racism in America," and it has encouraged them to "honestly confront the persistence of racism as never before."[14]

By the evening that George Floyd was killed in 2020, Americans had been watching for more than three years as Trump smeared Mexican Americans and praised neo-Nazis as "very fine people," rarely seeming to pay a political price for his slurs and effrontery. If any non-black Americans were slapping their foreheads in disbelief at his conduct in the initial years of his presidency, they were largely accepting of

[12] Isaac Chotiner, "A Black Lives Matter Co-Founder Explains Why This Time Is Different," *The New Yorker*, June 3, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-black-lives-matter-co-founder-explains-why-this-time-is-different (accessed July 14, 2020).

[13] On the status-based nature of Trump's appeal, see Christopher S. Parker and Matt Barreto, "The Great White Hope: Polarization and Threat in the Age of Trump," in *Democratic Resilience: Can the United States Withstand Rising Polarization*, edited by Robert C. Liberman, Suzanne Mettler, and Kenneth M. Roberts (forthcoming manuscript, on file with author); Christopher S. Parker, *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Diana Mutz, "Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, V115, N9 (2018): E4330-E4339. For research that stresses economic factors, such as exposure to trade with China, see David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaeh Majlesi, "A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure on the 2016 Presidential Election," working paper, https://economics.mit.edu/files/12418, accessed July 14, 2020 and David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi, "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure," *American Economic Review*, forthcoming. For evidence on the success of Trump's ethnic and racial appeals in attracting white, working-class voters, see Alan Abramowitz and Jennifer McCoy, "United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump's America," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 681 (January 2019): 137-156. On the role of race in fueling a growing feeling of mutual antipathy that obtains between the electoral coalitions of the two major parties, see Nicholas A. Valentino and Kirill Zhirkov, "Blue is Black and Red is White? Affective Polarization and the Racialized Schemas of U.S. Party Coalitions," working paper, n.d., https://economics.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9386/f/pe_04_17_valentino.pdf, accessed July 14, 2020.

[14] Christopher S. Parker, "Do Trump's Racist Appeals Have a Silver Lining?" *The American Prospect*, May 19, 2016, https://prospect.org/power/trump-s-racist-appeals-silver-lining/ (accessed July 14, 2020); Dana Milbank, "A massive repudiation of Trump's racist politics is building," *Washington Post*, July 3, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/03/massive-repudiation-trumps-racist-politics-is-building/ (accessed July 14, 2020).

prejudice and discrimination as an incontrovertible if lamentable fact of life a few years later. As much as BLM or the pandemic, Trump's promotion of white supremacy was a necessary ingredient for turning George Floyd's killing into the trigger that it became.

Further research will determine whether these points have any merit, and I certainly hope comparative-historical sociologists will lead the intellectual charge. But what seems difficult to dispute is the remarkable scale, wide scope, and diverse character of the protests that have occurred in the wake of George Floyd's killing.

This month-long wave of protest began in Minneapolis on May 26. Thousands of people, many of them wearing masks, gathered at 38th Street and Chicago Avenue outside Cup Foods, where Floyd had been killed, and they then marched to the Minneapolis Police Department's Third Precinct station. The protest in Minneapolis intensified over the next few days and spread to other cities, including New York, Los Angeles, and Atlanta. After several days of unrest, President Trump threatened to suppress the demonstrations, tweeting "When the looting starts, the shooting starts."[15]

Trump's echo of a segregationist mantra only seemed to fuel further protest. On the day of his "looting, shooting" tweet—Thursday, May 28—there were perhaps 50 protests around the United States. The number leapt upward sharply each subsequent day. According to data collected by the *New York Times*, there were 150 protests on Friday, May 29; 400 protests on Saturday, May 30; and then nearly 500 protests on Sunday, May 31. The protests peaked on June 6 (which saw more than 500 protests), but June 13 (which saw 250 protests) and Juneteenth (which also saw around 250 protests) also witnessed major protest activity. By the end of June, there had been more than 4,700 protests in 2,500 cities of varying sizes all across the country. Anywhere from 15 million to 26 million people had participated. The scale and extent of the wave seemed utterly unprecedented. "I've never seen self-reports of protest participation that high for a specific issue over such a short period," Neal Caren is quoted as saying.[16]

As significant as the raw number of protestors involved was their racial composition. Whereas earlier protests led by Black Lives Matter involved participants who were predominantly Black, many American protestors in May and June were not Black. In fact, many were non-Black and indeed White. This is readily discernible in news photos, but it can also be cautiously inferred from the demographics of the locations where protests took place. For instance, one analysis in the *New York Times* shows that three-quarters of the counties that saw a protest are more than 75 percent white. Better evidence of the racial composition of recent protests is reported by Michael Heaney and Dana Fischer (via Doug McAdams), whose surveys in Los Angeles, New York, and the

[15] Ryan Faircloth, "Rubber bullets, chemical irritant, water bottles in the air as thousands march to protest George Floyd's death," *Star Tribune*, May 27, 2020, https://www.startribune.com/rubber-bullets-chemical-irritant-water-bottles-in-air-as-thousands-march-to-protest-george-floyd-s-death/570786992/ (accessed July 15, 2020); "Protestors march after death of George Floyd while in custody of Minneapolis police," *Star Tribune*, May 26, 2020, https://video.startribune.com/protesters-march-after-death-of-george-floyd-while-in-custody-of-minneapolis-police/570785262/ (accessed July 15, 2020); Andy Mannix, "Minneapolis police station set on fire," *Star Tribune*, May 29, 2020, https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-police-station-set-on-fire-protesters-march-downtown/570849592/ (accessed July 15, 2020); "George Floyd Protests: A Timeline," *New York Times*, July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html (accessed July 15, 2020).

[16] Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, "Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History," *New York Times*, July 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html (accessed July 15, 2020).

District of Columbia indicate that something like three-fifths of protestors there were White, while Blacks, Latinx, and Asian protestors each represented about a tenth of protestors.[17]
The protests were not confined to the United States for long. Marches were staged and gatherings were held in London, Bristol, Oxford, Edinburgh, Paris, Osaka, Brussels, Nairobi, Frankfurt, Berlin, Cologne, Toronto, Pretoria, Capetown, Mexico City, and Sydney, to name just a few places. The slogan "Black Lives Matters" appeared not only online in social media but on cardboard placards in the hands of protestors around the world. It is no exaggeration to say that George Floyd's killing struck a global nerve, leading hundreds of thousands of people outside the United States to take collective action in response.[18]

What seems as equally difficult to dispute as the unprecedented number and diverse makeup of protestors is the rapidity and extent of the shift in public opinion that occurred in the aftermath of George Floyd's killing.

In a June survey administered by the Monmouth University Polling Institute, three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that "racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States is a "big problem" (compared to two-thirds of those surveyed in 2016). Seven-one percent of White respondents and eighty-four percent of people of color agreed with the statement. In the same June survey, fifty-seven percent of respondents agreed that police officers were "more likely to use excessive force if the culprit is black" (compared to just thirty-four percent in 2016). Half of white respondents and seventy-one percent of people of color agreed with the statement.[19]

The shift is even more apparent when data of higher granularity is examined. Looking at the Civiqs tracking poll of registered voters, Michael Tesler argues that George Floyd's killing accelerated pre-existing trends. Support for the BLM movement had hovered around forty percent among all respondents for much of 2018, 2019, and 2020. It began ticking upward with the availability of CDC data on COVID-19 by race, and it experienced a sharp jump with Floyd's death. (Interestingly, so did the percentage of respondents *opposing* the BLM movement.) Half of all respondents now express support for the BLM movement. A similar jump with Floyd's death can be seen in the views of white respondents.[20]

Looking at data from UCLA/Nationscape, Tesler observes that sixty-two percent of those surveyed (in the period from May 28 to June 3) agreed that Black people face a significant amount of discrimination, compared to fifty-five percent of those surveyed a week earlier. Fifty-six percent of White respondents agreed,

[17] Audra D.S. Burch, Weiyi Cai, Gabriel Gianordoli, Morrigan McCarthy, and Jugal K. Patel, "How Black Lives Matter Reached Every Corner of America," *New York Times*, June 13, 2020.https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/13/us/george-floyd-protests-cities-photos.html (accessed July 15, 2020); Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, "Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History"; Doug McAdams, "We've Never Seen Protests Like These Before," *Jacobin*, June 20, 2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/george-floyd-protests-black-lives-matter-riots-demonstrations (accessed July 15, 2020).

[18] Washington Post Staff, "How George Floyd's death sparked protests around the world," *Washington Post*, June 10, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/2020/06/10/how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-around-world/ (July 16, 2020).

[19] Monmouth University Polling Institute, "Protestors' Anger Justified Even If Actions May Not Be," June 2, 2020, p. 4-5, https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/monmouthpoll_us_060220.pdf/ (accessed July 16, 2020).

[20] Michael Tesler, "The Floyd protests have changed public opinion about race and policing," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/09/floyd-protests-have-changed-public-opinion-about-race-policing-heres-data/ (accessed July 16, 2020); Civiqs, "Do you support or oppose the Black Lives matter movement?," https://civiqs.com/results/black_lives_matter?uncertainty=true&annotations=true&zoomIn=true (accessed July 16, 2020).

which was seven percentage points higher than the previous week. Over the same stretch of time, it appears that the percentage of White respondents who have a very or somewhat favorable impression of police officers fell from seventy-two percent to sixty-one percent. At the same time, thirty-one percent of White respondents held a somewhat or very unfavorable view of the police, compared to eighteen percent the week earlier.[21]

The interracial character of the recent protests and the signs of a shift in public opinion have been accompanied by various degrees of government action. A nominally bipartisan majority in the U.S. House of Representatives approved the "George Floyd Justice in Policing Act" by a 236-181 margin. Although the legislation is a non-starter in the Senate, it nevertheless put a number of long-sought reforms on the congressional agenda. This includes among other things lowering the intent standard in the section of the federal criminal code (18 U.S.C. Section 242) that is currently used to prosecute cases of police misconduct involving the use of excessive force; modifying the section of the federal criminal code (18 U.S.C. Section 1983) that is currently interpreted by the federal courts as giving local and federal law enforcement officers "qualified immunity" from liability in private civil actions in which they have committed constitutional violations; giving the U.S. Attorney General court-enforced subpoena power in "pattern and practice" investigations of law enforcement agencies suspected of violating constitutional rights; providing $750 million to state attorneys general for use in conducting independent investigations of excessive use of force that led to someone's death, contingent on the passage of state legislation setting up a framework for the independent prosecution of law enforcement; establishing a National Police Misconduct Registry and requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to report all incidents involving use of force to the U.S. Attorney General; banning no-knock warrants in federal drug cases, making the use of chokeholds a civil rights violation, and denying federal monies to localities that do not adopt similar restrictions. Many provisions in the bill will surely serve at minimum as the initial bargaining position for the Democrats in future sessions of Congress.[22]

States and localities have arguably taken more serious steps than the federal government to curb police brutality. Elected officials in Los Angeles and New York City have begun looking at cutting their police budgets. Officers around the country who might not have faced charges for the conduct in earlier times—including George Floyd's killer—have now been charged by prosecutors with violating the law. California's state police training program has stopped teaching choke holds; Memphis police officers must now restrain colleagues who are engaging in misconduct or face consequences; Kansas City's mayor has committed to having every local police shooting reviewed by an external party; Seattle has banned the practice of covering up badge numbers. These are admittedly small changes, and they may not eventually add up to comprehensive reform, but many of them are more substantive than the responses of Congress or the Trump administration.[23]

[21] Tesler, "The Floyd protests have changed public opinion about race and policing"; Rebecca Morin, "Percentage grows among Americans who say Black people experience a "great deal" of discrimination, survey shows," *USA Today*, June 8, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/06/08/survey-higher-percentage-us-agree-black-people-face-discrimination/3143651001/ (accessed July 16, 2020).

[22] *Congressional Record—House*, June 25, 2020, H2440-2453, https://www.congress.gov/116/crec/2020/06/25/CREC-2020-06-25-pt1-PgH2439-4.pdf (accessed July 16, 2010); Catie Edmondson, "House Passes Sweeping Police Bill Targeting Racial Bias and Use of Force," *New York Times*, June 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/politics/house-police-overhaul-bill.html (accessed July 16, 2020).

[23] Paresh Dave, "Factbox: What changes are governments making in response to George Floyd protests?" Reuters, June 10, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-protests-response/factbox-what-changes-are-governments-making-in-response-to-george-

The stirrings of broader social change are evident as well. Mississippi retired its state flag, which prominently featured a symbol of the Confederacy. A statue of Stonewall Jackson was removed from Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia. A statue of Jefferson Davis was taken away from the rotunda of the state capitol building in Frankfort, Kentucky. In the private sector, thousands of American companies have asserted that Black lives matter and vowed to make good on their proclamations. Some of them have even committed real resources. Doug McAdams points out that Comcast announced it was allocating $100 million over three years to "fight injustice and inequality against any race, ethnicity, sexuality orientation, or ability." McAdam also guardedly highlights the symbolic significance of NASCAR's ban on the Conference flag and the NFL commissioner Roger Goodell's *mea culpa*, in which he confessed the error of the league's earlier ways and proclaimed that "we, the National Football League, believe black lives matter." Many such examples exist, McAdams writes. "Put together, we appear to be experiencing a social change tipping point that is as rare as it is potentially consequential."[24]

"It feels different this time," writes Hannah-Jones. BLM's Tometi agrees. Many other close observers share the same sentiment. "I can't believe I'm going to say this," said Ta-Nehisi Coates in a recent interview with Ezra Klein. "But I see hope. I see progress right now." What is different about the current moment is the fact that "significant swaths" of non-Black people in places like Des Moines and Salt Lake City and Berlin and London care about the "pain" and "suffering" of "black folks in their struggle against the way the law is enforced in their neighborhoods." Much of the credit for the transformation of the collective consciousness, he believes, should go to BLM. "Within my lifetime, I don't think there's been a more effective movement than Black Live Matter."[25]

It therefore seems fitting that Alicia Garza, another one of BLM's three founders, feels a sense of hope as well. Just a few years ago, she observed, Garza and her fellow activists struggled to simply assert that Black lives matter without getting an earful of unmitigated grief. "Now everybody's saying Black lives matter. The question now is, 'Well, what do you mean? I would say that's progress.'" It is a huge achievement that BLM is a "major part of our global conversation right now," when things are just "bonkers." And what it is doing is "forcing people across all walks of life, all sectors in our economy, and every corner of the planet really, to assess whether we are where we need to be—and what we need to do to get to where we're trying to go."[26]

floyd-protests-idUSKBN23I01D (accessed July 16, 2020).

[24] Rick Rojas, "Mississippi Lawmakers Vote to Retire State Flag Rooted in the Confederacy," *New York Times*, June 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/us/mississippi-flag-confederacy.html (accessed July 16, 220); Alan Taylor, "The Statues Brought Down Since the George Floyd Protests Began," *The Atlantic*, July 2, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2020/07/photos-statues-removed-george-floyd-protests-began/613774/ (accessed July 16, 2020); Doug McAdams, "We've Never Seen Protests Like These Before"; Brian Robert, "Comcast Announces $100 Million Multiyear Plan to Advance Social Justice and Equality," June 8, 2020, https://corporate.comcast.com/press/releases/comcast-announces-100-million-multiyear-plan-social-justice-and-equality (accessed July 16, 2020).

[25] Nikole Hannah-Jones, "What is Owed"; Isaac Chotiner, "A Black Lives Matter Co-Founder Explains Why This Time Is Different"; Ezra Klein, "Why Ta-Nehisi Coates is hopeful," Vox, June 5, 2020, https://www.vox.com/2020/6/5/21279530/ta-nehisi-coates-ezra-klein-show-george-floyd-police-brutality-trump-biden (accessed on July 16, 2020).

[26] Rachel Hartigan, "She co-founded Black Lives Matter. Here's why she's so hopeful for the future," *National Geographic*, July 8, 2020, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/07/alicia-garza-co-founded-black-lives-matter-why-future-hopeful/ (accessed July 16, 2020).

Despite all of the optimism, few close observers are under the illusion that transformative potential of the current moment can be identified easily or realized immediately. There is a keen awareness that additional phases of conscious, sustained struggle are required and that it will be necessary to address and overcome the limits of the initial phase. Garza stresses the importance of making sure "we keep this momentum going where everybody feels like this is a movement that is theirs. It's not just for Black people."[27]

There is also a sense that BLM might need to address organizational limits that have held it back from being even more effective. Taking stock of BLM last fall, Yamahtta-Taylor expressed a concern that the decentralized, leaderless structure set up by the organizers was not suited to creating the organic goodwill that they wanted to exist at the heart of the movement. Instead, it simply ignored the growing tension within BLM between a reformist contingent (interested in body cameras and the like) and a "revolutionary" contingent (interested in the abolition of the carceral state). Nor did such a decentralized structure make it possible for the movement to build cumulatively on the lessons that were there to be learned. "The lack of clear entry points into movement organizing, and the absence of any democratically accountable organization or structure within the movement" made it challenging to "evaluate the state of the movement, delaying its ability to pivot and postponing the generalization of strategic lessons and tactics from one locality to the next or from one action to the next." Each locality often wound up reinventing the wheel. Yamahtta-Taylor was also concerned that BLM's ethos of leaderlessness was not serving it particularly well. "The issue is not whether there are leaders, it is whether those leaders are accountable to those they represent." The ideology of "horizontalism" that guided it often caused confusion or led to "hard feelings," and it made it difficult to course-correct when things began going in the "wrong direction."[28]

The biggest question of all naturally is whether the current moment will lead to more than stopgap measures, symbolic gestures, and incremental improvements. Is the optimism justified? What kind of enduring achievements and institutional changes will come of it, if any? "It doesn't take a lot, nor does it cost a lot, to protest the torture and killing of a man on video," says Vince Hutchings. Grappling seriously with the "original sin of racism is going to take a lot more than condemning murderous police officers."[29]

Especially sobering is the idea that the remarkable wave of protests that we witnessed in May and June—and the green shoots of social change that have emerged in their wake—have been possible only because one of the most compelling social movements in the last fifty years found itself mobilizing in the context of a once-in-a-century pandemic after three years of shambolic rule by the most bigoted man to sit in the Oval Office since perhaps the Civil War. [30]

The protests are exceptional, for sure. But they have come out of exceptional times. What happens if our times become less exceptional? Will the current sense of urgency dissipate? Will the concern of non-Black people about the dignity and equality of Black people fade away as the pandemic is gradually overcome and economy begins to right itself? Will public

[27] Hartigan, "She co-founded Black Lives Matter. Here's why she's so hopeful for the future."

[28] Taylor, "Five Years Later, Do Black Lives Matter?"

[29] Dan Balz, "The politics of race are shifting, and politicians are struggling to keep pace," *Washington Post*, July 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/race-reckoning/ (accessed July 16, 2020).

[30] Jon Meacham argues that Trump is the most racist president since Andrew Johnson. See Shane Croucher, "Trump Is Most Racist President Since Andrew Johnson, Says Historian," *Newsweek*, July 16, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-racist-president-andrew-johnson-historian-tweet-1449449 (accessed July 20, 2020).

concern be satisfied by incremental reforms that do little to challenge the power of police unions once the outrage over George Floyd subsides? Will the outrage be hijacked by other actors with other aims?

There have been times in the American past when the momentum for social change borne of an exceptional moment was sustained and led to meaningful institutional achievements. One example that comes to my mind is the two-and-a-half-year stretch from the Birmingham campaign in 1963 to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.

This remarkable period began with one of the most exceptional episodes of collective action in U.S. history, one that remains central to the study of social movements to this day. The campaign to dismantle segregation in Birmingham, led by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Fred L. Shuttlesworth of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, involved a boycott of local businesses followed by an escalating succession of mass demonstrations. Thousands of Black people participated in various ways throughout April and May, including the Black schoolchildren who famously took to the streets in the face of police dogs and water cannons.[31]

The situation came to a head on May 7, according to Aldon D. Morris's authoritative analysis. That day, thousands of protestors were able to flood the unguarded downtown business district after a team of decoy marchers around the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church succeeded in distracting the police. This made it impossible for local authorities to control the situation. Nothing could be done about the downtown protestors, as Birmingham's jails were already full from days of arrests. The economic and political order had clearly broken down, and the city's business leaders capitulated early the next morning, conceding most of the movement's demands. Not long afterward, the Kennedy administration accepted the need for a legislative approach. Birmingham contributed mightily to the nationalization of the civil rights issue. It was a stunning achievement for a disenfranchised people, made possible by the exceptional circumstances that they themselves had been responsible for creating.[32]

There was no backsliding in the two or three years after Birmingham, as exceptional as it was. In fact, Birmingham might well be seen an initial, catalytic step in a dynamic sequence that culminated with the Voting Rights Act.

What followed the Birmingham campaign was a clear intensification of mass mobilization and political engagement, much of it led by an overlapping (and sometimes competing) set of actors. Birmingham provided a "model of protest" for protestors elsewhere in Morris's words. In the weeks thereafter, several hundred demonstrations took place in scores of cities throughout the South, and civil rights groups organized the now-storied March on Washington at the end of the summer. By the end of 1963, it was clear that Black protest events had leapt sharply upward over the previous two years. News coverage of the four most prominent civil rights groups also shot up, and the volume of pro-civil rights letters written to the White House similarly increased. [33]

[31] Harvard Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), Chapter 5.

[32] Aldon D. Morris, "Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered: An Analysis of the Dynamics and Tactics of Confrontation," *American Sociological Review* 58 (October 1993): 623.

[33] Morris, "Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered"; J. Craig Jenkins and David Jacobs, "Political Opportunities and African American Protest," *American Journal of Sociology* V109, N2 (September 2003): 287; Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky, and James E. Stobaugh, "All the Movements Fit to Print: Who, What, When, Where, and Why SMO Families Appeared in the *New York Times* in the Twentieth Century," *American Sociological Review* 74 (August 2009): 647; Taeku Lee, *Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial*

In 1964, there was a falloff in the raw frequency of protest events, news coverage, and constituency mail, but there was still a great deal of notable activity. This was the year of Freedom Summer; the murders of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner; the passage of the Civil Rights Act; and the controversy over the seating of delegates from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City.[34]

The subsequent year saw high levels of mass mobilization and political engagement reach a peak. Black protest activity swing sharply upward again. There were nearly 250 Black protest events in 1965, nearly twice as many as 1963. Many of them were connected to the campaign to win federal legislation on voting rights, based in Alabama and led by the SCLC's King and the late John Lewis, then chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. News coverage also remained at a high level, and Johnson's White House saw a deluge of constituency mail, more than tripling the volume that had been generated in 1963. A large number of letters came in the wake of Bloody Sunday, the murders of Rev. James Reeb and Viola Liuzzo, and Johnson's address to a joint session of Congress. The culminating achievement of the period was the passage of the Voting Rights Act, which no less a constitutional authority than Lawrence H. Tribe has pronounced "probably the most radical piece of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction."[35]

The comparison between our current moment and the years from Birmingham to the Voting Rights Act is not just inexact. The outcome of the May and June protests is simply not known. What kind of case is it? We do not know right now; we cannot know yet. It is possible that little will come of the current moment. The possibility for major change may simply fade after the arrival of a vaccine and a Biden election. There could be backsliding or backlash. Perhaps the moment that should come to mind is not the mid-1960s but the late-1960s. A study by Omar Wasow exploits rainfall as an instrumental variable to show that "protestor-initiated violence" in 1968 "tipped" the election toward Nixon. A comparison should be approached with the utmost caution.[36]

To the extent that it is valid to think about the current moment as a case of success analogous to the mid-1960s, what a comparison suggests to me is the relevance of federal action to significant, lasting change. In a widely read essay in *Medium*, President Obama argues that protest is important because it raises public

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Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 127, 131, 133.

[34] Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality*.

[35] Jenkins and Jacobs, "Political Opportunities and African American Protest," 287; Amenta et al, "All the Movements Fit to Print," 647; Lee, *Mobilizing Public Opinion*, 127, 131, 133; Lawrence H. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* (New York: Foundation Press, 1978), 336. The radicalism of the Voting Rights Act inhered in the fact that the legislation did not simply provide for enforcement of a generic new prohibition again treating individuals in a discriminatory way. Instead, it banned or called into question specific voting practices, such as the literacy test and poll taxes. One of the most robust provisions, Section 5 required covered jurisdictions that wanted to change their election laws to first obtain permission from the federal government, and the formula that determined coverage was based on whether a jurisdiction's level of voter participation met specific numerical thresholds at particular moments in time. Hence the Voting Rights Act did not take an individualistic approach to protecting the franchise; it took a more structural and substantive approach that was motivated not by abstract ideals like "freedom from discrimination" but historically specific instances of injustice.

[36] Omar Wasow, "Agenda Seeding: How 1960s Black Protests Moved Elites, Public Opinion and Voting," *American Political Science Review* V114, N 3 (August 2020): 638-659. Wasow argues that the Floyd protests started out like protests in 1968 and became more like protests in 1964. Omar Wasow, "The protests started out looking like 1968. They Turned into 1964," *Washington Post*, June 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/11/protests-started-out-looking-like-1968-they-turned-into-1964/ (accessed August 3, 2020).

awareness and discomfits the "powers that be." But he also argues that political participation and electoral politics are important because our "aspirations" are translated into "specific laws and institutional practices" in our democracy only when "we elect government officials who are responsive to our demands." President Obama goes on to point out that that "the elected officials who matter the most in reforming police departments and the criminal justice system work at the state and local levels." Mayors appoint police chiefs and bargain collectively with police unions. District attorneys and state's attorneys decide whether to investigate, charge, and prosecute the perpetrators of police misconduct. Hence our current moment could be a turning point for "real change" because protest and politics have come together in a way that responsive governance is actually possible.[37]

Yet it is not clear that the state and local officials are capable of responding effectively to newly resonant demands for "real change" without robust federal assistance. Police unions continue to wield enormous political power in most cities. In a sharply observed portrait of the New York City Police Benevolent Association (NYPBA), William Finnegan argues convincingly that it has thoroughly succeeded in not just winning generous salaries and retirement benefits for its members, but it has also dominated various aspects of public policy. For instance, there has been no requirement that police officers live in the five boroughs since the sixties. Finnegan points out that the NYCPBA has succeeded for decades in rebuffing every attempt to restore it, and a majority of white members continue to live in Long Island and other nearby suburbs. When it comes to public policy around brutality and misconduct, police union influence translates into collective bargaining agreements that shield the "bad apples" (maybe ten percent according to analysts most favorable to police). Typical contracts are stuffed with provisions that often make it difficult to collect the most elementary evidence that is needed to establish whether brutality or misconduct occurred in the first place, and many contracts require binding arbitration if major discipline is meted out to officers. Even if voters wanting real change manage to elect state and local officials who intend to be responsive to their constituents, other political actors like police unions remain powerful enough to thwart reform—major or minor. *Various types of federal action might be necessary to make local and state government sufficiently responsive.*[38]

Here the comparison to voting rights reminds us that it has previously been the case that federal action was ultimately necessary in order to encourage change on the part of state and local officials. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which required covered jurisdictions to obtain "federal pre-clearance" before making any changes to their election procedures, was necessary because state and local officials had been enormously creative over the years in their disenfranchisement of Black people, and pre-clearance was necessary to make sure that changes state and local officials wished to make that seemed innocent on their face did not simply make things worse for Black people.

[37] Barack H. Obama, "How to Make This Moment the Turning Point for Real Change," *Medium*, June 1, 2020, https://medium.com/@BarackObama/how-to-make-this-moment-the-turning-point-for-real-change-9fa209806067 (accessed July 24, 2020).

[38] William Finnegan, "How Police Unions Fight Reform," *New Yorker*, July 27, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform (accessed July 29, 2020); Max Schanzenbach, "Union contracts key to reducing police misconduct," *Chicago Tribune*, November 23, 2015, https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-police-excessive-force-laquan-mcdonald-perspec-1124-20151123-story.html (accessed July 24, 2020). On the problematic role of prosecutors in holding police accountable for misconduct, Kristy Parker, "Prosecute the Police," *The Atlantic*, June 13, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/prosecutors-need-to-do-their-part/612997/ (accessed July 24, 2020). For an open-source database of police contracts, see www.checkthepolice.org.

Similarly, federal action seems necessary today, albeit for different reasons. If the George Floyd protests have finally convinced state and local officials to respond robustly to voter demands, they still need all the help they can get when trying to restructure police union contracts in a way that makes police officers accountable for their misconduct.

Is the difficulty of achieving democratic representation at the state and local level a reason to abandon reform in favor of a full-throated abolitionist agenda? Perhaps it is, but I am not so sure yet.

Even if the Minneapolis Police Department's embrace of "procedural justice" reforms did little to prevent George Floyd's killing, it strikes me that other types of reform may still be worth exploring. David Thacher argues persuasively to my mind that the police are unique as a government institution because they are invested with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and a "meaningful agenda" for reform should aim to help the police resolve problems that might require the use of force with as little force as possible.[39]

This will necessitate among other things the adoption of a new portfolio of policies designed to regulate use of force; to monitor compliance with these regulations; and to give the police the capacity to address the wide range of situations they encounter in a manner that uses the minimal degree of force necessary.[40]

One of the most compelling ideas along these lines was introduced several years ago in the aftermath of Laquan McDonald's killing in Chicago. Max Schazenbach argued that mayors and police superintendents should be given the authority "to fire any officer for any reason that does not otherwise violate a general employment statute." This authority would be used to purge the police department of problematic, abusive officers. A "less dramatic" change would be to "prohibit local governments from paying for officers' settlements in civil rights cases" and "require officers to buy professional liability insurance." Officers exceeding regulations on the use of force or accumulating too many complaints would simply be priced out of the market for insurance.[41]

One sign of the latter idea's promise is the movement recently afoot among some insurers and brokers to design the kind of professional liability coverage that Schanzenbach had in mind. In response to New York state senator Alessandra Biaggi's proposal to require officers to carry insurance covering liability for excessive force and abuse, companies like Marsh & McLennan, Hylant Group, and Prymus Insurance are looking into how to set premiums and structure payouts. There is not yet a consensus about the viability of such a product, but some companies believe that "this is absolutely something they will be able to work with."[42]

[39] David Thacher, "The Crisis of Police Reform," unpublished manuscript on file with the author. See also David Thacher, "The Limit of Procedural Justice," *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, edited by David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and David Thacher, "The Learning Model of Use-of-Force Reviews," *Law and Social Inquiry* V45, N3 (August 2020): 755-786.

[40] Thacher, "The Crisis of Police Reform."

[41] Schanzenbach, "Union contracts key to reducing police misconduct."

[42] Suzanne Barlyn and Alwyn Scott, "U.S. Carriers Begin Crafting Police Professional Liability Cover," *Carrier Management*, July 24, 2020, https://www.carriermanagement.com/news/2020/07/24/209484.htm (accessed July 29, 2020); Biaggi's proposal would require local governments to pay a basic premium for every officer, but any premium increases stemming from the misconduct of a particular officer would be borne by the officer themself. On the kind of liability insurance *currently* purchased by small cities around the country and the role of insurers in reforming the police, see Kit Ramgopal and Benda Breslauer, "The hidden hand that uses money to reform troubled police departments," NBC News, July 19, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hidden-hand-uses-money-reform-troubled-police-departments-n1233495 (accessed, July 29, 2020). But see especially John Rappaport, "How Private Insurers Regulate Public Policy," 130 *Harvard Law Review* 1539 (2017),

Still, putting either of Schanzenbach's ideas into place—or pursuing other kinds of meaningful reform—would very likely require modifying union contracts, which would in turn require mayors to muster up enough political will to win the right set of contractual provisions in the next round of collective bargaining.

This is where it is not hard to imagine that the federal government could play a powerful and beneficial role. One conceivable way to incentivize mayors and cities to be more responsive to demands for stronger policies would be for the federal government to step in and offer reinsurance for professional liability coverage on certain terms.

Reinsurance is basically insurance for insurers, and it is purchased by insurers (or self-insured entities) who wish to offload specified financial risks that they face as a result of the insurance policies they have written. In the context of health care insurance, for example, some states have created reinsurance programs for health insurers in the individual market. Insurers who participate in the state program are provided payment for some portion of the cost for their enrollees above a certain amount. Successful reinsurance programs can help to lower premiums and maintain the viability of a market that might not otherwise be able to function properly.

A federal reinsurance program for professional liability coverage might work by picking up a substantial portion of the payment for all losses above a certain threshold incurred by an insurer or self-insured municipality due to "wrongful acts" by a covered officer. (This is technically called "specific stop-loss excess insurance." A policy that covers aggregate losses by an insurer for a particular period of time is called "aggregate stop-loss excess insurance.") Depending on exactly where the threshold is set, which is a decision that would naturally affect the pricing of the premium, such a program could save large cities a substantial sum of money. These cities are usually self-insured and pay out millions of dollars each year in misconduct cases. For smaller cities that purchase professional liability coverage, such a program could potentially lower premiums and encourage more insurers to participate in the market.[43]

The way that a federal reinsurance program might be leveraged to catalyze responsiveness on the part of state and local officials is that federal reinsurance coverage could be made contingent upon the maintenance of high underwriting standards on the part of insurers. The federal reinsurance program would work directly with self-insured cities (instead of working with insurers), and here coverage could also be made contingent upon high underwriting standards. These high standards would be geared toward loss prevention, and they could include (for instance) whether the mayor and the police chief have the authority to fire officers without being subject to reinstatement by an arbitrator; whether there is a "cooling off" period before an officer accused of misconduct is obliged to make a statement about what happened; whether the police department penalizes officers for making false statements about misconduct; whether there are detailed guidelines on the use of force; whether compliance with those guidelines is monitored; and whether officers are trained to resolve situations using the least amount of force necessary.

Hence the establishment of a federal reinsurance program could potentially give state

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ccfe/86d2cf8f20d9f1469cf19f2a725185519c10.pdf (accessed July 29, 2020).

[43] Chicago is an outlier when it comes to the cost of police misconduct, but it is nevertheless instructive to observe that it paid in aggregate $757 million in settlements, losses at trial, and other payouts from 2004-2018. See Dan Hinkel, "A hidden cost of Chicago police misconduct," *Chicago Tribune*, September 12, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-met-chicago-legal-spending-20190912-sky5euto4jbcdenjfi4datpnki-story.html (accessed July 20, 2020).

and local officials a financial incentive to heed demands from their constituents for meaningful reform; furthermore, it could help to set a nationwide "floor" for the reform of use of force policies.

Just as federal action once proved necessary to extending the franchise to Black people in the United States, federal action may well be essential to defeating the scourge of police brutality in the current moment. Depending on the next phase of mobilization, if there is one, police brutality could just be the beginning. It is not inconceivable that some form of reparations could move squarely into the national discussion. Regardless, without a considered degree of federal involvement, meaningful reform of any kind seems out of reach, no matter how powerful the calls for change become.

The subfield of comparative-historical sociology operates at a remove from the most immediate issues that gave rise to the George Floyd protests, but it is certainly implicated in the larger system of anti-Blackness of which police brutality is only one expression.

In comparative-historical sociology, anti-Blackness is manifested in myriad ways. It is recognizable in our canon, our syllabi, our topics of investigation, our lists of award-winning authors, our elected leadership, our editorial boards, and our new hires. In these and other areas of our intellectual and professional life, there are simply fewer Black sociologists in the mix than there should be.

These issues were foremost in the minds of the Officers and Council of the ASA CHS Section in the second week of June, as all of us discussed what to do in response to the protests sweeping the country. (The protests had just reached their second and highest peak on June 6, although we obviously could not have known it at the time.) Several us had learned that the Inequality, Poverty, and Mobility Section under the leadership of David Brady had decided to donate all of the funds that would have gone to finance their conference reception to the ASA Minority Fellowship Program, and there was a strong sense that ASA CHS should consider doing likewise. But there was also a sense that it was incumbent upon us to do more. In particular, we felt that it was important to publicly express our solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement and Black people more generally. At the same time, we felt that our expression of solidarity would be even more meaningful if we took serious steps to identify and address anti-Blackness and anti-Black racism in our own intellectual backyard—that is, comparative-historical sociology.

Over the course of the week, we sought to take steps that would begin to address these issues. We decided to contribute a large portion of our reception funding to the ASA Minority Fellowship Program, and we drafted and unanimously approved a statement of solidarity that articulated our basic values and commitments. (See inset.)

We also resolved to take a moment at the next Council meeting to form a Standing Committee on Anti-Blackness and Racism in Comparative-Historical Sociology. The basic charge of the committee would be to identify and address manifestations of anti-Blackness in our subfield. It might do so in a number of ways. It might undertake an analysis of graduate syllabi at top departments to determine the extent to which Black authors are underrepresented. It might consult with the Elections Committee to help develop a sufficiently diverse pool of candidates for annual elections. It might be asked annually by Section Chairs to assess whether the Section's program each year reproduces a larger pattern of anti-Blackness.[44]

[44] I want to note that I initially suggested that the committee be called the Committee on Diversity in Comparative-Historical Sociology or something similarly bureaucratic and anodyne. My sense from my research on affirmative action—especially at a moment when

Lastly, we resolved to commission a panel on "Identifying, Confronting, and Addressing Anti-Blackness and Racism in Comparative-Historical Sociology" at the next CHS mini-conference.

These are modest actions and initiatives when compared to bigger steps that are needed to take down police brutality and challenge the carceral state. But they are actions and initiatives that are borne out of the same moment of collective recognition that gripped many non-Black people around the world in the wake of George Floyd's killing—that anti-Blackness must be confronted now in all of its multifarious incarnations and that comparative-historical sociologists must not shrink from doing our part.

STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY

As the Officers and Council members of the Section on Comparative-Historical Sociology in the American Sociological Association, we emphatically assert that Black lives matter.

We recognize the dignity and humanity every Black person.

We mourn all people who have been murdered because of their Blackness.

We condemn police brutality and all other manifestations of racial inequality that reflect the anti-Blackness that is rife in our culture and institutions.

We lend our voices to the chorus of people protesting in the streets around the world.

We demand action at every level of government to hold accountable every police officer who violates the law and the Constitution.

And we rededicate ourselves to rooting out anti-Blackness in our own midst, whether it is found in our canon, our syllabi, our admissions committees, our hiring committees, our co-authorship patterns, or our editorial boards.

Students for Fair Admissions is appealing last year's decision to uphold Harvard's affirmative action plan by the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts—led me to think that it might be perfectly fine to lean on the word "diversity" again. But two younger, more thoughtful colleagues on the ASA CHS Council disabused me of the notion, arguing persuasively that it was critically important for a range of reasons to include the terms "Anti-Blackness" and "Racism" in the names of the committee and panel.

Essay

Analytic Architectures, Pluralism, and Coherence in Historical Sociology

Damon Mayrl, Colby College

Nicholas Hoover Wilson, Stony Brook University

What do historical sociologists do all day? The answer to this question is surprisingly hard to come by. One reason is that historical sociologists do many different things. As Julia Adams and Ann Orloff argue in their essay in this issue, historical sociology celebrates its methodological, theoretical, and substantive pluralism—a pluralism which is growing with every passing year. There thus is not a simple, straightforward answer to the question. Another reason is that—while historical sociologists have written extensively about logic of inquiry, the relationship between theory and conceptualization, case selection and causality, and specific analytic techniques, much of this work is prescriptive. As a result, the actual practice of historical research has received relatively short shrift. How do historical sociologists actually gather, evaluate, and deploy evidence over the course of a research project—and how do they put that evidence into dialogue with theories when they write up their published findings?

For the past several years, we have been looking into these questions by examining the practice of historical sociology—both by examining how published studies are composed, and by interviewing historical sociologists about their research practices. The first article from this project, "What Do Historical Sociologists Do All Day? Analytic Architectures in Historical Sociology," was recently published in *The American Journal of Sociology*. In it, we ask how and why scholars combine theoretical claims and empirical evidence the way they do in their published work. We argue that the answers to these questions are neither self-evident nor idiosyncratic. Rather, scholars use "analytic architectures"—that is, familiar templates for linking theoretical claims and evidence—to guide how they write up and present research.

To support this argument, we looked at every book and article that won either the Barrington Moore Book Award or the Charles Tilly Best Article Award from ASA's Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology between 1995 and 2015. We individually coded in-text citations for what kind of source the authors were citing—theoretical or empirical, and primary or secondary evidence—and how that source was mobilized in the author's argument—constructively or critically. We coded 15,256 citations in total across 37 books and articles. We then subjected these citations to cluster analysis, a technique that identifies commonalities across different works; and qualitatively examined the clusters that emerged to identify patterns in how theory and evidence are combined in historical sociology.

Figure 1 – Relative emphases of book and article clusters and associated analytic architectures (from Mayrl and Wilson 2020, p. 1368).



Using this combination of inductive quantitative and holistic qualitative analysis, we found that "historical sociology" encompasses four distinct analytic architectures that combine theory and evidence in different ways. As Figure 1 shows, these architectures differ in how often they cite primary sources, how heavily they engage with theoretical arguments, and how critical they are of existing work. Each architecture thus reflects choices about what kinds of evidence to present (and in what amounts), how and where (and how extensively) to engage with theoretical explanations, and how to enroll theory and evidence into a coherent presentation of findings and argument. These four architectures are as follows:

1) A first architecture, which we dub "The Theoretical Frontier," prioritizes engaging with theoretical claims. This architecture gives pride of place both to theoretical criticism and to constructive theorizing, often by explicitly evaluating competing theoretical explanations. In this architecture, evidence (most commonly, existing secondary histories) is used as building blocks brought to bear directly in the service of the evaluation of existing theories.

2) A second architecture, the "Sociologist as Historian," mirrors the conventions of historians. It emphasizes the use of archival and other primary sources, which are used to nail down an empirically rich and theoretically revealing study. The concentrated presentation of detailed and extensive historical data is thus central, while theoretical citations are typically relegated to a frame in ways that may echo the style of work by historians.

3) A third architecture, the "Macro-Causal Analysis," constructively combines historical evidence to make claims about large-scale change. This architecture stresses the constructive citation of large amounts of empirical evidence, typically resulting in synthetic comparative accounts or revisitations of classic arguments. In this architecture, unique to books, primary sources fill holes and provide rich detail, but the main power of the analysis rests on an exhaustive foundation of secondary sources.

4) Finally, a "Data-Driven Theorizing" architecture closely couples the building of a theoretical and empirical case. This architecture, unique to articles, is deeply empirical without being archival, and uses its empirical materials to engage in constructive theoretical work. This architecture permits the presentation of case-based inductive theory development, where detailed analysis of a single case is used to construct both an explanation of the case and a more abstract theoretical intervention.

Figure 2 – Prominence of architectures, books and articles combined, 1995-2015 (from Mayrl and Wilson 2020, p. 1379)



In addition to identifying these architectures, we also took advantage of the twenty-year span of our sample to examine whether awards flowed to certain architectures rather than others at particular points in time. We found suggestive evidence that architectures come in and out of fashion, becoming more or less likely to receive awards at certain moments in time, as can be seen here in Figure 2. Most notably, the architecture that mirrors historians' conventions became much more prominent among award-winners in the years immediately following the publication of the third-wave landmark *Remaking Modernity*. This trend in architectural prominence paralleled a secular trend toward the greater use of primary sources, especially among award-winning books. It also appeared to be somewhat, but not perfectly, related to the composition of awards committees. Analytic architectures thus appear to play an important role in mediating prestige, consecration, and transformations in the practice of historical sociology.

Why does this matter? In the article, we argue that this study of our little corner of sociology has lessons for debates in the sociology of knowledge about how knowledge gets produced, as well as broader disciplinary debates over the value and nature of methodological pluralism. But for historical sociologists specifically, we think there are additional particularly important lessons.

First, "historical sociology" is less of a coherent "thing" than we usually take it to be. We have choices about how we put theory and evidence into dialogue, and structure our arguments. There are in fact multiple recognized "excellent" ways to produce historical sociology, and this productive, peaceful pluralism is something we should celebrate.

Second, analytic architectures appear to play an important role in making our findings legible to one another. They do this in part by signaling what kind of historical sociologist we are trying to be. The choice of the Historian architecture may signal that we value the methods, standards, and evidence of historians; the choice of the Macro-Causal architecture may signal our hope of positioning ourselves within the tradition of Moore, Skocpol, and Wallerstein. We situate others' work in part by recognizing their architectures—how they connect theory and evidence—and how that architecture relates to the goals and contributions of other scholars who have written similarly.

In fact, the existence of analytic architectures likely helps the subdiscipline to cohere. Although techniques and strategies for historical inquiry have multiplied, when it comes to writing, they tend to be presented in a delimited number of architectures, which engage with and link together theory and evidence in ways that make them legible and recognizable as historical sociology. While we are a diverse bunch, it is not the case that "anything goes" in historical sociology. Instead, our methodological pluralism is tamed within a formal structure that allows for diversity and innovation within recognizable bounds.

CHS at the ASA Virtual Engagement Event

8-11 August 2020

Please register for the event
https://www.asanet.org/annual-meeting-2020/registration

CHS Council Meeting
12:00-1:00pm, Thursday, August 6, 2020

CHS/GTS Annual Mentoring Event
12:00-2:00pm, Friday, August 7, 2020

Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Law, Politics, and Institutional Change in the United States
8:30am-10:10am, Monday, August 10, 2020

To join this session:
https://berkeley.zoom.us/j/92313306742;
password: ASA 2020

Presider: Cybelle Fox (University of California, Berkeley)

"Crime Pays the Victim: Criminal Fines, the State, and Victim Compensation Law, 1964-1984," Jeremy R. Levine (University of Michigan) and Kelley Russell (University of Michigan)

"What is Predistribution? Social Conflict, Market Rules, and the Invention of American Residential Zoning, 1879-1915," Luis Flores (University of Michigan)

"Seemingly Settled: Judicial Rhetoric and the Meaning of Segregation," Jimmy Biblarz (Harvard University)

"'On the Basis of Sex': The (Il)Legitimation of Trans Bodies in Law," Eli Alston-Stepnitz (University of California, Davis)

"Transforming Title XI: How Sexual Harrassment Became Sex Discrimination in American Higher Education," Celene Raymer Reynolds (Cornell University)

Organizer: Cybelle Fox (University of California, Berkeley)

Populism and Religion: Comparative-Historical Approaches
10:30am – 12:10pm, Monday, August 10, 2020.

This panel is co-sponsored with the Section on the Sociology of Religion. To join this session: https://uni-goettingen.zoom.us/j/95982336547

Presider: Efe Peker (University of Ottawa)
Discussant: Shai M. Dromi (Harvard University)

"Religion and Gender in the European Populist Right," Ayse Serdar (Istanbul Technical University), Ebru Ozturk (Mid Sweden University), Katarina Giritli Nygren (Mid Sweden University)

"Religion, Populism, and Nationalism in Nine Eastern European States," Pamela Irving Jackson (Rhode Island College), Peter E. Doerschler (Bloomsburg University)

"Religious Populism in America and the Possibility for Democratic Politics," Rhys H. Williams (Loyola University, Chicago)

Organizers: Efe Peker (University of Ottawa) and Gülay Türkmen (University of Goettingen)

Reflections on Field Theory and Comparative-Historical Sociology, 2:30-*4:10pm, Monday, August 10, 2020*

This panel is co-sponsored with the Section on Theory. To join this session: https://fsu.zoom.us/j/98840660397

Presider: Sourabh Singh, Florida State University
Discussant: Craig Calhoun, Arizona State University-Tempe

"The Zero Time of the Political Field: Sociological Comparisons between Transitions to Democracy, Constitutional Moments, and Revolution," Alfredo Joignant (Universidad Diego Portales)

"The New Class, the Field of Social Classes, and Contemporary Populism," Chad Alan Goldberg (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

"The Presentation of Self in International Society: Insights from Bourdieu's Field Theory," Sadia Saeed (University of San Francisco)

"Field Theory and Imperial Geopolitics," George Steinmetz (University of Michigan)

Organizers: Sourabh Singh (Florida State University) and George Steinmetz (University of Michigan)

ASA CHS Business Meeting
4:30 - 5:10pm, Monday, August 10, 2020

To join this session: https://northwestern.zoom.us/s/93899064123; password: CHS4ever!

REFEREED ROUNDTABLES,
5:10-6:10pm, Monday, August 10, 2020

Table 1 has been canceled on account of scheduling complications brought on by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Table 2: The Political Development of Law and Policy in the Twentieth-Century United States.

To join this session: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/93678718838; password: 796760

"How Space Shapes Fate: Political and Institutional Determinants of Access in Los Angeles Eviction Courts," Kyle Nelson (UCLA)

"Credit and Welfare? The Lost Opportunity to Modernize Housing Policy During the Great Society," Jessica Schirmer (UC Berkeley)

Please note that both papers in this roundtable will be given live, online.

Table 3: Studies of Economic Policy - National and International Change after World War Two.

Toin this session: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89549879808; password: 0DXsCu [Note that 0 in the password is the number "0" and not the capital letter "O".]

"Institutional Change in China's Price Reform, 1979-1992," Chang Liu (New School)

"Making the Economy in South Korea Through National Income," Kyunghwan Lee (University of Southern California)

"State Power and Class Dynamics in Global Economic Governance: 1970s IMF Reform," Christoffer Zoeller (UC Irvine)

Please note that all papers in this roundtable will be given live, online.

Table 4: State-Building, Institutional Change, and Empire

To join this session: https://appstate.zoom.us/j/92896576190?pwd=M0ZNbW0rbmVBSXdzWjZ3YXRMZ1lUQT09; password: 942303

"Corporate State or State Inc.: Modern State-Building in the Dutch Republic, Britain, Japan, and China," Yi-wen Yu (Zhejiang University)

"Disaggregating the State, Discerning Class Formation A Comparative Historical Analysis of Global Land Resettlement Policy," Perdana Roswaldy (Northwestern University)

"The Pathways to Empire: Spain and Russia," Pavel I. Osinsky (Appalachian State University)

Please note that Roswaldy and Osinsky will be presented live, online; Yu's presentation will be pre-recorded and played back during the live session.

Table 5: Challenging and Adapting Bourdieu and Benjamin

To join this session: https://umn.zoom.us/j/94952153655; password: 9Fe1ZB

"Development, Take One; Development, Take Two; Humanitarianism GO! On the Transfer of Knowledge across Fields," Nir Rotem (University of Minnesota)

"Arcades in the Tropics: The Long History of Guayaquil's Soportales," Robert Fenton (George Mason University)

Please note that both papers in this roundtable will be given live, online.

Table 6: New Approaches to the Study of Events and Interactions

To join this session: https://umn.zoom.us/j/92969581556; password: WorldWar1

""Such a Rash Act": Wartime Experiences and Veteran Suicides After the Great War," Kris Inwood (University of Guelph), Les Oxley (University of Waikato), Evan Roberts (University of Minnesota)

"Long Term Event Effects in the Production of Political Talk: Evidence From Western Europe, 1973–2002," Sergio Galaz Garcia (Princeton University)

Please note that both papers in this roundtable will be given live, online.

Table 7: Social Movements: Origins, Development, and Consequences

To join this session:
https://umassd.zoom.us/j/3280374765;
password: sociology

"Cold War Made Developmental States: The Détente Period Savings Mobilization Movement in Taiwan and South Korea," Joonsik Kim (National Taiwan University)

"Mobilizing for the Diaspora Nation: What Makes Israeli Americans Enlist in the Israeli Military," Lior Yohanani (Rutgers University)

"Laboring Sovereignty: Class, Nation, and the Origins of Food Sovereignty," Eric Larson (University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth)

Please note that all three papers in this roundtable will be given live, online.

Table 8: Epistemic Communities: Historical and Comparative Perspectives

To join this session:
https://colby.zoom.us/j/98568158858;
password: 357127

"Canons and Colleges: The Structure of Coherence in a Fragmented Subdiscipline," Nicholas Hoover Wilson (Stony Brook University), Damon Mayrl (Colby College)

"Expanding Holocaust Education: Critical Perspectives on Nazi-Era Professionals," Michael F. Polgar (Pennsylvania State University)

Please note that both papers will be pre-recorded and given online at the scheduled time.

Organizers: Maria Akchurin (Loyola University), Anthony S. Chen (Northwestern University)

Introducing the ASA-CHS Teaching Initiative

Damon Mayrl, Colby College

Robert Braun, UC Berkeley



As graduate students, comparative-historical sociologists are trained in how to conceive, design, and carry out historical research in a wide range of spatial-temporal contexts. Far fewer of us are trained in how to conceive, design, or lead a course on comparative-historical sociology. In this, we are not alone—graduate education in sociology more generally emphasizes research over teaching. Yet at the same time, the sprawling character of comparative-historical sociology makes teaching it particularly challenging. Should we foreground method or substance? Which methods? Which substantive foci? Which regions? For many, it can be easier to teach required introductory or theory courses, or courses in our other subdisciplinary foci, where syllabi of friends and colleagues are more readily available as templates.

As a result, comparative-historical sociology is often conspicuous by its absence in the curriculum—especially at the undergraduate level.

This pedagogical deficit impacts comparative-historical sociologists' job market prospects. Why should a department hire a historical sociologist or a comparativist? For us, the answer may be obvious: studying historical change in different societies is an essential means of denaturalizing the social world, decentering the present, contextualizing the United States, and—perhaps most importantly—revealing threads and patterns that help us understand the here and now. Lessons from different times and places acquired through historical inquiry, are essential

to understanding current events, from pandemics to police violence and beyond.

But for hiring committees, especially outside of research-intensive graduate programs, this rationale is not always so obvious. What will comparative-historical sociologists teach? Will students take such a course? And what is comparative-historical sociology, anyway? These answers are often not clear to search committees and deans, and the results are visible in the low number of job searches targeting historical sociologists, and in the persistent sense among many of our colleagues that historical sociology is like a Panerai watch or Prada bag—prestigious and elegant, but ultimately only a luxurious accessory for the most elite departments (Adams et al. 2005; Prasad 2006).

We think it is time to take the teaching of historical sociology more seriously, at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. We seek to find out how comparative-historical sociologists are teaching our subdiscipline, and to share that knowledge amongst ourselves. What kinds of courses and assignments work well to inspire undergraduates to undertake their own comparative-historical sociological projects? How can we teach our rich and plural methodological options to graduate students in ways that foster rigor and creativity simultaneously? What obstacles may present themselves along the way? And if they do, how can we overcome them, to make historical sociology a more central substantive and methodological component of both undergraduate and graduate curricula?

With this in mind, we plan to inaugurate a new teaching initiative this summer under the auspices of the ASA Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology. This initiative has two main goals: (1) to develop a database of sample syllabi and assignments, and (2) to create a space for exchange around strategies for teaching historical sociology. We aim to include a wide range of epistemological, methodological and theoretical approaches, and to develop an account of comparative-historical sociology that adequately captures racial, gender, and class diversity:

*** Graduate syllabus database:**
Our first goal is to create a database of syllabi and assignments for both graduate and undergraduate courses. At the graduate level, historical sociology has a more robust presence, and historical sociologists have developed a wide array of approaches to teaching the field—from guiding students through hands-on practice in archives, to centering questions of logic of inquiry and causal inference, to closely analyzing classic texts in the field, and beyond. We aim to gather these, to better highlight the diversity of texts and approaches being taught in graduate departments, and place them in an accessible forum for section members, so that they may learn about and share ways of structuring graduate courses. Doing so, moreover, will create a space for us as a community to reflect and re-envision how historical sociology might be taught with a greater diversity of traditions and positions, an expanded canon, and a more global vision.

*** Undergraduate syllabus database:**
At the undergraduate level, we similarly seek to gather as many syllabi and assignments as possible * and make them available to section members. Historical sociology qua historical sociology is infrequently taught at the undergraduate level, although it may often be taught through more topical courses on war, revolutions, policy change, and other topics. We are interested in casting a wide net. We are also interested in thinking through the best ways to teach courses in "social change" more specifically. Social change is a topic with an illustrious history in sociology, and historical sociologists—with their sensitivity to temporality and knowledge of the mechanisms of historical change—are uniquely positioned to teach such a course. Yet there are few available models for how to teach it that center historical sociology, especially at the undergraduate level.

We hope to pool our brainpower to develop one or more model syllabi for undergraduate courses on "social change" that faculty and graduate students could incorporate into their teaching portfolios or use as inspiration as they develop their own courses.

Assignment database:
A related goal is to create a database of assignments for teaching aspects of historical sociology. How can we introduce students to historical research in the compressed space of a single semester? What kinds of assignments work best? What should our learning outcomes be, at the undergraduate and at the graduate level? As part of that, what aspects of our subdiscipline should we emphasize through our assignments—substantive aspects, methodological training, or something else? And what kinds of assignments best enable us to achieve our objectives? Again, by pooling our resources and knowledge, we can allow for the diffusion of successful and innovative assignments that bring historical sociology to life for our students.

*** A pedagogical community:**
Finally, we hope to create a virtual (and, when conditions again permit, in-person) forum for interested historical sociologists to come together and discuss strategies for teaching historical sociology. Such a community might meet regularly at ASA and SSHA, and maintain a virtual community for exchange of syllabi, assignments, reflections, and other materials and ideas throughout the calendar year.

We invite all interested members of the Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology to join us in this initiative. If you are interested in sharing your syllabi (undergraduate or graduate), assignments, and ideas about how to improve how we teach historical sociology, we want to hear from you. Please email us at 2020teachs@gmail.com if you are interested or have materials to share. We will be in touch about a virtual meeting in early August. Thanks, and we hope to hear from many of you!

Comparative-Historical Section

Announcements and Recent Publications

2020 CHS Section Awards

Ibn Khaldun Distinguished Career Award

Co-winner: William H. Sewell, Jr., University of Chicago
Co-winner: Viviana A. Zelizer, Princeton University

Committee: Fatma Müge Göçek (chair), Bruce Carruthers, and George Steinmetz

Barrington Moore Book Award

Co-winner: Robert Braun, *Protectors of Pluralism: Religious Minorities and the Rescue of Jews in the Low Countries during the Holocaust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
Co-winner: Eddy U, *Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2019).

Committee: Andreas Wimmer (chair), Fabien Accominotti, A.K.M. Skarpelis

Charles Tilly Article Award

Co-winner: Accominotti, Fabien, Shamus R. Khan, Adam Storer. 2018. "How Cultural Capital Emerged in Gilded Age America: Musical Purification and Cross-Class Inclusion at the New York Philharmonic." *American Journal of Sociology* 123(6): 1743-83.

Co-winner: Kentikelenis, Alexander E. and Sarah Babb. 2019. "The Making of Neoliberal Globalization: Norm Substitution and the Politics of Clandestine Institutional Change." *American Journal of Sociology* 124(6): 1720-62.

Committee: Paul Chang (chair), Barış Büyükokutan, Christopher Muller

Theda Skocpol Dissertation Award

Winner: Johnnie Lotesta, "Rightward in the Rustbelt: How Conservatives Remade the GOP, 1947-2012," Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 2019.

Committee: Edwin Ackerman (chair), Cameron Campbell, and Sefika Kumral

Reinhard Bendix Student Paper Award

Winner: Simeon J. Newman, University of Michigan, "Mass Clientelism: A Mode of Political Intermediation."
Honorable Mention: Lantian Li, Northwestern University, "Redefining Innovation for Development: The Political Economy of New Drug Classification in China."

Committee: Eric Schoon (chair), Luciana de Leão, and Joris Gjata

2020 ASA-CHS Election Results

Chair-Elect: Nitsan Chorev, Brown University
Secretary/Treasurer: Marisela Martinez-Cola, Utah State University
Council: Karida Brown, UCLA; and Marco Garrido, University of Chicago

Election Committee: Müge Göçek (chair), Barry Eidlin, and Michael Polgar

Recent Publications

Books

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2019. *Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison*. Cambridge, CUP.

Plys, Kristin Victoria Magistrelli. 2020. *Brewing Resistance: Indian Coffee House and the Emergency in Postcolonial India: Indian Coffee House and the Emergency in Postcolonial India*. Cambridge, CUP, 2020.

Pfaff, Steven and Michael Hechter. 2020. *The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance and Mutiny in the Age of Sail*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Hechter, Michael. 2019. *Rational Choice Sociology: Essays on Theory, Collective Action, and Social Order*. Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar.

Alexander, Jeffrey, Trevor Stack and Farhad Khosrokhavar. 2020. *Breaching the Civil Order: Radicalism and the Civil Sphere*. Edited Volume. Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press.

Andreas, Joel. 2019. *Disenfranchised: The Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stephan, Rita and Mounira M. Charrad, eds., 2020. *Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring*. New York: New York University Press.

Articles

Mayrl, Damon, and Nicholas Hoover Wilson. 2020. "What Do Historical Sociologists Do All Day? Analytic Architectures in Historical Sociology." *AJS*. 125(5), 1345-1394.

Luft, Aliza. 2020. "Theorizing Moral Cognition: Culture in Action, Situations, and Relationships." *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World*. 6:1-15.

Luft, Aliza. 2020. "Religion in Vichy France: How Meso-Level Actors Contribute to Authoritarian Legitimation." *European Journal of Sociology*. 1-35.

Luft, Aliza. 2020. "Three Stories and Three Questions about Participation in Genocide." *Journal of Perpetrator Research*. 3(1), 196-206.

Burchardt, Marian, and Ann Swidler. 2020. "Transplanting Institutional Innovation: Comparing the Success of NGOs and Missionary Protestantism in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Theory and Society 49: 335-64*.

Hammer, Ricarda. 2020. Decolonizing the Civil Sphere: The Politics of Difference, Imperial Erasures, and Theorizing from History. *Sociological Theory*. 38(2). 101-121

Singh, Sourabh. 2020. To rely or not to rely on common sense? Introducing critical Realism's insights to social network analysis. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 50(2). 203-222

Joachim J. Savelsberg. 2020. "Anti-Impunity Transnational Legal Ordering and Human Rights – Formation, Institutionalization, Consequences, and the Case of Darfur." In *Transnational Legal Ordering of Criminal Law*, edited by E. Aaronson and G. Schaffer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, pp. 205-233.

Joachim J. Savelsberg. 2020. Chambers, Brooke B., and Joachim J. Savelsberg. "Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing." In E. Erez & P. Ibarra (eds.), *Oxford Encyclopedia of International Criminology*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Joachim J. Savelsberg and Amber Joy Powell. 2020 "Politics, Institutions and the Penal State." *The New Handbook of Political Sociology*, edited by Thomas Janoski, Isaac Martin, Joya Misra, and Cedric De Leon, Cambridge University Press, pp. 513-537.

Joachim J. Savelsberg. 2020. "The Representational Power of International

Criminal Courts." In *Power in International Criminal Justice: Towards a Sociology of International Justice*, edited by M. Bergsmo, M. Klamberg, K. Lohne and C. Mahony. Nuremberg Academies, TOAEP, pp. 493-510.

Yohanani, Lior. 2020. "Zionist identity and the British Mandate: Palestine's internment camps and the making of the Western native." *Nations and Nationalism* 26(1), 246-262.

Türkoğlu, Didem. 2019. "Student protests and organised labour: Developing a research agenda for mobilisation in late neoliberalism." *Current Sociology*, 67(7), 997–1017

Charrad, Mounira M. & Nicholas Reith. 2019. "Local Solidarities: How the Arab Spring Protests Started." *Sociological Forum* V34: 1174-1196.

Charrad, Mounira M. & Rita Stephan. 2020. "The Power of Presence: Professional Women Leaders and Family Law Reform in Morocco." *Social Politics*, Volume 27, Issue 2: 337–360.

Charrad, Mounira M.& Amina Zarrugh. 2020. "Women are Complete, not Complements: Terminology in a New Constitution in Tunisia." *Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring*, edited R. Stephan & M. M. Charrad. New York: New York University Press.

Peker, Efe. 2020. "Beyond Positivism: Building Turkish *Laiklik* in the Transition from the Empire to the Republic (1908-1938). *Social Science History*, 44(2): 301-327.

Peker, Efe. 2019. "Bringing the State Back in Secularization: The Development of *Laïcité* in the French Third Republic (1875-1905)." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 58(4): 813-832.